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“Entre o falar e o fazer há um mundo a vencer.” 
 
“Del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho.”  
 
“It is easier said than done.” 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Does it really matter to implementation performance whether the implementing jurisdiction is 
rich or poor? This study aimed at answering this question and building a better understanding 
of how local socio-economic characteristics impact policy implementation in the context of 
poverty alleviation policies, such as conditional cash transfers, which are largely  carried out 
in poor areas.  
 
Even though the importance of socio-economic characteristics in influencing performance is 
widely recognised in the policy implementation literature, existing theoretical frameworks 
offer only a superficial and limited examination of the role of local socio-economic 
characteristics in the implementation process. Given this gap in the literature, the first part of 
this thesis focus on the development of a theoretical framework which explains the 
relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and implementation performance. 
This theoretical framework offers a path to analysing the interaction between local socio-
economic characteristics and six other intervening variable clusters that influence 
performance, namely policy objective, policy resources, political conditions, agency capacity, 
disposition of implementers and intergovernmental relations.  
 
The second part of this work empirically investigates this relationship in the context of the 
Bolsa Família Program,  a Brazilian conditional cash transfer programme which benefits over 
13 million families with monthly cash transfers linked to the fulfillment of health and 
education conditionalities. Bolsa Família’s decentralised implementation offers an ideal 
setting to study performance variation among the 5,565 municipalities implementing this 
federal programme.  
  
Using a sub-national comparative approach, this study applies a combination of large-n 
quantitative research with contextualised qualitative research to analysed and compared the 
performance of municipalities implementing the Bolsa Família Program and their socio-
economic characteristics, particularly their levels of income and development. Quantitative 
analysis of performance data from all municipalities implementing Bolsa Família shows that, 
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contrary to common sense, poorer, less developed municipalities have a better 
implementation performance than wealthier, more developed ones. Why is that the case?  
 
Further investigation using qualitative techniques suggests that this is the case because the 
relative importance of the Bolsa Família Program to municipalities is very different 
according to their socio-economic situation: the programme is extremely important to poor 
municipalities and only marginally important to wealthy ones.  This in turn influences the 
level of support and resources available to programme implementation in such areas;  
wealthy municipalities have largely failed to mobilise existing local resources to support 
implementation, while poor ones benefited from  performance-related federal funds to build 
their capacity to carry out programme implementation. In sum, poor municipalities are likely 
to have both the motivation and the capacity to implement the Bolsa Família Program, while 
wealthy municipalities, in most cases, lack both. 
 
The conclusions of this study challenge the widely accepted assumption that more resources 
and capacity at local level will invariably lead to better implementation performance and 
propose a revision of decentralised policy implementation and capacity building strategies in 
poor areas.  
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RESUMEN 
 
 
¿Es realmente importante para la implementación de políticas que la jurisdicción ejecutora 
sea rica o pobre? Este estudio se centra en contestar esta pregunta y en entender mejor cómo 
las características socioeconómicas locales pueden influir en la implementación de las 
políticas, particularmente en las políticas para aliviar la pobreza, como por ejemplo las 
transferencias monetarias condicionadas, que son en gran parte aplicadas en áreas pobres. 
 
Aún cuando la influencia de las características socioeconómicas en el desempeño es 
ampliamente reconocida en la literatura sobre implementación de políticas, los marcos 
teóricos existentes sólo ofrecen un examen superficial y limitado sobre el rol de las 
características socioeconómicas en el proceso de implementación. Dada esta laguna en la 
literatura, la primera parte de esta tesis está dedicada a desarrollar un marco teórico que 
explique la relación entre las características socioeconómicas y la ejecución de políticas. Este 
marco teórico ofrece un camino para analizar la interacción entre características 
socioeconómicas locales y otros seis grupos de variables que influyen en la ejecución, éstas 
son: el objetivo de la política, los recursos de la política, las condiciones políticas, la 
capacidad de la agencia ejecutora, la disposición de los implementadores y las relaciones 
intergubernamentales. 
 
La segunda parte de este trabajo investiga empíricamente estas relaciones en el contexto del 
Programa Bolsa Família, un programa de transferencias monetarias condicionadas en Brasil 
que beneficia a más de 13 millones de familias con transferencias de dinero mensuales, 
vinculadas al cumplimento de condicionalidades de salud y educación. La implementación 
descentralizada de Bolsa Família ofrece un espacio ideal para el estudio de variación de 
desempeño entre las 5.565 municipalidades que implementan este programa federal. 
 
Haciendo un análisis comparativo subnacional, este estudio aplica una combinación de 
investigación cuantitativa con amplia muestra e investigación cualitativa contextualizada, y 
compara el desempeño de municipios que implementan el Programa Bolsa Família y sus 
características socioeconómicas, particularmente sus niveles de ingreso y desarrollo. El 
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análisis cuantitativo de datos de desempeño de todos los municipios que implementan Bolsa 
Família demuestra que, contrariamente al sentido común, los municipios más pobres y menos 
desarrollados tienen un mejor desempeño que aquellos más ricos o más desarrollados. ¿Por 
qué sucede esto? 
 
Una investigación más profunda utilizando técnicas cualitativas sugiere que esto se da porque 
la importancia relativa del Programa Bolsa Família para los municipios varía de acuerdo a su 
situación socioeconómica: el programa es de extrema importancia para los municipios 
pobres, y tan solo marginalmente importante para los ricos. Esto, por su parte, influye en el 
nivel de apoyo y en los recursos disponibles a la hora de ejecutar el programa en dichas áreas. 
Los municipios ricos han fracasado en movilizar recursos locales existentes para apoyar la 
implementación, mientras que los municipios pobres se han beneficiado de fondos federales 
relacionados con desempeño, para prepararse para llevar a cabo la implementación del 
programa. En suma, los municipios pobres tienden a tener tanto la motivación como la 
capacidad de implementar el Programa Bolsa Família, mientras que los municipios ricos, en 
la mayoría de los casos, carecen de ambas. 
 
Las conclusiones de este estudio desafían la creencia ampliamente aceptada de que más 
recursos y capacidad a nivel local conllevan invariablemente a un mejor desempeño en la 
implementación de políticas, y proponen una revisión de estrategias de implementación 
descentralizada y de desarrollo de capacidades en áreas pobres. 
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Chapter I   Introduction 
 
 
Governments all over the world are becoming increasingly horizontal and decentralised and, 
as a result, policy outcomes are more and more dependent on the success of local government 
action (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). From the perspective of policy implementation this 
entails a renewed interest in understanding performance variation at the local level and 
investigating how local characteristics can facilitate or hinder implementation (Barrett 2004; 
Hill and Hupe 2009).  
 
It is often assumed that poverty and underdevelopment are characteristics which invariably 
hinder implementation (van Stolk and Patil 2014; Yoong 2012; Pritchett, Woolcock and 
Andrews 2012; Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). This assumption is normally based on the fact 
that poor, less developed areas have inherently limited resources and fragile institutional 
capacity and as such often lack the means to implement policies successfully. Indeed, there 
are large numbers of case studies from the development and implementation literatures 
illustrating the difficulties poor, less developed areas face when implementing policy (see for 
instance Brinkerhoff 1999; DFID 2011; Ridde 2008) .  
 
However, while resources and capacity are critical elements of implementation success 
(O’Toole 2004), this somehow intuitive idea that wealthy, more developed areas are better at 
implementing policies than poor ones is based on a rather simplistic view of implementation, 
which attributes the outputs of implementation solely to local capacity and resources. It fails 
to recognise the importance of several other variables affecting implementation, both 
contextual variables and non-contextual ones, and the interaction between local socio-
economic characteristics and such variables.  
 
And yet, the idea that wealth and development facilitates policy implementation while 
poverty and underdevelopment hinders it sounds so commonsensical and is so firmly 
established that, despite its significant practical implication to policy design and 
implementation, and indeed to wider governance, there are, to my knowledge, no systematic 
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empirical studies which investigate the relationship between local poverty/wealth and 
implementation performance. 
 
While virtually all policy implementation theoretical frameworks acknowledge the influence 
of local socio-economic characteristics in the implementation process, they offer only a 
superficial analysis of the role of this variable cluster, failing to explain how this aspect of the 
local context interact with other contextual (political conditions, institutional capacity)  and 
non-contextual variables (policy/statutory variables, intergovernmental relations) to produce 
performance (see for instance, Van Meter and Van Horn’s “Model of the Policy 
Implementation Process” (1975,1976); Sabatier & Ma manian’s “Policy Implementation 
Framework” (1980); Goggin et al.’s “Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy 
Implementation” (1990); Winter “Integrated Implementation Model” (1990 and 1994). As 
Matland (1995) noticed, the implementation literature has “given us a field overflowing with 
diagrams and flow charts with a prodigious number variables. [However] The conditions 
under which these variables are important and the reasons we should expect them to be 
important have been ignored to a large degree or have been treated superficially”.  
 
This study aims to fill this gap in the literature and provide a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and performance. It has two main 
objectives: (i) To develop a theoretical framework which explains the relationship between 
local socio-economic characteristics and performance in the implementation of 
intergovernmental policy; (ii) To empirically study this relationship in the context of targeted 
poverty alleviation policies, such as Conditional Cash Transfers.  
 
By building theory and empirical evidence on this key variable of the implementation 
process, this study supports the development of implementation, decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations studies. It also contributes to the wider debates regarding the 
implications of new governance arrangements in policy implementation and the dilemmas 
they create in terms of  management, accountability and equitable provision of services.  
 
Investigating such arrangements and the dilemmas they create has been my primary research 
interest over the past 10 years. I first explored this topic while reading for a MSc in 
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Development Projects at the University of Reading, when I wrote a dissertation focused on 
the possibilities and the perils of international cooperation in policy implementation. This 
work was published in the Development in Practice Journal  in 2004
1
. A few years later, I 
wrote a MSc dissertation on Public Private Partnerships, at Birkbeck College, University of 
London, focusing on the British experience with Private Finance Initiative (PFIs) and 
exploring how such instruments could be applied in a developing country context.  
 
During the course of this doctorate, I further explored the issues of public-private 
partnerships in policy implementation in my Tesina, but this time I focused on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) with a study that compared the direct and indirect 
implementation of a cash transfer programme in Mozambique. This work was published in 
the GIGAPP Working Papers in 2010. This thesis, focused on intergovernmental policy 
implementation, is part of this quest to understand the possibilities and challenges the new 
governance arrangements open to policy implementation.  
 
 
1. Research Question 
 
The main research question that guide this investigation is as follows: Does it matter to 
implementation performance whether the implementing jurisdiction is rich or poor? If so, 
how? 
 
The specific research questions in this study are: 
(1) Do local socio-economic characteristics influence the implementation of 
intergovernmental policy? 
(2) Are the dynamics of policy implementation different in poor and rich areas? 
(3) Do poor and rich areas have different implementation performances? 
(4) If so, which one has better implementation performance? Do wealthy, more developed 
areas outperform poor ones; or, on the contrary, poor, less developed areas outperform 
wealthy ones? 
                                                        
1 Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004) “Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost‐sharing model in Bra il”, 
Development in Practice 14(3): 311-327 
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2. Research Strategy 
 
This study is carried out from a pragmatic perspective and hence the choice of research 
approach was guided by its research questions (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). The research 
questions addressed in this study call for the analysis of policy implementation in areas with 
contrasting socio-economic characteristics, rich and poor, suggesting the use of comparative 
approaches. The comparative approach can be defined as “a method of testing hypothesi ed 
empirical relationships between variables (…) in which cases are selected in such way as to 
maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of control 
variables” (Lijphart 1975:164). As the primary interest is to investigate the relationship 
between local socio-economic characteristics and implementation within a decentralised, 
intergovernmental implementation context,  a sub-national comparative method was selected.  
 
The sub-national comparative approach can be defined as the systematic analysis of a small 
number of territorially-defined sub-national cases, such as cities, provinces, states and 
regions (Moncada and Snyder 2012). According to Snyder (2001) the sub-national 
comparative approach  has two key strengths with regard to research design. First,  it can 
serve as a powerful tool for increasing the number of observations, mitigating the problem of 
many variables, small-n and facilitating the use of quantitative methods. Secondly, it makes it 
easier to construct controlled comparisons which increase the probability of obtaining valid 
causal inferences, as the focus on sub-national units can greatly strengthen the ability to 
establish control over potential explanatory variables. This is particularly the case in  within-
nation comparisons which follow what Snyder (2001) called a “one sector, many places” 
strategy.  
 
The sub-national comparative method is extensively used the field of comparative politics 
(Moncada and Snyder 2012).  However, there are few comparative studies in studies in the 
policy implementation literature, as the literature still relies mostly on single case studies to 
examine the success of failures of the implementation process (O’Toole 2000; Winter 2006). 
  5 
Some notable exceptions include research on policy implementation variation in the U.K. by 
Vicki et al. (2006)  and Choi (1999) . Vicki et al. (2006) research used postal survey of local 
officers to investigate the factors affecting the implementation of a social care policy from 
the central government in England. Choi (1999) compared implementation by local 
authorities in the U.K. of the privitasation of local government services. Both studies provide 
useful methodological and theoretical insights regarding the use of sub-national comparisons 
to study local implementation variance. The extensive literature on comparative politics in 
the U.S.A. which examines federal policy adoption by states also offers interesting insights 
regarding the use of sub-national comparative studies to investigate variation in 
intergovernmental contexts. 
 
Similarly to Snyder’s (2001) “ones sector, many places” strategy, the analysis of the same 
policy across several sub-national jurisdictions - states in the case of USA focused research 
or local authorities in the case of the U.K. – can yield significant insights regarding the 
conditions under which certain variables are important, allowing comparisons to focus on key 
independent contextual variables and the interaction between the policy and the local context 
without having to control for all the variables related to policy objectives, design and 
resources. This study follows this “one policy, many places” research strategy, comparing the 
implementation of a single programme across poor and wealthy sub-national areas to chart 
variation and gain a better understanding of the behaviour of implementation performance 
under these contrasting circumstances. 
 
The policy selected for this comparative study is the Brazilian conditional cash transfer 
programme Bolsa Família.  
 
 
2.1 Why Conditional Cash Transfers? 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are one of the most widely adopted poverty alleviation 
policies in the developing world. CCTs are regular money payments to poor individuals or 
households in exchange for compliance with human development conditionalities, with the 
objective of alleviating poverty in the short run and breaking the cycle of poverty in the long 
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run through improvements in human capital. Hailed as the closest one could come to a magic 
bullet in development, CCTs have, since the 1990s when Brazil and Mexico launched the 
first programmes, expanded very rapidly and are currently implemented in over 40 countries 
(Adoto and Hoddinot 2007; DFID 2011). 
 
CCTs are complex to implement and, given their poverty targeting, concentrate beneficiaries 
in poor areas, imposing a significant management and administrative burden on less 
developed implementers. This has raised concerns regarding the ability of poor countries and 
poor areas within high and middle-income countries to implement such complex policies 
given their limited institutional capacities and resources (Samson et al. 2006, Rawlings 
2005). Harvey and Holmes (2007) have called this issue “the catch 22 of social protection”, 
where the greater the need for it, the lower government’s ability to provide it.  
 
Such concerns have had real implications to programmes’ design and implementation 
strategies. For instance, some countries, such as South Africa and Zambia, opted for less 
complex unconditional cash transfers, relinquishing a key component of CCTs and 
potentially compromising its long term objective of breaking the cycle of poverty; others, 
such as Mexico, Peru, and Mozambique have adopted centralised implementation 
approaches. 
 
By focusing on the analysis of Conditional Cash Transfer policies, this study aims to enhance 
the understanding of how the relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and 
implementation performance works in the context of policies whose implementation largely 
takes place in poor, less developed areas.  
 
 
2.2 Why the Bolsa Família Program? 
 
The Bolsa Família Program is the largest CCT programme in the world, currently benefiting 
13 million families with an annual budget of over $24 billion reais (US$12 billion). There are 
three main reasons for selecting Bolsa Famíla for this comparative study.  
  7 
 
Firstly, as a pioneers CCT programme, Bolsa Família is very representative of the policy type 
focus of this research. It has all the characteristic elements and features of a typical 
conditional-cash transfer programme and is often the reference (along with Mexico’s 
“Oportunidades”) for the development of new CCT programmes.  
 
Secondly, Bolsa Família’s decentralised implementation created an ideal setting for a sub-
national comparative study. This federal programme is implemented by Bra il’s 5,565 
municipalities, enabling the analysis of implementation variation across municipalities and 
their diverse socio-economic characteristics.  
 
Finally, the Programme has developed a unique quantitative indicator of implementation 
performance – the Decentralized Management Index (Índice de Gestao Decentralizada 
Municipal- IGD-M, in Portuguese) – which can be used to measure and compare municipal 
implementation performance. Finding the right proxy for implementation performance is 
often the key challenge faced by implementation researchers, particularly in the case of 
quantitative research (Hill and Hupe 2009). Hence, the fact that Bolsa Família’s I  -M 
enables the quantitative analysis of implementation performance and that information on 
IGD-M scores was collected and available for all municipalities was a critical reason for 
studying the Bolsa Família Program. 
 
 
3. Research Method 
 
Heeding to the advice put forward by Lester and Goggin (1998) to combine large-n 
quantitative research with contextualised qualitative research when analysing variance in 
local implementation performance,  this research employed a mixed methods strategy with a 
explanatory sequential design (Creswell and Clark 2011). The use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods together and in complementary ways provides a richer pool of data and 
greater analytical power than that gained through either method alone and has long been 
established theoretically and empirically (Creswell 1994; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  
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Quantitative methods were used to analyse and compare  implementation as an output, while 
quantitative analysis helped to interpret and explain the quantitative results and to establish 
the underlying processes which lead to a certain performance. The combination of these two 
levels of analysis – output and process – offers a more comprehensive view into the “black 
box” of implementation, increasing our comprehension of the intermediate processes that 
ultimately determine programmes’ impacts. 
 
Snyder (2001) noted that in sub-national comparative studies, the focus of analysis should be 
lower-level units in which the process entailed by the hypothesis takes place. Hence, in this 
comparative study, Bra il’s municipalities are the sub-units of analysis in both the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, as they are the main loci of Bolsa Família’s 
implementation. 
 
 
3.1 Quantitative Analysis 
 
The purpose of the quantitative analysis was to examine the relationship between municipal 
implementation performance and local socio-economic characteristics and test the following 
research hypotheses: 
H1: Municipalities’ socio-economic characteristics affect implementation performance. 
 
H2a: High levels of income and development are associated with good performance, 
while low levels of income and development are associated with weak performance;  
OR 
H2b: High levels of income and development are associated with weak performance, 
while low levels of income and development are associated with good performance. 
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3.1.1 Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Implementation Performance 
 
The dependent variable in this study is implementation performance, represented by  the 
Decentralised Management Index ( ndice de  est o  escentrali ada – IGD-M, in 
Portuguese), a synthetic performance indicator developed by Bolsa Família’s federal 
managers (MDS). Performance indicators should, according to Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975), assess the extend to which policy targets and objectives (rather than policy outcomes) 
have been realised. The IGD-M fulfills this criteria, as it measures municipal performance at 
the output level in all programme areas which are carried out directly by municipalities, 
namely family registration and enrolment, upkeep of the Unified Registry (Cadastro Único) 
and monitoring of conditionalities’ compliance. The IGD-M is calculated on a monthly basis 
for all municipalities and its value can vary from 0 to 1; the closer to 1, the better the 
implementation performance of the municipality. The IGD-M is also specific, measurable, 
attainable, relevant and time bound and hence a good indicator to be used in quantitative 
research, as demonstrated by Tomazilli et al. 2010, Silva et al. (2010), and  van  Stolk and 
Patil (2013).  
 
Independent Variables: Local Socio-Economic Characteristics 
 
In this study, municipalities’ socio-economic characteristics are defined in term of income 
and development levels and operationalised by two widely used indicators: Gross Domestic 
Product per capita (GDP per capita)  and the Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI).  
 
GDP per capita ( also known as income per capita) is calculated by dividing an area’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by its population. Rich municipalities are those with GDP per 
capita above the national average; poor municipalities are those with GDP per capita below 
the national average. A key criticism of this indicator is that it reflects only the “material” 
aspect of the socio-economic context. Hence, in order to address this limitation,  I have also 
used in this study a multidimensional indicator of development, the MHDI. 
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“The Human Development Report” and its “Human Development Index” were developed by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as an alternative to  money-metric 
approaches such as GDP per capita. The human development approach, was based on the 
Amartya Sen’s (1970, 1983, 1985) capability approach and introduced a new way of 
measuring development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment 
and income into a composite human development index. The Municipal Human 
Development Index, used in this study, is a composite measure of human development 
calculated by the UNDP for all Brazilian municipalities based on data provided by the 
decennial censuses conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-IBGE, in Portuguese). Brazil was one of the first 
countries to adopt and calculate the HDI for all the municipalities, creating the sub-national 
index in 1998. The MHDI adjusts the HDI to the municipal reality and reflects specific and 
regional challenges in Brazilian human development, enabling one to evaluate and compare 
the performance of municipalities (UNDP 2013).The MHDI is a methodological adaptation 
of the HDI hence, while both indices consist of the same three dimensions - health, education 
and income - , some indicators used in MHDI to reflect these dimensions are different.  
 
Control Variable: Population Size 
 
Population size has been shown to be an important factor in performance variation in policy 
the implementation. Van Stolk and Patil (2014) have also shown that the size of municipal 
population can potentially play an important role in the implementation of Bolsa Família. 
Hence municipalities’ population si e has been used as a control variable in this study, 
following IB E’s categorisation which divide Bra ilian municipalities in three groups: small 
municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants (4,957 municipalities); medium-sized 
municipalities with population between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants (475 municipalities); 
and large municipalities with over 200,000 inhabitants (133 municipalities).  
 
3.1.2 Data Sources 
 
Data for this research has been obtained through the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Brazilian Institute of 
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Geography and Statistics (IBGE). All variables refer to the year 2010. In the case of the 
dependent variable, IGD-M, which is collected on a monthly basis, the data used is the 
average score over a period 12 months, January to December 2010. 
 
3.1.3 Data analysis 
 
The data analysis was carried out in several sequential stages. Firstly, a descriptive and 
geographical analysis of the variables was carried out. This was followed by bivariate 
analysis of the relationships between the independent variables – municipal GDP per capita 
and MHDI - and the implementation performance indicator used in this study –IGD-M, 
taking into account municipal size. Based on the results of the correlation analyses, Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the 
average IGD-M scores for the year 2010, as the dependent variable, both municipal 
contextual variables (GDP per capita and MHDI) as independent variables, and population 
size as a control variable. Four separate regression analyses have been performed; one 
including all municipalities and one for each subgroup of municipalities according to 
population size (small, medium and large municipalities). The results of the quantitative 
analysis are presented and discussed in Chapter VI.  
 
 
3.2 Qualitative Analysis 
 
The main purpose of the qualitative analysis was to interpret and explain the results of the 
quantitative analysis by analysing the underlying processes of implementation. This 
explanatory was guided by a theoretical framework based on Van Meter and Van Horn’s 
“Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation” (1975,1976).  Van Meter and Van 
Horn’s model explain the implementation process, that is, “the process by which policies are 
transformed into public services” in an intergovernmental context where various government 
units exercise legitimate authority with relative autonomy. The “Model of Intergovernmental 
Policy Implementation” identifies eight clusters of variables, from both the “top” and the 
“bottom” of the implementation system, which are linked dynamically to the dependent 
variable “performance”, namely, policy standards, policy resources, intergovernmental 
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communication, intergovernmental enforcement, characteristics of the implementing agency, 
political environment and the socio-economic environment of the implementing jurisdiction.   
 
Having van Meter and Van Horn’s Model as staring point, I applied  theoretical and 
empirical insights from comparative policy analysis, policy implementation and 
intergovernmental relations literatures to develop a theoretical framework which focus on the 
local socio-economic context and its relationship with implementation performance. Local 
socio-economic characteristics is the framework’s independent variable cluster, while Van 
Meter and Van Horn’s other independent variables became the intervening variables in this 
study’s theoretical framework, mediating  the relationship between local socio-economic 
characteristics and implementation performance. The resulting framework aims to explain 
how the independent variable (local socio-economic characteristics) interacts with six 
intervening variable clusters (policy standards, policy resources, political conditions, agency 
capacity, disposition of implementers and intergovernmental relations) to produce an effect 
on the independent variable (implementation performance).  
 
Figure 1: Van Meter and Van Horn’s Model and the Socio-Economic Characteristics 
and Implementation Performance Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
Independent 
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3.2.1 Data Sources 
 
This qualitative work was based on data from a qualitative survey of Bolsa Família’s 
municipal managers, as well as a thorough review of secondary data related to Bolsa Família, 
which included programme documents and an extensive academic and professional literature 
focused on Bolsa Família.  
 
Primary data: Qualitative Survey 
 
In order to investigate variation in the implementation of Bolsa Família across rich and poor 
municipalities, a questionnaire with 14 open-ended questions was sent by email to a sample 
of municipal programme managers to collect first-hand information on the local 
implementation context, as well as grasp perceptions and attitudes of municipal managers in 
relation to the programme.  
The questionnaire (Appendix 1) was elaborated based on this study’s theoretical framework 
and covered four areas: 1) political conditions: the importance of the programme at the local 
level and support from local mayor;  2) institutional capacity: resources for Programme 
implementation at the local level;  3) disposition of implementers: their views and attitudes 
towards the Programme’s objectives and execution; 4) intergovernmental relations: 
relationship with state and federal governments (communications, resources, IGD-M). 
 
In order to ensure the representativeness of both poor and rich municipalities, a non-
probabilistic quota sampling design was used and the questionnaire was sent to 100 
municipalities with MHDI and income per capita above the national average and 100 
municipalities with MHDI and income per capita below the national average  (Cooper and 
Emory 1995). The email was used as a means of communication for pragmatic reasons, 
enabling the research to cover a range of respondents in a wide geographical area at low cost 
(Cooper and Emory 1995:287). The final sample consisted of 42 completed questionnaires;  
21 (3 of which were large ones) from municipalities with MHDI and income per capita above 
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the national average and  21 from municipalities with MHDI and income per capita below the 
national average. A profile of respondent municipalities can be found in Appendix 2. 
Secondary data  
 
The main types of secondary data used in this study included Bolsa Família specific 
documents such as laws and decrees, guidelines on several aspects of programme 
implementation issued by MDS, training material used by MDS, and programme evaluations; 
and the extensive academic and professional (produced by international organisations and 
think tanks) literature dedicated to the Bolsa Família Program. 
 
3.2.2  Data Analysis 
 
Primary and secondary data were used complementarily. Content analysis of municipal 
managers’ questionnaires and secondary data was carried out with reference to this study’s 
theoretical framework, taking into account municipalities’ different socio-economic contexts. 
For the purpose of this study, municipalities have been divided in two groups according to 
their income and development levels.  
The “poor municipalities” group was comprised of municipalities with both   P per capita 
and MHDI below the national average. Typically, municipalities in this group were small 
(with less than 50,000 inhabitants), were mainly in the North or Northeast regions of Brazil 
and had large proportions of their population benefiting from the Bolsa Família Program – on 
average, over 60 per cent of these municipalities’ population directly benefited from Bolsa 
Família. 
 
The “rich municipalities” group was comprised of municipalities with both GDP per capita 
and MHDI above or equal to the national average. Such municipalities were mainly in the 
South and Southeast regions of Brazil and were mostly medium or large-size municipalities, 
with virtually all large municipalities (population above 200,000) within this group. The 
proportion of population benefiting from the Bolsa Família Program within this group was 
considerably smaller, with just over 20 per cent of families benefiting on average from the 
programme.  
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Table 1: Rich and Poor Municipalities Compared 
2010 
Wealthy municipalities 
(High MIDH and GDP per 
capita)
2
 
Poor municipalities 
(Low MIDH and GDP per 
capita) 
N 1,848 2,453 
Average IGDM 0.7458 0.8552 
Average IDH 0.728 0.592 
Average IDSUS 5.9846 5.38 
Average IDEB year 1-5 5 4 
Average IDEB year 6-9 4.2 3.3 
GDP per capita (R$) 23,251 5,659 
Average number of 
beneficiary families 
2,513 (approx.  11,308 
people) 
2,257 (approx. 10,156 
people) 
Average benefit (R$) 2,577,077 2,758,962 
Average population 
62,431 (approx. 13,873 
families) 
16,512 (approx. 3,669 
families) 
Bolsa Família’s 
benefit/population (R$) 
41.27 167.02 
Number of beneficiary 
families/population 
22% (1/5) 61% (1/1.5) 
 
The results of the qualitative analysis are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
  
 
4. Limitations 
 
The first limitation of this study is the complexity of the topic under analysis. As noted by 
Hill and Hupe (2009),  implementation studies is a  “diffuse subject concerned with policies 
                                                        
2
 1,264 municipalities are in neither of these groups: 1,077 municipalities have MHDI above the national 
average, but GDP per capita below the national average; while 168 municipalities have MHDI below the 
national average, but GDP per capita above the national average. 
  16 
and administrtative arrangements that differ widely”; this complexity is reflected in the lack 
of a comprehensive implementation theory and the absence of agreement among academics 
in relation to several key aspects of implemenation studies such as what constitutes 
implementation performance and how to measure it.  This study has dealt with this by 
focusing on one policy area and developing a theoretical framework which incorporated the 
specificities of this policy area, including the the use of  a specific performance indicator. 
Additionally, rather than trying to investigate all possible variables which can impact 
performance,  this study focused on the analysis of one specific variable cluster thought to  
influence implementation performance – local socio-economic characteristics. Hence, the 
scope of this study is limited and its conclusions should not be automatically extrapollated to 
other policy areas or variable clusters.  
 
This reasearch is also limited by its research methods. The quantitative analysis  has several 
limitations. Firstly, as mentioned previously, this study do not capture all the factors that 
influence implementation performance and as such offer only a partial explanation for 
performance variation and has little predicative value. Secondly, this analysis is based on 
proxy variables that only partially capture complex concepts  such as municipal’s socio-
economic environment and implementation performance. Thirdly, the statistical tools used  
capture associations and cannot be specific on direction of causality.  Finally, this is a cross 
sectional study and as such offers a snapshot view of the relationships and do not reflect 
trends over time. 
 
In relation to the qualitative analysis, a key limitation is the scope and depth of primary data 
collected for this research. It would probably have been better to cover a wider sample of 
municipal managers and conduct a more in depth discussion with each of them, however due 
to resource constraints this was not posssible. Furthermore, it is important to underline that 
the quastionnaire responses were in Portuguese, thus their content had to be translated before 
being incorporated into the research.  espite the author’s aim to conduct the translation in the 
most accurate form, some minor inexactitudes may have remained.  
 
With respect to secondary data, one of the most important limitations is that the sources of 
information are very few. The majority of Bolsa Família’s documents were elaborated by the 
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Ministry of Social Developmen (MDS), the government Ministry responsible for Bolsa 
Família’s development and overall implementation and hence reflect a particular perspective. 
Similarly, despite the large volume of studies in the professional literature regarding the 
Bolsa Família Program,  I have noticed a great overlap (crossreferencing) among them, 
resulting in the same  information/evidence being replicated by many different studies. Also, 
despite the large number of studies addressing the Bolsa Família in general, very few studies 
have addressed the issues relevant to this study; for instance, there are virtually no studies 
focusing on local implementor’s  perspective. I sought to minimise the impact of these 
limitations by resorting to primary data to complement, contrast and corroborate the 
secondary sources.  
 
Despite such limitations, this study has been able to fullfil its proposed objectives of 
developing a theoretical framework which explains the relationship between local socio-
economic characteristics and performance in the implementation of intergovernmental policy; 
and empirically studying this relationship in the context of targeted poverty alleviation 
policies, such as Conditional Cash Transfers.  
 
 
5. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The opening chapters of this thesis are dedicated to building a theoretical framework which 
describes how local socio-economic characteristics can impact on implementation 
performance, particularly in the case of conditional cash transfers. Chapter 2 starts with a 
brief review of implementation studies literature, with a focus on the meaning of 
implementation performance and the relationship between local context and performance. 
Next, using van Meter and van Horn’s Model of Intergovernmental Implementation (1976) as 
a starting point, I expose the interaction between the local socio-economic characteristics and 
the other six intervening variable clusters which, according to van Meter and van Horn’s 
Model, impact implementation, namely, policy objectives, policy resources, political 
condition, agency capacity, disposition of implementers, and intergovernmental relations. 
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Van Meter and Van Horn’s noted that the implementation process will vary depending on the 
nature of the policy to be carried out (1975:458). Hence, in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework is adapted to the implementation of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). This 
chapter describes the main characteristics of CCT polices and analyses how CCT’s 
distinctive features impact implementation performance differently in wealthy and in poor 
areas, proposing very different scenarios for CCT  implementation in each of these areas. 
CCTs concentrate beneficiaries and resources in poor areas and hence the implementation of 
CCTs in such areas is likely to enjoy strong support from local leaders, bureaucrats and the 
general population; however, the implementation of CCTs requires significant amounts of 
inputs and hence is also likely to be hindered by poor areas limited resources and capacity. In 
wealthy areas, on the other hand, local support for CCTs may not be as forthcoming, but local 
institutional capacity is less likely to be an obstacle to programme implementation. 
Moreover, the framework suggests that each of these scenarios can be significantly altered by 
intergovernmental dynamics. But do these two different scenarios produce different 
implementation performances? If so, which one results in better implementation? Do rich 
areas outperform poor ones; or, on the contrary, poor areas outperform wealthy ones?  
 
These questions have been addressed empirically through a mixed-methods comparative 
study of rich and poor municipalities implementing the Bolsa Família Program in Brazil. This 
empirical study is presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Chapter 4 contextualises the empirical study by presenting an overview of the Bolsa Família 
Program, its main characteristics, scope and achievements; it also describes the programme’s  
institutional arrangements, with a particular focus on its intergovernmental framework. The 
quantitative analysis,  presented in Chapter 5,  suggests that indeed different socio-economic 
circumstances result in different implementation performances at the local level; that is, the 
statistical study confirms that there is a statistically significant relationship between local 
socio-economic characteristics variables and implementation performance. The direction of 
this relationship, however, is somehow surprising, as poor municipalities have been shown to 
outperform rich ones in the implementation of Bolsa Família. This finding contradicts the 
view that poverty and underdevelopment are characteristics which invariably hinder 
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implementation and reaffirms the need of a broader framework to understand performance 
variation at the local level.  
 
In this sense, in Chapter 6,  the variation in Bolsa Família’s municipal implementation 
performance is explained with reference to the theoretical framework on local socio-
economic characteristics and implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Based on a qualitative survey of Bolsa Família’s municipal managers 
(gestor municipal) from 42 municipalities with both low and high levels of income and 
development and a thorough review of Bolsa Família’s documents and evaluations, the 
qualitative analysis largely confirms the theoretical framework and suggests that the great 
importance of Bolsa Família to poor areas, combined with adequate intergovernmental 
resources and incentives, gave poor municipalities the edge in the implementation of the 
Bolsa Família Program.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 draws from both qualitative and quantitative analyses to offer a more 
comprehensive account  of the relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and 
performance in the context of the Bolsa Família Program and concludes this study by 
summarising its contributions and recommendations to Bolsa Família and Conditional Cash 
Transfers research and practice, as well as its contributions to policy implementation, 
decentralisation and intergovernmental relations literatures.  
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Chapter II  Policy Implementation Performance 
 
 
This chapter introduces the key conceptual and theoretical issues that underline this study. It 
starts with a discussion of the place of implementation in the policy process, followed by a 
brief review of the policy implementation literature, with particular focus on the definition of 
implementation performance and the importance of the local context in performance 
variation. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the development of a theoretical 
framework which, based on Van Meter and Van Horn’s Model of Intergovernmental 
Implementation, describes and explains the interaction between local socio-economic 
characteristics and other six variable clusters which affect implementation performance, 
namely, policy objectives, policy resources, political conditions, agency capacity, disposition 
of implementers, and intergovernmental relations.  
 
 
1. The Policy Process  
 
Policy is not a tightly defined concept; it can be defined as both a course of action or, more 
concretely, as a specific decision designed to carry out such course of action. The terms 
policy, plan, programme and project broadly refer to the same concept, but are progressively 
specific in time and place. Public policies refer to a defined course of action or decisions 
selected by a government or, as defined by  Meny and Thoenig  (1992:88), by an authority 
invested with public power and governmental legitimacy.   
 
The process by which governments translate their political vision into a course of action to 
address a certain issue and deliver desired changes can be “extremely complex” (Sabatier 
2007:3). Sabatier described the public policy process as involving hundreds of actors with 
different values, interests and goals in which “…  problems are conceptuali ed and brought to 
government for solution; government institutions formulate alternatives and select policy 
solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and revised”.  
  21 
 
In order to study and understand such complex process, researchers must resort to theoretical 
frameworks or models which simplify the policy process.  The most common and influential 
framework for understanding the policy process is the “policy cycle” or “stages heuristics”, 
which divides the policy process in to discrete stages.  
 
The idea of modeling the policy process in terms of stages was first put forward by Lasswell 
in 1956, based on an ideal-type of rational planning and decision making. Lasswell original 
model of the policy process comprised seven stages: intelligence, promotion, prescription, 
invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. The policy process in this view is 
sequential (one stage leads to the next), differentiated functionally (each stage represents a 
distinct activity) and cumulative (results from one round of activities fed back into the 
process) (Nakamura 1987). While Lasswell sequence of stages has been contested, the model 
itself has been highly successful as a basic framework for the field of policy studies and 
became the starting point of a variety of typologies of the policy process (Fischer et al. 2007 
:43). There are several variations of the stages of the policy process, but most models 
typically include: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, and 
evaluation (Hill and Hupe 2009). 
 
Agenda-setting is the stage in which a recognised social problem requiring  state intervention 
is put on the “agenda” for consideration. The agenda is defined by Kingdon (1995:3) as “the 
list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside the 
government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any 
given time” . 
 
The next stages are “policy formulation” and “decision-making”, in which expressed 
problems, proposals, and demands are transformed into government policies and 
programmes.  They involve the definition of objectives— what should be achieved with the 
policy—and the consideration of different alternatives actions.  
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Once a policy has been formulated, it is then normally carried out, executed, enforced by the 
responsible institutions and organisations that are often, but not always, part of the public 
sector. This “implementation stage” of the policy process is the focus of this study and will 
be discussed in detail in the next sections. 
 
The last stage of the policy process is “evaluation”, during which policies are appraised 
against intended objectives and impacts, leading to either the termination of the policy or its 
redesign.  
 
Despite its popularity among researchers, the stage heuristics model has come under 
increasing criticism. Paul Sabatier, one of the leading critics of the stages approach, points 
out that  the policy cycle or stages heuristic lacks defining elements of a theoretical 
framework, as it does not identify a set of causal drivers that govern the policy process within 
and across stages. He also criticises  the stage heuristic for being very legalistic and top-down 
and for focusing on major pieces of legislation. Sabatier (2007) concluded that the “stage 
heuristic has outlived its usefulness” and even excluded it from the second edition of his book 
“Theories of the Policy Process” which compiled the “most promising and widely used” 
theoretical frameworks of the policy process.   
 
Another common criticism of the stages approach refers to the fact that empirical reality does 
not fit with the classification of the policy process into discrete and sequential stages. Critics 
have repeatedly pointed out that real world decision-making usually does not follow this 
sequence of discrete stages, and hence the model is “descriptively inaccurate” (Nakamura 
1987). Under real-world conditions, policy processes rarely feature clear-cut beginnings and 
endings; they do not develop in a vacuum, but  rather are adopted in crowded policy spaces. 
Commonly  “new”  policies  modify, change, or supplement older policies, compete with 
them or contradict each other. At the same time, policies are perpetually reformulated, 
implemented, evaluated, and adapted. These processes do not evolve in a pattern of clear-cut 
sequences; instead, the stages are constantly meshed and entangled in an ongoing process; 
hence, in many cases it is more or less impossible to differentiate between stages;  in others, 
the sequence is reversed, some stages do not exist or are combined together (Hill and Hupe 
2009; Sabatier 2007).  
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This limitation of the stages heuristics is very significant to implementation studies, as the 
implementation stage sits uneasily between policy formation and policy evaluation. These 
artificial barriers create considerable dilemmas for the study of policy implementation and 
discussions/disagreement among scholars regarding these boundaries  have consumed much 
of the implementation scholarship. 
 
Where does policy formation end and policy implementation begin?  Implementation, as a 
stage of the policy process, assumes the existence of a public policy (product of what 
happened in the earlier stages of the process) that has to be implemented, carried out, 
executed. The problem is that the content of the policy may be substantially modified, 
elaborated or even negated during the implementation – isn’t this also policy formulation? 
Indeed, from the perspective of “bottom-up” researchers there is a continuum between 
formulation and implementation (the policy-action continuum). This view contradicts the 
classical hierarchical separation between political and administrative spheres that the division 
between policy formulation and policy implementation implies. Yet decisions are generally 
not self-executing, implying the need for a separate stage where they are carried out (Hill and 
Hupe 2009). This debate regarding the boundaries between policy formation and 
implementation  is particularly relevant in instances where there is a strong interactive 
process between formulation and implementation  such as the cases involving separate layers 
of governments exercising legitimate authority and autonomy, and cases where policies are 
too complex or continuously reformulated. Under these  circumstances, implementation 
becomes a “moving target” and may even result “un-researchable” according to Hill and 
Hupe (2009).  
  
Similarly, the boundaries between policy implementation and policy evaluation can also be 
blurred. Some  researchers take implementation to refer to the part of the process between 
initial statement of policy and its ultimate impact in the world;  others restrict implementation 
to the actions of those in charge of executing a policy. This issue is reflected in the 
relationship between implementation and evaluation research and the choice between outputs 
and outcomes to characterise implementation performance.  Implementation studies are 
concerned with similar questions to evaluation studies, but in many respects the objective of 
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implementation studies can be more specific. Winter (2006), for instance, argued that 
implementation research should explore the determinants of policy outputs, rather than 
explaining outcomes or goal achievement and getting into questions about the “real goals”, 
which can get researchers tangled up with attribution issues and normative debates about 
what these goals should be.  
 
Despite these complicated and unresolved boundaries issues, I tend to agree with Hill and 
Hupe (2009:6) that there is “continuing role for the stages framework as a useful analytical 
and heuristic tool for the study of the policy process” , particularly for its critical role in 
promoting and supporting the development of research within specific stages. The stages 
framework fulfils a vital role in structuring the vast amount of theoretical concepts, analytical 
tools and empirical studies conducted along the lines of single stages. As noted by Hill and 
Hupe (2009:7) “If there is such a stage, then there is also a good case for the separate analysis 
of that part of the policy process”. Policy implementation studies have developed out of the 
recognition that implementation has a place as an independent  stage in the policy process. 
Even if its place within the stages framework is not a “comfortable” one,  it offers a good 
starting point for debating what its place in the policy process should be. The next section 
presents an overview of policy implementation studies and discusses these boundaries issues 
in more detail. 
 
 
2. Policy Implementation  
 
Policy implementation can be described as “the carrying out of a policy decision” 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983:20). Hence, it involves a series of activities undertaken by 
government and other actors to achieve the goals and objectives articulated by a policy. 
 
The systematic study of policy implementation started in the early 1970s in the United States 
in an effort to understand the reasons behind the failure of many governmental social 
programmes of the 1960s. Up to then, the process between policy formation and policy 
outcomes was taken for granted; it was assumed that once political mandates were enacted, 
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they would be automatically carried out. Policy implementation studies started to challenge 
this view and unpack the complexities of this stage of the policy process.  
 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s “Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are 
dashed in Oakland; or Why it is amazing that Federal Programmes Work at All”, first 
published in 1973, is the seminal work of this initial period and set the tone for most of the 
implementation research throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In this book, Pressman and 
Wildavsky try to uncover the reasons behind the gap between stated objectives of a federal 
programme “The Oakland Project” - aimed at creating jobs for ethnic minorities in Oakland, 
California - and the poor results it actually achieved (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984:xxiii).  
 
Pressman and Wildavsky, and other researchers who followed a similar approach (Hogwood 
and Gunn 1984, Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983), focused on 
identifying key factors deemed to contribute to these implementation gaps - such as lack of 
clear policy objectives, limits of administrative control, the large number of agencies and 
layers involved in implementation - and offering recommendations to political leaders on 
how to better control the implementation process.  
 
This approach to implementation studies, known as the “top-down” approach, is grounded in 
the classical view of a hierarchical task division in the policy process between political and 
administrative actors, in which the starting point of the implementation process is a well 
defined policy/statute formulated by decision-makers at the top (politicians) which is 
subsequently carried out by administrators at the bottom (Hill and Hupe 2006).  
 
As a counterpoint to the “top-down” approach, a different approach to implementation 
analysis started to emerge in the late 1970s, early 1980s. This alternative view of the 
implementation process - known as “bottom-up” – challenged the “top-down” view of the 
implementation process and the assumptions about the existence of hierarchical relations 
between policy making and implementation (Barrett 2004: 252-253). It sustained the view 
that the content of policies may be substantially modified, elaborated or even negated during 
the implementation stage; that is, implementation was not neutral administrative process.  
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The bottom-up approach first emerged when Lipsky (1980) argued that front-line staff’s own 
judgments, values, opinions and experiences shaped the way they carried out policy 
implementation, in spite of what was stipulated by the policy. This implied that policy-
making continued in the implementation stage, contrary to the classical view of public 
administration.  
 
In “Policy and Action”, another seminal work within the “bottom-up” stance, Barrett and 
Fudge (1981) further elaborated this view and offered a broader definition of policy 
implementation as “a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place overtime between 
those who seek to put policy into effect and those upon action depends” (Barrett and 
Fudge,1981:4).  
 
For most of the 1980s, the academic debate regarding policy implementation was polarized 
around these apparently competing views. At the normative level, top-down and bottom-up 
approaches differed on their orientation in relation to policy formation - policy 
implementation boundaries; the top-down view, which was normatively grounded on the rule 
of law and representative democracy, argued for a consistent execution of choices made by 
political leaders; the bottom-up view, by contrast, regarded implementation as an integral and 
continuing part of the political process and hence expected policies to be modified during 
implementation to reflect the interests of implementers. At the empirical level, the top-down 
approach focused on variables controlled by the top of the system, while the bottom-up 
approach focused on variables related to the bottom of the system (Barrett 2004, Hill and 
Hupe 2009, O’Toole 1989, O’Toole 2004).  
 
In the late 1980s, a second generation of researchers argued that in order to move the 
implementation research forward, a balance between the two approaches was necessary. 
O’Toole (1989:2) argued that the top-down and bottom-up approaches were insufficient in 
isolation and urged researchers “to combine both the top-down and bottom-up insights in 
order to recogni e the multiplicity of the subsystem’s goals”.  
 
Some scholars have tried to combine both approaches within the same model (Elmore’s 
forward and backward mapping for instance), while others have tried to specify the 
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conditions under which one approach may be more relevant than the other (Matland 1995). 
But most commonly, scholars of this generation meticulously documented specific case 
studies using a combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches to expose and understand 
the complexity of implementation. This resulted in a research literature overpopulated by a 
mass of potential explanatory variables originated from the two perspectives, but lacking in 
structure (O’Toole 2000, Hill and Hupe 2009, Matland 1995). Goggin (1986) refers to this 
issue as the “cases-variables problem in implementation research”.  
 
Contemporary researchers have been focusing on providing more structure and depth to the 
field by using theoretical models and empirical methods which allow for broader 
generalisations, while at the same time dealing with the structural changes in public 
administration in the last decade which resulted in more horizontal and decentralised 
governance arrangements. 
 
Within this new way of governing, implementation across agency lines and levels of 
government have become the very heart of public administration and the traditional concern 
with the internal operations of public agencies and hierarchical relations became less central 
(Agranoff and Mc uire 2001, O’Toole 2000 ). In this context, the relationship between “top” 
and “bottom” has become very complex and Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1984) 
recommendation of “simpler, less complex programmes” as a key to successful 
implementation has never seem more unrealistic. 
 
This presents important consequences for the way in which the object of implementation 
research is defined. Indeed, in their latest reviews of implementation studies, Barrett (2004), 
O’Toole (2004), Hill and Hupe (2009), coincide that the future of implementation research 
lies in the study of implementation as the operational part of this new governance and should 
thus focus on the theoretical and methodological challenges of improving performance in a 
multi- actor and multi-level implementation context.  
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2.1 Implementation Performance  
 
As discussed above, improving implementation performance within the new governance 
context has emerged as a core aim of implementation research. But what is implementation 
performance?  
 
Even if the labels of “top-down” and “bottom-up” are less relevant in the current context, the 
different normative orientation among implementation researchers in relation to the 
boundaries between policy formation and policy implementation, and between policy 
implementation and policy evaluation is still reflected in the lack of agreement among 
scholars regarding what constitutes implementation performance and how it should be 
measured.  
 
From one perspective, which sees implementation as an integral and continuing part of the 
political process, performance is viewed as the achievement of what is possible given a 
particular scenario (Barrett 2004, Elmore 1980, McGrath 2009).  
 
Barrett (2004) explains that “interactive and negotiative models of implementation tend to 
see performance as the achievement of what is possible within a particular policy 
implementation environment (that is, the array of actors and interests, their relative 
bargaining power, degree of change or value conflict involved, and so on). From this 
perspective, judging performance is a matter of pluralistic and bottom-up evaluation to assess 
outcomes in terms of who has gained or lost what and how has this been affected or 
influenced by policy.  
 
However, what some researchers see as “legitimate” discretion, others see as “deficit” (Hill 
and Hupe 2009:174). Critics of this approach maintain that the lack of separation between 
policy formation and policy implementation is problematic in terms of accountability and 
democratic legitimacy, as unelected administrators should not have leeway to challenge or 
change the policy objectives established by elected officials.  
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Furthermore, they argue, the lack of set objectives or the continued reformulation of policy 
objectives throughout the implementation process poses an important methodological 
problem - how can performance be assessed without any reference point, with no pre-
determined objective? Instead, they advocate that performance should be judged in terms of 
achieving conformance with established policy targets and objectives. Mazmanian  and 
Sabatier (1983), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975,1976), O’Toole (2000), Hill and Hupe, 
(2009) among others, argue there must be a connection between policy implementation and 
the statues that authorise it .  
 
Within this policy-centred (or top-down) approach, the starting point of performance analysis 
should be the policy decision; the smaller the “gap” between what is stated in the policy and 
what has been achieved in practice, the more successful the implementation. Deviation 
accounts as implementation deficit.  
 
There is, however, disagreement among advocators of the policy-centred approach regarding 
the level at which implementation performance should be assessed. Some scholars, for 
instance Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) and Goggin et al. (1990), argued that 
implementation performance should be assessed against policy outcomes. Others, such as 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), O’Toole (2000), Matland (1995), Winter (2006), Hill and 
Hupe (2009), have emphasized the importance of making a conceptual distinction between 
implementation outputs and ultimate impact on the policy problem (outcomes).  
 
In the first case, policy goals/outcomes are chosen as the dependent variables and the 
boundaries between policy implementation and evaluation are blurred. For instance, 
Giacchino and Kakabadse (2003), in their study of policy implementation in Malta, define 
successful implementation as “a policy implementation initiative in which the strategic action 
adopted by the administrative arm of government was considered to have delivered the 
intended policy decision and to have achieved the intended outcomes. To qualify as an 
example of success, the policy decision under review must, therefore, have been delivered in 
a manner that addressed its terms of reference as well as achieved the expected functionality 
to the identified stakeholders”. A great deal of implementation literature has followed this 
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approach and focused on the extent to which policies have addressed the problems they were 
alleged to address.  
 
The problem with this approach is that the judgment about outcomes is a judgment about 
appropriateness of the policy, not about its implementation. McGrath (2009) argued that this 
confusion between policy output and outcomes and the choice of goals/outcomes as 
dependent variables has contributed to pessimism about implementation, as failed 
implementation often blamed for when the policy itself was defective. Indeed, both 
evaluation and implementation literatures sustain that factors other than implementation 
output affect policy outcomes.  
 
In this sense, Hill and Hupe (2009) concluded that “(....) the distinction between 
implementation and evaluation as two successive stages in policy process is analytically 
relevant enough to maintain”. Winter (2006) corroborates this view and stresses that the 
study of whether a policy’s goals are fit and proper, or whether they were achieved, should be 
left to evaluation studies and concludes that “the aim of implementation studies should be to 
look for output level variables to characterize performance of implementers and explain 
variation in such performance”. Heeding to this advice, this study analyses variation in 
implementation performance by using an output level performance variable.  
 
The next section reviews research aimed at understanding performance variation, with 
particular emphasis on studies analysing the role of contextual variables, such as socio-
economic variables, in explaining variation.  
 
 
2.2  Implementation performance and the local context  
 
As discussed previously,  more horizontal and decentralised governance arrangements have 
resulted in increased autonomy of implementers, with local and regional authorities 
experiencing growing leeway in the implementation of policies (O'Toole and Montjoy 1984, 
Agranoff and McGuire 2001).  
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Within this scenario of dispersion of power and control, policy implementation becomes a 
highly contingent and situated process. As Hupe (2011:172) points out, “The larger the 
freedom to act, the greater the impact of [local] characteristics will be”. In this sense, the 
local “context” has become an even more important determinant of performance variation, as 
implementation is more exposed to local characteristics which can facilitate or hinder 
performance.  
 
It is often assumed that poverty and underdevelopment are characteristics which hinder 
implementation performance; that is, poor, less developed jurisdictions are expected to be 
outperformed by wealthy, more developed ones (van Stolk and Patil 2014, Yoong 2012, 
Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2012; Rondinelli and Nellis 1986). For instance, Yoong 
(2012:43) argued that “(…) regional inequalities in local government capacity pose a direct 
challenge to the effective implementation of the Bolsa Família Program in a decentralised 
context. Because of limited resources such as insufficient physical space, technical 
difficulties with information systems, difficulties of access to isolated areas and insufficient 
knowledge, the quality of implementation of the BFP is likely to be lower in smaller and/or 
poorer municipalities.” The assumption here is that poor, underdeveloped jurisdiction lack 
the resources and the institutional capacity to implement policies; while wealthy, developed 
jurisdictions have the resources and the institutional capacity to do so. While it is 
undoubtedly true that local resources and institutional capacity are crucial components of 
implementation success, this somehow intuitive assumption is based on rather simplistic view 
of policy implementation as a purely administrative task,  reminiscent of early top-down 
research.  
 
This narrow interpretation of the local context fails to recognise the influence of other 
contextual and non-contextual elements in implementation performance. For instance, this 
view assumes that resources available at the local level will be automatically used in policy 
implementation; this is not necessarily the case, as resource allocation is often a political 
rather than a technical decision, particularly in the case of redistributive policies, such as 
CCTs, which normally have high levels of conflict over implementation (Ripley and Franklin 
1982). 
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Some studies have offered a broader interpretation of the local contexts. The literature on 
comparative state policies in the USA, for instance, has concentrated  on identifying the 
influence of several contextual variables on policy adoption. Researchers in this field often 
employ statistical techniques (DHS Models
3
) to assess the impact of a series of independent 
variables related to state/local characteristics on policy adoption (Blomquist 2007:268).  
 
A dominant issue within this literature has been the relative importance of socio-economic 
versus political variables for determining adoption of federal policies by states; a debate 
which to-date remains open. For instance, some studies have found that socio-economic 
variables, such as per capita income and state fiscal conditions, are more important than 
political variables, such as degree of inter-party competition, in explaining state welfare 
policy (Dawson and Robinson1963, Dye 1966, Hofferbert 1966 ). More recently, Jacobs and 
Callagan (2013) found a link between state economic circumstances and the adoption of state 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Interestingly, Record (2013) studying the 
adoption of the same policy found that political variables were more relevant in determining 
implementation. Others, have found that both socio-economic and political variables have an 
impact.  For instance, Miller’s study of Medicaid nursing facilities suggests that the sub-
national policy adoption is moderated both by internal political and socio-economic 
conditions (2011). 
 
A key limitation of  such comparative studies is that they often fail to take into account the 
dynamics and interaction between independent variables, which often leads to a partial 
understanding of performance variance at the local level (Berry and Berry 2007, Blomquist 
2007, Hill and Hupe 2009). Blomquist (2007:280) noted that “no matter how skilful scholars 
performing DSH-style comparative studies constructed their models, operationalised their 
variables, and gathered their data, they were rarely able to explain as much as half of the 
policy variation among states”. Furthermore, the use of policy adoption rather than 
performance specific variables as the standard dependent variable reduces the 
                                                        
3
 System theory based models developed by Dawson and Robinson(1963), Dye (1966) and Shrakansky(1970) 
and Hofferbert (1974) are known collectively as the Dye-Sharkansky-Hofferbert (DSH) approach.  
 
  33 
implementation process to a discreet event, significantly restricting the assessment of 
performance variance.  
 
A broader analysis of the local context has been proposed by policy implementation 
researchers who developed frameworks which recognise the importance of several contextual 
variables, including socio-economic variables, on implementation performance. For instance, 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) in their “Policy Implementation Framework” indicated that 
“social, economic and technological conditions are some of the principal exogenous variables 
affecting the output of implementing agencies and ultimately the attainment of statutory 
objectives”. Also,  oggin et al.’s “Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy 
Implementation” (1990) emphasise that a state's economic, political, and situational capacity, 
influences its ability and capacity to act and can affect the communication (interpretation of 
signals) within and between government levels.  
 
However, local socio-economic context has received only limited attention within such 
frameworks; there is little analysis on how and under which circumstances socio-economic 
variables are important, how they interact with other variables and how they impact 
performance. Overall, the existing frameworks offer only a superficial and limited 
understanding of the relationship between the local socio-economic characteristics and 
implementation performance. 
 
This study aims to address this gap in policy implementation theory by developing a 
framework which explains how socio-economic variables interact with other contextual and 
non-contextual variables and influence implementation performance. The development of 
this framework builds upon Van Meter and Van Horn “Model of Intergovernmental 
Implementation” (1976), in which “local socio-economic characteristics”  is one of eight 
variable clusters predicted to impact performance in intergovernmental implementation 
settings. 
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3. Theoretical Framework: Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation 
Performance  
 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1976:98) define implementation as “the process by which policies 
are transformed into public services”. Their “Model of Intergovernmental Implementation” 
(1975,1976)  aims to explain the implementation process  in situations involving the 
participation of various government units exercising legitimate authority with relative 
autonomy. The authors constructed their model on the basis of three bodies of literature, 
namely organisation theory, public policy and intergovernmental relations, with the objective 
of integrating the study of policy implementation and intergovernmental relations.  
 
Van Horn and Van Meter suggest that the model is viewed as an heuristic tool designed for 
the purpose of discovering facts about policy implementation process in a intergovernmental 
context. Hence, the model also allows one to chart variations and provide explanations for 
performance variance among the different implementing units. 
 
Van Meters and Van Horn’s model is often categorised as top-down because of its policy-
centred approach, that is, its starting point of analysis is the policy decision (Hill and Hupe 
2009). However, the model also recognises that the actions of local actors are not totally 
constrained by the directives and mandates that emanate from policy makers; local variables - 
socio-economic characteristics, political factors and the commitment and capacity of 
implementing agency/officials - are seem as crucial in determining performance. As such, the 
model offers a useful conceptual path to analyse how contextual characteristics, particularly, 
in the case of this study, socio-economic characteristics, influence intergovernmental policy 
implementation.  
 
The model also recognises the interdependency between the central and local levels, 
particularly in federal systems, due to the fact that commonly no one actor in the system 
possesses the information, expertise and political skills to implement policies on its own. 
Hence the importance of intergovernmental relations in shaping implementation 
performance, reflected in the Model by variable clusters related to policy 
resources/incentives, communications and enforcement activities.  
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Finally, the model analyses implementation performance from the output level. Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1976:103) argued for a clear distinction between policy implementation 
performance and policy evaluation or impact research: “Policy impact studies examine the 
linkage between specific program approaches and observed consequences. The study of 
policy implementation, on the other hand, highlights one of the forces that determines policy 
impact by focus on those activities that affect the rendering of public services”. Hence, their 
model is not designed to measure and explain the ultimate outcomes of governmental policy, 
but rather measure and explain programme implementation performance, that is, the degree 
to which anticipated services were actually delivered by implementers.  
 
Figure 2: Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation (Van Meter and Van 
Horn 1976)  
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The Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation identifies eight clusters of variables 
which are linked dynamically to the dependent variable “performance”. The clusters are:  
 
1. Policy standards and objectives;  
2. Policy resources and incentives;  
3. Intergovernmental relationships: communication;  
4. Intergovernmental relationships: enforcement activities;  
5. The characteristics of implementing agency (resources, inter and intra-agency  
issues);  
6. The economic and social environment of the implementing jurisdiction;  
7. Political Environment; and  
8. The “disposition” or “response” of the implementers, involving their                
cognition/understanding of the policy, the direction of their response to it (neutrality, 
acceptance, rejection) and the intensity of that response.  
 
The Model also delineates some of the relationships among these independent variables, as 
shown in Figure 2. However, the model fails to recognise some important connections among 
the independent variables, particularly in the case of the cluster “Economic and Social 
Environment of the Implementing Jurisdiction”, which is the focus of this study. In Van 
Meter and Van Horn’s model, the local socio-economic environment is affected by policy 
resources and affects performance directly and also indirectly by influencing local political 
conditions.  There is no attempt to describe the interaction of this variable cluster with  the 
other seven variable clusters.  
 
In order to overcome this limitation I complement and expand Van Meter and Van Horn’s 
analysis with theoretical and empirical insights from policy implementation, comparative 
policy analysis and intergovernmental relations literatures to develop a theoretical framework 
which focus on the local socio-economic context and its relationship with implementation 
performance.  
 
Van Meter and Van Horn’s independent variables become the intervening variables in this 
study’s theoretical framework, mediating  the relationship between local socio-economic 
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characteristics and implementation performance. This framework aims to explain how the 
independent variable (local socio-economic characteristics)  interact with the intervening 
variables to impact the independent variable (implementation performance).  
 
 
Figure 3 : Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance 
Theoretical Framework 
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between this variable cluster and six other variable clusters predicted to affect local 
implementation performance in Van Meter and Van Horn’s model. 
 
3.1.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Policy Objectives  
 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, 1976) argued that two components of policy decisions 
influence the implementation process: policy objectives and standards and policy resources.  
 
A good fit between local socio-economic environment (needs and resources) and policy 
objectives is more likely to result in a positive local response towards the policy/programme, 
increasing the prospects of policy implementation. Depending on the types of need within the 
community, the implementers may be led to accept or reject certain objectives of the policy 
or its approaches; likewise, the extent of the need may influence otherwise negatively 
oriented officials to embrace the policy in order to respond to public wishes (Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1976).  
 
Given the different socio-economic characteristics at the local level, it is expected that some  
policies will be a better fit than others to the local circumstances. For this reason, Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1976) advised researchers to examine the needs of the jurisdiction for the 
service that a federal programme is offering and the structure of those needs. They sustained 
that where the problem to be addressed by a programme is critical, it is more likely that 
implementers will accept policies goals and objective.  
 
Accordingly, Lester and Bowman (1993) analysis of the implementation of environmental 
programmes by American states found that the variations in the severity of the problem 
addressed by the legislation can affect perceptions of the relative importance of the policy 
and concluded that the greater the severity of the problem, more likely is implementation at 
local level.  
 
Giacchino and Kakabadse (2003) found that if there is no demand for the policy at the local 
level, there will be no ownership of the policy at the local level, and hence less commitment 
to its implementation. Berman (1978) argued that in such cases, where consonance between 
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local interests and federal programme goals is low, there will be slippage or the local delivery 
systems may even adopt a project only symbolically. McGrawth (2009) study of state 
implementation of Medcaid programme in the US corroborates this point. He noted that 
states have struggled with federal programme rules and provisions designed to promote 
overall programme objectives which are contrary to states’ needs, forcing many to find 
creative ways of covering populations. Ridde (2008) found a similar scenario in his study of 
the implementation of a health policy in Burkina Faso. Improving health access for the 
poorest, a key objective of the national health policy, was not sufficiently perceived as a 
public problem at the local level. As a result, local implementers prioritised the less 
challenging aspect of the policy for implementation, while the more challenging objective 
was ignored.  
 
Ridde’s study also highlighted that despite the high levels of poverty in Burkina Faso in 
general and particularly in the districts he studied, the health needs of the poor were not 
recognised as a pressing issue by the local government. This is a common observation in 
poverty alleviation policies or redistributive policies in general whose target beneficiaries 
have weak political clout. In this sense, high poverty levels do not necessarily translate in 
increased local support for poverty alleviation or redistributive policies. In such instances, 
Ridde argued that more specific national level direction translated into well developed policy 
standards may be necessary to guide implementation at the local level. If they are vague or 
unclear then all or less attractive parts of the policy may be ignored by local implementers. 
Equally, intergovernmental incentives and enforcement may be even more relevant in such 
contexts, as further discussed below.  
 
3.1.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Policy Resources  
 
Policy resources is the other aspect of the policy decision which influence the implementation 
process according to Van Meter and Van Horn’s Model (1976).  
 
Policies provide resources, including funds and other incentives, which can encourage or 
facilitate effective implementation. Additionally, policies vary in terms of the degree of 
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resources and technical expertise required for their implementation. These features are 
important in shaping incentive and capacity issues in local implementation.  
 
Policy resources are an important inducement for states and local authorities, particularly in 
cases where the local jurisdictions are not in full agreement with policy goals and objectives 
as discussed above. Sabatier & Mazmanian (1983) stressed the importance of policy 
resources in order to entice both implementers and target groups to comply with policy rules.  
 
Resources made available by the policy may be more or less relevant to a locality depending 
on its socio-economic circumstances. Some local jurisdiction may be more dependent on 
federal resources and hence are more open to federal programmes regardless of their 
objectives and have a greater tolerance to the strings attached to the resources. Jacobs and 
Callaghan (2013:1035) illustrate this point by describing how Ari ona’s governor justified 
the state’s implementation of Obamacare despite her party opposing the legislation: “With 
the realities facing us, taking advantage of this federal assistance is the strategic way to 
reduce Medicaid pressure on the State budget”. Brinkerhoff (1996) makes a similar point in 
relation to the relationship between international donors and local governments or local 
NGOs. On the other hand, more affluent jurisdictions, less dependent on federal resources to 
address local issues, may be less susceptible to such inducements (Van Meter and Van Horn 
1976, Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, Hall 2011).  
 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the way in which policy resources are distributed 
locally, that is, which local groups benefit most from policy resources, is also an important 
aspect in determining political support among local elite, citizens and public officials for 
policy implementation. The level of local political support will, in turn, determine the 
resources made available locally for its implementation. For this reason, Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1983) observed, “the more prosperous the target groups, the more probable the 
effective implementation of statutes”. In the case of poverty alleviation or redistributive 
policies, whose direct beneficiaries have no or very limited political influence, it is normally 
necessary to mobilise wider public support for the policy. 
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Polices require distinctive levels of resources and expertise for their implementation. Some 
jurisdictions will be more prepared than others to take on the task of policy implementation, 
as the local political and socio-economic context will determine the resource levels and 
operational capacity available at local level to carry out implementation. As Montjoy and 
O'Toole (1991:51-59) noted, in some cases, poorer jurisdictions cannot even afford the ex 
ante costs involved in joining a federal programme. Jacobs and Callagan (2013) also found 
that states with the weakest economies were especially sensitive to the marginal additional 
costs required to receive federal funding. In such cases, the central/federal level may need to 
play a bigger role in complementing local capacity to facilitate implementation locally.  
 
3.1.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Political conditions  
 
A good fit between policy objectives and local problems is an important but not sufficient 
pre-condition of successful implementation. Ridde (2008) noted that without a favourable 
political environment, there can be no coupling of the problem and policy streams. Indeed, 
Lester and Bowman (1989) found that, in the case of environmental legislation in the USA, 
the greater the commitment of local officials to the realization of statutory objectives the 
more likely their implementation.  
 
The extent of support or opposition to the policy objectives by public officials depend in 
large part on their perception of the salience and visibility of the programme (Giacchino and 
Kakabadse 2003), of public and elite opinion (Ebinger et al. 2011), and the potential electoral 
gains provided by a given policy (De la O 2011; Zucco 2010). Local socio-economic 
characteristics, and the way in which they determine the array of interests affected by a 
policy, are important in shaping these perceptions and hence the political scenario of a given 
policy.  
 
A favourable local political scenario is likely to foster a more positive relationship between 
local and national governments. It is also crucial for local resources mobilisation, generating 
a positive impact on the capacity of implementing agency and the motivation of its staff .  
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For this reason, political will can play an even more important role in contexts where 
resources are more scarce. Looking at policy implementation in difficult environments, such 
as in humanitarian emergency situations or in very poor countries, Berry et al. (2004) found 
that where there is political will, there is significantly more scope to amass resources at the 
local levels for policy implementation than in situations where there is a lack of willingness.  
 
3.1.4 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Agency Capacity  
 
The capacity of the organisation responsible for implementation will tend to limit or enhance 
the prospects for effective implementation (Goggin et al. 1990:38; Van Meter and Van Horn 
1976).  
 
Implementing agency capacity is a function of the availability of and access to tangible 
resources such as financial, material, technological, logistical; and intangible ones such as 
leadership, commitment, relationship with other government agencies (Brynard 2005).  
 
As discussed above, the level of political support enjoyed by a policy will be an important 
factor in determining implementing agency level of resources. Additionally, local socio–
economic conditions also have a direct and significant effect in determining the level of 
tangible and intangible resources available for the implementing agency. Poorer jurisdictions 
may struggle to equip the implementing agency with the physical and human resources 
necessary to carry out implementation; the more administrative and technically complex the 
programme, the more challenging it will be for such jurisdictions (Haverland and Romeijn 
2007; McLaughlin 2006). 
 
In such cases, intergovernmental resources may be needed to complement locally available 
resources, boosting the capacity and expertise of implementing agency and improving the 
prospects of successful policy implementation.  
 
 
  43 
 
3.1.5 Socio-economic Characteristics and Disposition of Implementers  
 
The disposition of implementers is a function of the content of the policy (policy objectives 
and resources) and implementers’ response to it: their understanding of the policy, the 
direction of their response to it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection) and the intensity of that 
response. The intensity and direction of their disposition can lead to different reactions; 
strong acceptance can generate a positive attitude towards policy with implementers going 
the extra mile to guarantee implementation; on the other hand, strong rejection may lead to 
outright and open refusal to participate in the programme. Less intense negative attitudes may 
cause implementers to attempt diversion and evasion (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, 1976).  
 
In an intergovernmental context, deposition of implementers can be discussed at two levels: 
firstly the disposition of local political leaders; and, secondly, the disposition of the 
bureaucrats directly involved in the provision of programme’s goods and services.  
 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, local political leaders will tend to accept/favour policies which 
deal with problems which are important to their jurisdictions and which have widespread 
support from local population, particularly the local elite. Conversely, when policies deal 
with problems which are not severe and/or organised interests are lined up against the it, local 
political leaders may be encouraged to look on the implementation with disfavour. The levels 
of resources available for implementation at the local level will vary accordingly. If local 
politicians are willing to see a policy through in an effective and successful manner, they are 
more likely to make resources available and also to subject civil servants to greater degrees of 
pressure (Giacchino and Kakabadse 2003).  
 
This leads us to the second layer of local implementers: civil servants working in the 
implementing agency. The success or failure of many federal programme has often been 
attributed to the level of support enjoyed within the agency responsible for implementation 
(Lundin 2007; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983).  
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Implementing agency staff will be more responsive to polices which are a clear priorities to 
local political leaders. Studies indicate that politicians play an important role in reinforcing 
the relevance of policy goals and influencing behaviour of the local implementing agency and 
its staff. For instance, May and Winter (2007) in their study of the implementation of 
employment policy reforms in Denmark found that the political attention that municipal 
elected officials give to employment issues made a difference in what caseworkers 
emphasised. Political attention by local officials signals to civil servants that their actions are 
being noticed because they are important and that the rewards for success and the 
repercussions of failure would be more intense (Giacchino and Kakabadse 2003).  
 
Political support will also normally result in increased resources for implementing agency. 
This will also contribute to implementing officials’ disposition, since the context within 
which they operated - such as availability or lack of resources - also influenced disposition 
(Lipsky 1980). Van Meter and Van Horn (1976) found, for instance, that staff working in 
implementing agencies facing budgetary cutbacks perceived and carried out their tasks quite 
differently from those that enjoy expanding budgets.  
 
Another factor influencing implementers’ disposition is bureaucrats own personal values and 
preferences. Implementers may fail to execute policies because they reject the goals 
contained in them based on their personal values system or self-interest (Lipsky 1980). 
Conversely, widespread acceptance will enhance greatly the potential for successful 
implementation. Wolf-Dieter and Chojnachi (1999) argued that local implementing staff will 
be more willing to implement policies which they believe make a meaningful contribution to 
local society. In this sense, the “meaningfulness” of a policy is context specific – hence local 
features, such as its socio-economic characteristics, can play an important role in explaining 
willingness/resistance towards implementation. In this sense, if implementers perceive 
poverty levels to be a problem in their community, it is likely that they will look at policies 
which address this issue favourably.  
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3.1.6 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Intergovernmental Relations 
 
At the centre of intergovernmental policy implementation is the relationship between levels 
of governments. The nature of this relationship in federal systems fits well with Agranoff and 
Mc uire (2001) definition of a “donor-recipient model”, in which “the recipient may need 
money, but donors need fundable applications and implementation ability at the local level. 
(....). Federal officials need program successes, and those successes depend on state and local 
government actions”. Policy implementation in such context entails securing the compliance 
of actors whose resources are vital to policy implementation – even those who may disagree 
with policy goals. In such context, coercive and remunerative mechanisms (stick and carrot 
approach) predominate (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Matland 1995; Agrannoff and 
McGuire2001).  
 
Policy resources are an important incentive (carrot) in intergovernmental implementation, as 
discussed above. Van Meter and Van Horn (1976) highlight two other important aspects of 
intergovernmental relations in policy implementation: Communications and Enforcement.  
 
Communications  
 
Policy objectives and standards cannot be complied with unless they are communicated with 
sufficient clarity. Communication between levels of the federal system is a complex and 
difficult task. In transmitting messages, communicators inevitably distort them either 
intentionally or unintentionally, placing their own emphasis and interpretations on what 
normally begins as uniform statement by federal governments. While good communication 
will not necessarily contribute to a positive disposition on the part of implementers, 
variations in their support for the policy may often be partially explained in terms of their 
understanding and interpretation of the policy standards and the manner they are 
communicated (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Goggin et 
al.1990).  
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Enforcement 
 
Successful implementation usually requires mechanisms and procedures whereby the federal 
government may increase the likelihood that state and local officials will act in a manner 
consistent with policy standards. As there is no hierarchy in the intergovernmental system, 
many of the enforcement and follow-up mechanisms available within hierarchical 
relationships are not available, or lack efficacy. In this context, central/federal government 
often relies on its normative power, issuing regulations and guidelines, and on its 
remunerative power, through performance related payments, withdrawal or withholding of 
funds. Reporting and accounting systems, on- site visitations, monitoring, programme 
evaluations and audits are also important enforcement tools used by the federal government 
(Van Horn and Van Meter 1976; Agranoff and McGuire 2001).  
 
Jurisdictions which are more susceptible to policy inducements, as discussed above, will also 
be more vulnerable to policy enforcement. Jurisdictions which rely more heavily on federal 
funds, are more likely to be more vulnerable to federal government’s sanctions.  
 
This section presented a more in depth analysis of the relationship between local socio-
economic characteristics and six intervening variable clusters predicted to affect 
implementation performance, using theoretical and empirical insights from comparative 
policy analysis, policy implementation and intergovernmental relations literatures. The 
resulting analysis is summarised in the table below.  
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Table 2: Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance 
Theoretical Framework: Relationships between Independent and Intervening 
Variables 
 
Independent and Intervening Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Policy Objective 
 
A good fit between local socio-economic characteristics 
and policy objectives is likely to result in positive local 
response towards a policy. 
Im
p
lem
en
ta
tio
n
 P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Policy Resources 
 
Resources made available by a policy may be more or less 
relevant to an area depending on its socio- economic 
circumstances. 
Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Political Conditions 
The local socio-economic context has an impact on how 
policy resources are distributed locally and the array of 
interests affected by it; this in turn helps to shape the 
views of the general population, the local elite and local 
political leaders about the policy. Local leaders support 
for a policy will also be contingent on their assessment of 
potential electoral gains afforded by the policy. 
Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Agency Capacity 
 
Local socio–economic conditions have a direct and 
significant effect in determining the level of tangible and 
intangible resources available for the implementing 
agency. 
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Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
 
The disposition of bureaucrats will be influenced by their 
perception of the meaningfulness of a policy given the 
local socio-economic context, the political support 
enjoyed by a policy and the availability of resources for 
policy implementation. 
Socio-Economic 
Characteristics 
 
 
Intergovernmental 
relations 
Jurisdictions are more or less susceptible to inducements 
and enforcements depending on their socio-economic 
circumstances. 
 
 
In Chapter 3, this framework is adapted to the analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers 
(CCTs). Over the last decade, conditional cash transfer programmes have become one of the 
most widely adopted anti-poverty initiatives in the developing world.  espite CCTs’ varying 
scope and operational details, all policies within this class are targeted at the poorest, and, 
hence, the implementation of such programmes tend to take place in poor areas. For this 
reason, it is crucial to develop a deeper understanding of how poverty and low levels of 
development impact the implementation of CCTs. The resulting theoretical framework 
should provide a path for analysing the dynamics between local socio-economic 
characteristics and performance in the implementation of CCTs , contributing to a better 
understanding of the implementation process in general. 
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Chapter III  The Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers  
 
 
The characteristics of a policy have implications for the ways in which it is implemented and 
hence an important stage in implementation analysis is to understand the distinct features of a 
policy and how they impact on implementation (Hill and Hupe 2009,Van Meter and Van 
Horn 1975). This chapter completes the development of this study’s theoretical framework by 
adapting the “Socio-economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance Framework” 
to the analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). The chapter begins with a brief 
overview of CCTs, their main characteristics and implementation challenges, followed by an 
analysis of how such characteristics interact with the Socio-Economic Characteristics and 
Implementation Performance Framework.  It concludes with the presentation of the likely 
scenarios for the implementation of CCTs in the poor and in rich areas. 
 
 
1. Overview of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
 
 
1.1 What are Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)?  
 
Social cash transfers are increasingly becoming a key pillar of social protection systems in 
developing countries (Lavinas 2001; Samson 2009). While direct income transfers to families 
or individuals are used extensively in developed countries, this is a relatively new policy in 
developing countries where social protection policies have traditionally been based on 
assistance in kind (such as food or agricultural inputs) or subsidies (Lavinas 2001).  
 
Social cash transfers can be defined as regular non-contributory payments provided by the 
government or, less frequently, non-governmental organisations, to individuals or households 
intended to increase or smooth the consumption of goods and services, decreasing chronic or 
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shock-induced poverty (Farringdon and Slater 2006). Social cash transfers can take many 
shapes and forms: they can be “universal”4 or means tested (targeted to those identified as  
poor); they can also be unconditional (Unconditional Cash Transfers - UCTs) or conditional 
either on recipients providing labour in compliance with a work requirement (Cash for Work 
programmes) or conditional on households actively fulfilling human development 
responsibilities (Conditional Cash Transfers - CCTs) (Farringdon and Slater 2006).  
 
This study focus on Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), that is, regular money payments by 
government or non-governmental organisations to individuals or households in exchange for 
active compliance with human development conditionalities (health education, nutrition, 
etc.). CCT programmes have their origins in the 1990s, in the wake of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and the deteriorating social conditions that followed. Then a number of Latin 
American countries, notably Brazil and Mexico, started experimenting with cash transfer 
schemes targeted at poor households in which payments were linked to beneficiaries 
complying with a series of conditions, particularly related to children’s education (Schubert 
and Slater 2006).  
 
Such programmes were underpinned by the concept of poverty as a multidimensional and 
intergenerational phenomenon and the view that short-term relief and long-term development 
are complementary rather than excluding approaches (Barrientos and Santibanez 2009). 
Accordingly, the aims of Conditional Cash Transfers programmes are generally two-fold: (i) 
to reduce current poverty through the provision of cash transfers, and (ii) to leverage these 
transfers as incentives to promote human capital development, contributing to breaking long-
term intergenerational cycles of poverty.  
 
In this sense, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) represented an important transformation in 
social protection policy. Traditionally, cash transfers were perceived in a developing country 
context as a prioritisation of short-term equity and humanitarian objectives over long-term 
objectives of sustainable development and economic growth. Transfers were also often 
                                                        
 
4
 What is often referred to as a “Universal” transfers, actually refers to a categorical approach to targeting in 
which everyone in a designated social, geographical, age or other such category benefit. Common examples 
include old pension schemes, Disability and Child grants. 
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criticised for introducing incentives that could lead to reducing labour supply and 
encouraging dependency (DFID 2012). Advocators of CCTs challenged this view of a trade-
off between short and long-term development objectives by maintaining that CCTs could 
have an important role in economic development, particularly in high inequality settings, by 
supporting minimum levels of consumption and providing incentives for long-term 
investments in human capital (Samson 2009). 
 
Evidence emerging from the pioneering programmes, particularly the Bra ilian Bolsa Escola 
(later merged into Bolsa Família) and the Mexican Progresa (precursor of Oportunidades), 
seemed to demonstrate that CCTs were generally able to fulfil their promise of reducing 
poverty and inequality while at the same time promoting human capital development. In a 
comprehensive review of the literature on CCT programmes, Fiszbein and Schady (2009:2) 
found that “CCTs generally have been successful in reducing poverty and encouraging 
parents to invest in the health and education of their children”. A recent review of cash 
transfers programmes carried out by DFID (2011) corroborated these findings. DFID 
sustained that CCTs generally produced important effects such as improvements in education 
attendance levels, access and usage of basic preventive health services, as well as increases in 
households average income levels, reducing poverty and extreme poverty gaps. This evidence 
is presented in more detail in section 1.3. 
 
These positive outcomes arouse the interest of other countries trying to tackle similar issues 
and also caught the attention of various international development organisations, such as the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), and bilateral donors, such as the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the German Organisation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), who 
started to actively promote the use of social cash transfers in developing countries, providing 
substantive funding and technical cooperation (Moraes Sá e Silva 2010).  
 
As a result, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCTs) programmes have become one of the most 
widely adopted anti-poverty policy in the developing world and are currently the cornerstone 
of social protection systems in several countries. There are currently 43 CCT programmes 
spread across 40 countries, 35 of which have a national scope (Moraes Sá e Silva 2010).  
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, CCTs reached, in 2010, 129 million people in 18 
countries, or 24 per cent of the population. These programmes, particularly the Bra ilian 
Bolsa Família, the largest in the world reaching 12.4 million families, and Mexican 
Oportunidades which covers 25 per cent of the Mexican population, have been emulated by 
countries from several regions (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
New and expanding CCT programmes are now operational across Asia in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. There are also a growing number of smaller-scale 
pilot CCT programmes across sub-Saharan Africa in countries such as Zambia and Angola 
targeted mainly at orphans and vulnerable children affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(DFID 2011).  
 
More recently, the city of New York in the USA started the implementation of the first CCT 
programme in a developed country, the Opportunity New York City Family Rewards 
programme (Aber and Rawlings 2011).  
 
In terms of costs, CCT programmes typically cost to 0.3-0.4% of GDP in Latin America, but 
this varies significantly as a result of coverage and the size of the benefit (Paes-Sousa et al. 
2013). CCTs are normally funded by governments, multilateral or bilateral donors, or a 
combination of both (Moraes Sá e Silva 2010). In 2009 alone, the World Bank provided $2.4 
billion to start or expand CCT programmes in Bangladesh, Colombia, Kenya, Macedonia, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, the IDB has invested more than $8 billion dollars 
in CCT programmes over the last decade and financed CCTs in 14 countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
 
1.2 Key Features of Conditional Cash Transfers  
 
Despite differences in design and scope, CCT programmes share two important features: they 
are targeted and conditional.  
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1.2.1 Targeted  
 
CCTs are selective policies that only benefit families which fit within pre-established 
conditions, usually related to poverty levels and the presence of children and other vulnerable 
groups in the household. Once the selection criteria is defined, several methods can be used 
for beneficiary identification and selection, including geographical targeting, household 
assessment using proxy means tests, unverified means-testing, proxy means testing (based on 
easily observable characteristics associated with poverty), and community-based selection 
(Samson et al. 2006).  
 
Advocators of targeted approaches to social transfers argue that scarce government resources 
should be concentrated on specific groups of poor households or individuals. Targeting, they 
argue, will achieve the maximum impact from a given poverty alleviation budget or achieve a 
given impact at the least budgetary cost (Coady et al. 2004). DFID (2011) points out that 
targeted CCT programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean typically absorb less than one 
per cent of GDP, a fraction of what universal provision would cost. Coady et al. (2004) 
reviewed 122 targeted programmes from 48 countries and found that the median programme 
provides approximately 25 per cent more resources to the poor than would a random 
allocation; and that the top ten performing programmes is terms of targeting precision 
delivered to the poor two to four times the share of benefits that they would receive with 
random allocations.  
 
Critics of the targeted approach counter this argument by pointing to the hidden costs of 
targeted policies such as information distortion, incentive distortion, private costs, high 
administrative costs and corruption (Mkandawire 2005, Samson et al. 2006). Universal social 
policies, they argue, are less prone to such distortions and more appropriate to contexts with 
widespread poverty and weak administrative institution, where targeting can be an open 
invitation to rent seeking and corruption. CCT programmes in general have been proactively 
seeking to address these issues in the design and implementation of targeting mechanisms.  
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Apart from these technical and financial arguments, a key aspect of the target versus 
universal debate revolves around the political economy of redistribution. Opponents of a 
targeted approach in social policies argue that universal programmes are more politically 
sustainable, as universal access is one of the most effective ways to ensure political support 
by the middle classes whose taxes finance welfare programmes.  
 
Excluding the middle classes, they warn, may remove a broad-based support for such 
programmes and make them unsustainable (Mkandawire 2005) . Coady et al. (2004) 
challenged this argument by highlighting that governments have gained support for CCTs 
precisely by showing that the programmes are efficiently targeted, reaching only those really 
in need. Indeed, CCT programmes have been remarkably sustainable. Some of the pioneer 
programmes in Latin America have existed for more than a decade and have been constantly 
expanded, with support from across the political spectrum (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, Paes-
Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
Apart from targeting, another key feature of CCT programmes is the conditional nature of the 
transfer. 
 
1.2.2 Conditional  
 
In Conditional Cash Transfers programmes, cash payments are conditional on household 
members investing in human development. Conditionalities have been introduced in order to 
modify behaviour and contribute to breaking with sustained cycle of exclusion and poverty. 
The inclusion of conditionalities is based on the assumption that there is no sufficient demand 
for key social services such as education or health among the poorest sectors of the 
population, either because poor households lack full information on the long-term benefits of 
preventative healthcare and education, and/or because the interests of parents may diverge 
from those of their children. The theory is that, by linking transfers to compliance with 
conditionalities, the programme creates additional incentives for investing in human 
development - the cash serve as an incentive to encourage investment in health and 
education, as well as covering private costs related to using these services (DFID 2011).  
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The use of conditionalities, however, raises specific issues that are not a concern for other 
types of social transfers and create additional costs for both governments and recipients. 
Government agencies must have substantial institutional capacity to monitor compliance and 
to link compliance information with benefit payment. Additionally, public services (schools, 
health centres) must be able to respond to the increase in demand induced by CCTs, as 
services must be available and accessible to all beneficiaries. 
 
Conditionalities also generate costs for beneficiaries, who have to bear the costs associated 
with compliance; such costs may offset the benefits of the cash transfer and even exclude the 
poorest from the programme. For these reasons, some authors have argued that CCTs are 
inappropriate for poorer areas and that social cash transfers in such contexts should be 
unconditional (Samson et al. 2006, Schubert and Slater 2006).  
 
There are also questions regarding how much of CCT impact so far can be attributed to the 
existence of conditionalities. Indeed, the evidence to date regarding the impact of 
conditionalities is inconclusive. Evaluations have found it difficult to attribute the impact of 
CCT programmes to either its cash transfer component or to conditionalities. For instance, 
Gaardner et al. (2010) reviewed evidence on health and nutrition and suggested that 
conditionality is not required for a cash transfer programmes to have some nutritional impact, 
but without conditionality visits to health clinics are less likely to increase. In relation to 
impact on education, the evidence is also mixed; Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2010) found 
that there is an important improvement in school enrolment in CCT treatment in comparison 
to an unconditional cash transfer (UCT). On the other hand, DFID (2011) found evidence in 
UCT programmes in South Africa and Malawi that cash alone might be sufficient to improve 
school enrolment, without the need for conditionalities.  
 
Nevertheless, even in the absence of sound evidence that conditionalities are needed to 
increase the impact of cash transfers, political factors weigh in favour of their inclusion. 
Similarly to targeting, conditionalities substantially enhance the political attractiveness of 
social cash transfer programmes, as they help to dilute the negative perceptions of 
dependence with the positive sentiments created by beneficiaries’ investment in human 
capital. Also, by reinforcing the link between cash transfers and human capital development, 
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conditionalities also help policymakers to deal with the pressures regarding a possible trade-
off between cash spent in alleviating poverty and promoting investment and economic 
growth. Hence, politicians view conditional cash transfers as more politically acceptable to 
voters and taxpayers than non-conditional transfers. (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, Paes-Sousa 
et al. 2013).  
 
 
1.3 The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers 
 
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes have been the focus of unprecedented scrutiny, with 
virtually all programmes undergoing systematic evaluations. To date, empirical evidence on 
CCT programmes points to largely positive impacts. 
 
1.3.1 Poverty levels and Inequality 
 
There is convincing evidence from a number of countries that cash transfers can reduce 
inequality and the depth or severity of poverty (DFID 2011).  
 
For instance, it is estimated that Oportunidades programme in Mexico has reduced the 
national poverty gap by approximately 20 per cent, from 8.5 to 6.8. In Brazil, Soares et al. 
(2010) found that nearly 60 per cent of the 2.6 percentage point reduction in poverty levels 
between 2007 a 2009 could be attributed to the Bolsa Família programme. The authors also 
estimated that the Bolsa Família programme has accounted for 16 per cent of the fall in the 
country’s  ini index (a summary measure of inequality) in the last decade.  
 
Similarly, in South Africa, the national  system of cash grants is estimated to have reduced 
the country’s  ini coefficient by three percentage points, as it approximately doubles the 
share of national income that the poorest quintile receives (EPRI 2011). 
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1.3.2 Food Consumption and Nutrition  
 
There is  significant evidence that CCTs have had a positive impact on food consumption and 
nutritional status of beneficiary households (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Attanasio and 
Mesnard 2006).  
 
For example, in Mexico, Oportunidades has also been found to increase both caloric 
consumption and caloric diversity among households and to reduce stunting among the 
beneficiary population (Handa and Davis 2006). The median value of food consumption was 
11 per cent higher for beneficiary households than for comparable control households, and 
the median caloric consumption had increased by 8 per cent (Hoddinott, Skoufias, and 
Washburn 2000).  
 
Similar results are reported elsewhere. Cash transfers in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Colombia 
have been found to increase food consumption and support a more diverse dietary intake. 
There is evidence of children in recipient households having a more rich and diverse diet 
(Kebede 2006; Hofmann et al. 2008: Samson et al. 2006).  
 
Research results also indicate that for a given level of total household expenditure, 
beneficiary  households tend to consume a larger proportion of food. For example, the food 
share is about 4 percentage points higher among programme beneficiaries in Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua than among non-beneficiaries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). This 
evidence also helps to dissipate some of the concerns that cash could be used by beneficiaries 
for the consumption of less desirable commodities such as alcohol and tobacco (Skoufias et 
al. 2008).  
 
1.3.3 Education 
 
Investment in human development constitutes a primary objective for CCTs and most 
programmes condition the receipt of benefits on school enrolment and minimum levels of 
attendance. The evidence from a range of CCT programmes points to significant 
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improvements in school enrolment by children in beneficiary households (Barrientos and 
Scott 2008; DFID 2011; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Hofmann et al. 2008).  
 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009)  found that in all countries analysed, CCTs have led to 
significant increase in school enrolment among beneficiaries, especially among the poorest 
children, whose enrolment rates at the outset were the lowest. These impacts are found across 
the board in the middle-income countries such as Mexico and Brazil; in lower-income 
countries in Latin America such as Honduras and Nicaragua; and in low-income countries in 
other regions such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Pakistan.  
 
In Brazil, Bolsa Família has been credited with a 2.2 per cent increase in school attendance 
(Silveira Neto 2010) and a lower drop-out rate amongst beneficiaries (Hall 2008). In Mexico, 
it has been estimated that the improvements in schooling of children in Oportunidades’s 
beneficiary households will translate into an extra 0.65 of a year by the time they complete 
their education (Barrientos and Scott  2008). Another encouraging result from the evaluations 
of Oportunidades in Mexico is the large increase in school transition rates (from primary to 
middle school) among beneficiaries. 
 
Also, because CCT programmes effects are concentrated among households who were least 
likely to use services in the absence of the intervention, CCTs have particularly contributed to 
deductions in pre-existing disparities in access to education. For instance, in Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Turkey, where school enrolment rates among girls were lower than among 
boys, CCTs have helped reduce this gender gap (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Similarly, in 
Mexico, Oportunidades has had a larger impact on girls’ schooling relative to that of boys, 
particularly at older ages – the  programme increased enrolment in secondary school by 6 
percent for boys and 9 percent for girls (Barrientos and Scott 2008; Handa and Davis 2006). 
 
However, there is less evidence that improvements in enrolment and attendance have led to 
increased learning outcomes. Results of evaluations have been mixed. Barham et al. (2013) 
have found that random exposure to the CCT during critical school years led to a one-quarter 
standard deviation increase in learning outcomes for young men. On the other hand, recent 
evaluations in Ecuador, Mexico and Cambodia have found absence of any impact on 
  59 
achievement test scores (DFID 2011). This outcome is likely to be related to the insufficient 
coverage and quality of schools. 
 
1.3.4 Health 
 
There is consistent evidence of the positive impacts of CCT programmes on health, 
particularly on the utilisation of preventive health services and reduction in morbidity for 
specific age groups  (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, Gaarder et al. 2010).  
 
Oportunidades in Mexico has been successful in achieving higher rates of utilisation and 
improved health status among beneficiaries. Barrientos and Scott (2008) found that the 
programme has increased health visits in general by 18 per cent. Skoufia and McClafferty 
(2000) also found that the programme has generated an 8 per cent increase in clinic visits by 
pregnant women in their first trimester. Gertler (2004) also found a significant improvement 
in the health of children in response to Oportunidades. The author found that children from 
beneficiaries’ households experienced an illness rate in the first six months of life that was 
25.3 per cent lower than that of control children. These results are supported by Skoufia and 
McClafferty (2000) who found a 12 per cent reduction in incidence of ill-health among 
children aged 0-5 years compared to non-Oportunidades children, and 19 percent fewer days 
of illness among adults. 
  
Even though the bulk of the health impact evidence available come from Oportunidades 
(Gaarder et al. 2010), evidence emerging from other countries also point to a positive impact 
of CCTs on health. In Jamaica, Levy and Ohls (2007) reported significant effects of the CCT 
programme PATH on the number of preventive health care visits by children under the age of 
6. Rasella et al. (2013) found that Bra il’s Bolsa Família has contributed to decreasing child 
mortality, in particular for deaths attributable to poverty-related causes such as diarrhoea.  
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1.3.5 Local Economy  
 
The evidence on the overall impact of CCTs on the local economy is limited. However, 
evidence produced so far from existing programmes show that benefits from social cash 
transfers can spill over beyond beneficiaries’ households and benefit local economies 
(Barrientos and Scott 2008, Davies and Davey 2008, DFID 2011, Gelan 2006). 
 
Cash transfers serve as cash injections to local economies, providing liquidity and stimulating 
demand for goods  and services (particularly food and agricultural inputs) at the local level 
and therefore can have a positive impact on income growth in the local economy. 
 
An evaluation of Oportunidades in Mexico observed an increase in consumption and 
productive assets among non-beneficiary households in treatment areas, compared to non-
beneficiaries in control areas, which can be explained by improvements in the local economy 
(Barrientos and Scott 2008).  
 
There is also some evidence from Ethiopia and Malawi that the introduction of cash transfers 
into poor, remote areas can stimulate demand and local market development. Gelan (2006) 
found that in Ethiopia cash transfers had a multiplier effect, generating welfare improvements 
not only to households which are direct beneficiaries, but also to other households whose 
livelihood depends on producing and selling food in domestic markets and providing 
services. Evidence from Malawi also showed a positive impact of cash transfers in the local 
economy. Davies and Davey (2008) found visible signs of increased economic activity in 
most villages benefiting from CCTs in response to the increased demand generated by the 
social transfers. The authors estimated that the multiplier effect of the cash transfers was in 
excess of two – that is, each dollar of cash transferred to beneficiaries injected more than two 
dollars of income into the local economy. 
 
Another way cash transfer programmes may stimulate local economies is by creating rural 
markets for financial services. In the case of rural areas with a high degree of non-
monetisation, cash transfers are a way of integrating beneficiaries into the monetised 
economy, which is an important first step in introducing the very poor to the financial system. 
Additionally, the need to distribute cash can in itself be a trigger the establishment of 
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financial services in remote areas. Increasingly, cash transfers are distributed to target groups 
via formal financial intermediaries - through Smartcards (as in Malawi and South Africa), or 
by opening current accounts for beneficiaries (as in Brazil, Mexico, Philippines) (Carpio and 
Riemenschneider 2008). 
 
However, evidence from existing programmes also show that cash transfer can also generate 
negative externalities, such as creating inflation on prices of food and other commodities, by 
“over stimulating” the local economy. This is a particular concern in places where 
commodity supply is inelastic because local market systems are isolated or fragmented and 
unable to respond to the increase in demand produced by cash transfers. For instance, in 
isolated food deficit markets, cash transfers aimed at helping beneficiaries to purchase food 
may have the perverse effect of driving food prices up, further exacerbating the very problem 
it aimed to address (Harvey and Holmes 2007). A cash transfer programme in Meket, 
Ethiopia illustrates this point: demand for food was stimulated by a cash transfer scheme and 
prices soared as the programme was creating demand to which the local market could not 
respond. In such cases, the use of in-kind transfers seems to be more appropriate (Kebede 
2006). 
 
1.3.6 Negative impact on Labour supply and fertility 
 
Evaluations also reveal that CCTs have been quite successful in addressing many of the 
criticisms of earlier social assistance programmes related to disincentive effects. Despite 
initial concerns that positive impacts would be offset by negative behavioral changes among 
adults, such outcomes are not prevalent. CCTs have not generally decreased adults’ labor 
supply (from dependence on social assistance) nor fostered fertility, or reduced remittances 
and other private transfers (DFID 2011; Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
Where reductions in adult labour supply have been found, they have been small. Parker and 
Skoufias (2000) found a reduction in hours worked by adult men by about six hours per 
week, with no effect among adult women. On the other hand, studies  from Brazil and South 
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Africa found positive effects on labour market participation, with transfers used to cover 
costs associated with job seeking (DFID2011). 
 
Coady et al. (2004) argued that work disincentive effects seems to be less important in CCT 
programmes mainly for two reasons: firstly, transfers are rarely graduated and thus only those 
around the cut-off point have an incentive to change behaviour to become eligible to 
transfers; secondly, benefit levels are usually very low, implying that recipients will maintain 
a strong incentive to pursue additional earnings when they have a choice. 
 
Overall, CCT programmes’ evaluations have produced considerable evidence to support the 
view that CCTs have generated positive outcomes. However, such evaluations have generally 
provided little insight into why and how these outcomes have been achieved. In this sense, 
this research will also make a contribution to the Conditional Cash Transfers literature by 
specifying and analysing, from a policy implementation perspective, the intermediate 
processes that ultimately determine the degree in which cash transfer programmes are able to 
generate impacts.  
 
The next section describes the implementation of  CCT programmes’ key components and 
discusses the particular challenges they pose to programme implementers.  
 
 
2. The Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes  
 
CCT programmes vary greatly with respect to scope, size, context and operational details, but 
it is possible to indentify key components common to all programmes. These include:  
 Beneficiary Identification and Enrolment Cash transfer payments  
 Monitoring and Enforcement of Conditionalities  
 Accountability mechanisms: Auditing, Monitoring, and Evaluation  
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2.1 Beneficiary Identification and Enrolment  
 
The ability to effectively reach the poor is central to the success of any poverty alleviation 
programme; however, finding and engaging the poorest within a population is a difficult task. 
Identifying and registering the individuals or households who fit the criteria established by a 
CCT programme require substantive amounts of information and complex logistic 
arrangements – it is hence very costly. According to Mkandawire (2005), the average cost of 
administering individual targeting schemes is about 9 per cent of total programme cost. Other 
less efficient models such as self-targeting and geographic targeting are cheaper, but still 
consume an estimated 6–7 per cent of a programme’s budget.  
 
And yet, the success or failure of CCTs depends to a large extent on accurate targeting. 
Targeting performance in CCTs is crucial not only in terms of achieving programmatic 
objectives, but also because targeting errors - errors of exclusion (under coverage) and errors 
of inclusion (leakage) - can severely undermine the legitimacy of the programme and 
consequently its political sustainability.  
 
There are numerous targeting strategies available to programme implementers. Coady et al. 
(2004) identify two main categories of targeting methods which are commonly used in CCT 
programmes: categorical targeting and individual/household assessment.  
  
Categorical targeting refers to a method in which all individuals in a specified category are 
eligible to receive benefits. Geographical and demographic (age, gender, ethnicity) categories 
are commonly used as they are easy to observe, hard to manipulate and can correlate well 
with poverty. Geographical targeting is one of the most commonly used strategies and 
performs well when the poor are geographically concentrated and overall poverty levels are 
high. It is widely used as the first stage of the process of selection of beneficiaries (Paes-
Sousa et al. 2013). Demographic categories are also a commonly used; a review of CCT 
programmes in Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has shown 
that CCT programmes in the region tend to focus on households with pregnant or lactating 
women, or women of reproductive age, children, and school-age youth (Paes-Sousa et al. 
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2013). Categorical targeting is relatively low cost, but also less precise than Individual and 
Household Assessments (Coady et al. 2004).  
 
Individual and Household Assessment is a method that involves testing a person’s or 
household’s means for survival. This process is often referred to as mean testing. It usually 
involves interviewing each applicant , requesting information on income and assets. This is a 
very laborious process, requiring substantial administrative capacity to collect, process and 
update information. Verified means tested are potentially very accurate, but are very costly 
and may exclude legitimate applicants who can not produce the necessary documentation to 
proof income (Samson et al. 2006). Proxy means testing is an alternative form of individual 
and household assessment which employs more easily observable indicators associated to 
poverty, such as location of residence and quality of its construction. Overall, Individual and 
Household Assessment requires substantive resources, and for this reason is normally used to 
identify poor households within those that satisfy the categorical criteria (Coady et al. 2004).  
 
What constitutes the best targeting option for a particular programme will depend on 
programme objectives, the characteristics of the poor and vulnerable, the availability of data 
and funds, institutional capacity and political acceptability of the programme (DFID 2011). 
In practice, beneficiaries are typically selected through a combination of methods. For 
example, in Colombia, the M s Familias en Acci n Programme uses geographic, categorical 
(displaced and indigenous families) targeting combined with means testing using a 
multidimensional poverty index. In Mexico, Oportunidades combines an initial round of 
geographical targeting with proxy means test (Paes- Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
All targeting methods are imperfect and invariably result in some level of exclusion and 
inclusion errors. Coady et al. (2004) found, however, that the scale of these errors is 
determined largely by how the targeting methods are implemented. They found that 80 per 
cent of the variability in targeting performance was actually due to differences within 
targeting methods and only 20 per cent was associated to differences across methods, 
meaning that the most important determinant of targeting success is its implementation rather 
than the targeting method per se.  
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Targeting implementation is especially problematic in poorer jurisdictions where, besides 
limited resources and overall low administrative capacity, the social-economic environment 
invariably compounds the burden of identifying and incorporating eligible 
individuals/households. In such areas, most people’s source of livelihood is in the informal 
sector, people commonly lack identification documents, and, particularly in rural areas, are 
often spread through vast areas with poor transport infrastructure (Samson et al. 2006).  
 
Overall, CCT programmes have put a lot of effort into developing implementation strategies 
to overcome some of these limitations and improve accuracy and transparency of targeting. 
Common strategies include alternative means-testing and identification mechanisms, 
continuous recertification process, regular audits, independent validation and grievance 
redress mechanisms, investment in technology such as unified data bases (Lindert et al. 2007, 
Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
As a result, CCTs are among the better targeted social assistance programmes - eight of the 
top ten performing programmes in Coady et al. (2004) analysis of 85 social assistance 
programmes are CCT programmes. CCT are particularly successful in including the poor – 
for instance, both Bolsa Família and Oportunidades have low exclusion error rates at around 
10 per cent (Soares et al. 2010).  
 
However, inclusion errors are still generally high. Lindert et al. (2007) estimated that 
leakages for the Bolsa Família Program are estimated at about 20  of programme coverage, 
or about 2.2 million families; and Coady and Parker (2004) estimated an inclusion error of 22 
percent for Oportunidades. In the case of Bolsa Família, Soares et al. (2010) explained that 
the inclusion error is, to a great extent, the result of rapid programme expansion. They also 
noted that, although a portion of the inclusion error can be attributed to recording error and 
some to fraud, the bulk of the inclusion error, was the result of income volatility of 
households who were close to the programme’s poverty line. Indeed, Lindert et al. (2007) 
found that those in the poorest two quintiles (40 per cent of the population) received 94% of 
the Bolsa Família Program’s benefit. 
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In order to reduce inclusion errors, most programmes periodically revise beneficiary 
households’ eligibility. In Bra il, for instance, recertification takes place every two years and 
in Mexico every 5 years (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). The recertification process may lead to the 
household’s continuation in the programme, modification of the benefits, or exit from the 
programme (those who no longer fit the programme’s eligibility criteria). In 2011, Mexico’s 
Oportunidades recertified 1.1 million beneficiary households. Of these, 49 per cent were 
determined to be poor and eligible to remain in the program, 19 per cent were supposed to be 
redirected to a different programme, and 32 per cent were deemed no longer eligible (Paes-
Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
 
2.2 Cash transfer payments  
 
Once beneficiaries have been identified and registered, providing regular cash transfers 
would be a relatively straightforward process if beneficiaries were connected to the banking 
system – as is often the case of cash transfers in developed countries. However, the 
overwhelming majority of CCT programmes’ beneficiaries are not linked to any financial 
institution and most of them live in areas in which such services are not available. In such 
cases, cash is often delivered through programme’s implemented payment processes, 
increasing costs and raising issues of transparency and security.  
 
In order to deal with issues of cost and transparency, a growing number of programmes have 
been implementing electronic delivery of cash payments, relying on cash cards or mobile 
phones and a networks of alternative service providers (post offices, lottery offices, shops) to 
distribute payments. Despite steep set up costs, electronic delivery can substantially reduce 
costs in the long run; in Brazil, for instance, switching to electronic benefit cards cut the 
administrative cost of delivering Bolsa Família payments nearly seven-fold, from 14.7 
percent to 2.6 percent of grant value disbursed (Lindert et al. 2007). Switching to electronic 
delivery also reduces private costs for beneficiaries, as the use of cards and mobile phones 
significantly reduces wait and collection time (Samson et al. 2006). However, according to 
DFID, of the 40 social transfer programmes launched in the past decade for which detailed 
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data is available, only 45 per cent feature electronic delivery of cash payments (DFID 2011); 
the majority still relied on cash delivery through programme offices or agents.  
 
Direct cash delivery is an even more challenging and costly process and often results in 
delays and unreliable payment patterns, particularly in rural areas with poor infrastructure 
and scattered population. In Mozambique, for instance, payments to beneficiaries of the Food 
Subsidy Programme (PSA) are made directly by the implementing government agency 
(INAS) officials, who have to travel to communities carrying the cash. As the number of staff 
in each INAS Delegation is very limited, there are frequent delays in payments. Also the 
costs involved are very high – besides transport costs, INAS officials receive per diem of 
MTN1,500 when travelling to deliver the benefits, 15 times the Food Subsidy itself (Galvani 
2010). In Lesotho, delivery of cash transfers even involve the Lesotho defence forces, with 
military helicopters used to access remote area (Samson et al. 2006). As a result of these 
costly and cumbersome arrangements, payments are often made out of schedule, impacting 
negatively on the predictability and reliability of cash transfers and its ability to reach its 
goals.  
 
An added complication of CCT payment systems is the need for it to be integrated with the 
conditionalities monitoring system and be flexible enough to allow for benefit suspension and 
reinstatement.  
 
 
2.3 Monitoring and Enforcement of Conditionalities  
 
Conditionalities are the most distinctive features of Conditional Cash Transfer programmes 
and are also the most complex to implement. CCT programmes vary with respect to the 
design of their conditionalities and the enforcement of those conditionalities. Programmes 
normally have education and health related conditionalities, which vary in scope and 
specificity.  
 
The most common conditions to promote education include enrolment and regular attendance 
of the households’ children (commonly a minimum of 80 or 85 per cent of school days). A 
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few programmes also include conditions related to performance - Cambodia, for example, 
requires passing grades and Turkey allows a grade to be repeated only one (DFID 2011, 
Fiszbein and Schady 2009, Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
Health conditionalities of some kind are included in all Latin American programmes, while 
such conditions are much less common in programmes in Africa and South Asia, as service 
provision tend to be more limited in these areas (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Health 
conditionalities tend to apply to children and pregnant women and/or lactating mothers. 
Common health conditions include regular health centre visits, immunisations, and health and 
nutrition education sessions.  
 
Overall, conditionality compliance is high. In Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico, compliance 
with education conditions has tended to be 90 percent or better among enrolled students; 
compliance with health conditions are in the same range (Paes- Sousa et al. 2013). Although 
all CCT programmes specify a schedule of sanctions in the case of noncompliance with the 
stated conditionalities, the type of sanctions and the degree of enforcement vary substantially 
among programmes. The most common sanction is the temporary suspension of all or part of 
the benefit for the first instances of noncompliance, followed by an eventual termination of 
the benefit for repeated noncompliance.  
 
The conditional aspect of CCTs is one of the most complicated and costly features of CCT 
programmes to implement. Grosh et al. (2008) compile administrative costs for ten CCT 
programmes and estimated that monitoring compliance cost between of 1–3 per cent of total 
program resources. Beyond the allocation of budget resources, monitoring conditionalities 
compliance often involves complex inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms and information 
sharing involving social protection, health and education sectors at national and local levels 
(Lindbert et al. 2006).  
 
Besides the monitoring issues, one of the main challenges posed by conditionalities relates to 
the additional demands on the supply of services likely to arise when beneficiaries try to meet 
the conditionalities. Limited coverage and poor quality of services in many countries has 
weakened the efficacy of the conditional transfers, or produced a relaxed interpretation of the 
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conditionalities (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). Additionally, lack of adequate services may 
significantly increase the private costs incurred by beneficiaries in order to comply with 
conditionalities by, for instance, increasing cost of transport to school and clinics. Coady 
(2000) calculated that the beneficiaries of Progressa (precursor of Oportunidades) spent an 
annual average of US$95.70 on travel costs to comply with requirement to visit health clinic 
six times a year. Also, the potential administrative burden of monitoring conditionality and 
service supply issues are particularly critical in poorer jurisdictions with weak institutional 
capacity. For these reasons, some authors have pointed to the inevitability of CCTs in such 
contexts and advocate for unconditional cash transfers in such contexts (DFID 2011, Samson 
2006, Schubert and Slater 2006).  
 
 
2.4 Accountability mechanisms  
 
Checks and balances are an important feature in the implementation of any government 
policy, but are specially important in the case of CCTs mainly for two reasons; firstly 
because of the nature of the policy which involves the distribution of cash to large numbers 
of beneficiaries and is hence open to political and other manipulation; and secondly, because 
the intended beneficiaries of CCTs are among the most vulnerable in society and often lack 
the resources to protect their rights (Bassett and Blanco 2011).  
 
Strong control and accountability mechanisms are critical throughout CCT programmes 
implementation to prevent fraud and errors which can reduce its efficacy and undermine 
public support for the programme. A number of oversight mechanisms have been used in 
CCT programmes, including top down instruments such as formal audits, spot checks, public 
ombudsperson, hotlines, and impact evaluation; as well as bottom up approaches such as civil 
society organisations and community committees (Bassett and Blanco 2011, Samson et al. 
2006).  
 
For instance, in beneficiary selection, a combination of oversight mechanisms are normally 
used to increase transparency and reduce inclusion errors. Beneficiary eligibility criteria and 
beneficiary selection process are often widely publicised. Once beneficiaries are selected, 
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certain countries publish the full list of programme’s beneficiaries on the internet. 
Programmes also commonly have redress mechanisms, such as community committees, for 
challenging decisions. Finally, most programmes periodically carry out electronic cross 
checks and auditing of beneficiaries to address inconsistencies and correct errors. In Bra il, 
for example, the Court of Audit identified inconsistencies in 878,026 records of Bolsa 
Família beneficiaries in 2009, resulting in 194,869 beneficiary families being expelled from 
the programme (Paes- Sousa et al. 2013). All these checks and balances are important for 
mitigating the risk (and the perceived risk) of selective/political incorporation of 
beneficiaries, improving targeting efficiency and promoting programmes’ reputations and 
political support.  
 
Another important accountability mechanism common in CCT programmes are systematic 
programme evaluations. Robust external evaluations have been crucial for programme 
performance and political sustainability and have also helped to stimulate the rapid spread of 
cash transfer programmes across the globe. 
 
 
3. Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance Theoretical 
Framework applied to Conditional Cash Transfers  
 
The above analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers components and challenges highlighted the 
peculiarities and complexities of this policy type and the importance of implementation 
performance to CCTs’ legitimacy and sustainability. With this in mind, this section analyses 
the relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and performance in the 
implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers by applying the “Socio-Economic 
Characteristics and Implementation Performance Theoretical Framework” developed in 
Chapter 2. I start by discussing the meaning of implementation performance in the case of 
Conditional Cash Transfers. Next, I analyse the relationship between the socio-economic 
context and the six intervening variable clusters (policy objectives, policy resources, political 
conditions, agency capacity, disposition of implementers and intergovernmental relations) in 
the context of CCT programmes.  
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3.1 Dependent Variable: Implementation Performance 
 
Overall, CCT programmes’ evaluations have produced considerable evidence to support the 
view that CCTs have generated positive outcomes. However, such evaluations have generally 
provided little insight into why and how these outcomes have been achieved.  
 
Research into Conditional Cash Transfers performance, both academic and professional, has 
been almost entirely carried out from an outcome perspective, with evaluations often using a 
“black box” approach which does not take into consideration the implementation process  and 
implementation performance per se has rarely been analysed (Gaardner et al. 2010). To this 
effect, Samson (2009:46) has noted that “The open issues [about CCTs] revolve more around 
operational questions rather than impact. The question is not so much if [CCT produce 
impact] as much as how”. 
 
The few output level analysis which have been carried out focused on isolated components of 
CCTs such as targeting efficiency (Soares et al. 2010, Coady et al. 2004) or conditionality 
monitoring (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). This approach , however, offers only a partial view of 
implementation performance, since CCTs are characterised by the use of a multiplicity of 
interventions to reach their objectives. In this sense, the assessment of CCTs’ implementation 
performance should encapsulate the implementation of all key programme components, 
namely beneficiary identification and enrolment, payments, monitoring and enforcement of 
conditionalities and accountability mechanisms.  
 
A key difficulty in carrying out this type of analysis is that output level data is rarely 
collected systematically; hence, proxy indicators for implementation performance are rarely 
available. One notable exception is the “ ecentralised Management Index” ( ndice de  estao 
 escentralisada – I  ) of the Bolsa Família Programme, an index which assigns quality 
scores to several aspects of municipal implementation. Despite some limitations, such as the 
lack of information on the quality of supply of health and education services, the IGD is 
indeed a good indicator for measuring and comparing implementation performance at the 
local level, as it is comprehensive, measurable and collected periodically for all 
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municipalities. The IGD-M will be used as the proxy indicator for implementation 
performance (dependent variable) in this study’s quantitative analysis. 
 
 
3.2 Relationship Between Socio-Economic Characteristics and Intervening Variables in 
the Implementation of CCTs 
 
As poverty alleviation policies, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have a two-way 
relationship with the local socio-economic context: they affect and are affected by local 
socio-economic characteristics at the same time. CCTs are a direct response to an area’s 
socio-economic context and their aim is to interfere in such context and change it. For 
instance, the influx of resources brought by CCTs to poor areas alters the local socio-
economic context, generating support/opposition towards the policy and thus changing local 
political conditions for policy implementation.  
 
In order to build a more complete understanding of how the implementation of CCTs is 
affected by and at the same time affects the local socio-economic context, this section 
analyses in detail the interaction between local socio-economic characteristics and the 
theoretical framework’s  six intervening variable clusters -  policy objectives, policy 
resources, political conditions, agency capacity, disposition of implementers and 
intergovernmental relations -  in the implementation of CCTs. 
 
3.2.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Policy Objective  
 
The objectives of Conditional Cash Transfers are generally (i) to reduce current poverty 
through the provision of cash transfers, and (ii) to leverage these transfers as incentives to 
promote human capital development, contributing to breaking long-term intergenerational 
cycles of poverty.  
 
Jurisdictions that have higher proportions of individuals living in poverty presumably have a 
greater need for welfare programmes, such as CCTs. And, as a good fit between local need 
and policy objectives is likely to result in a positive local response towards a policy, it seems 
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reasonable to expect that poorer areas are likely to be more willing to implement such 
programmes than wealthy ones. However, research suggests that this relationship is not as 
straightforward. 
 
State-level comparative research in the USA regarding poverty levels and social protection 
produced mixed results regarding the association between poverty levels and the adoption of 
social protection policies; while some research have shown a positive association (Mogull 
1993 and Hicks and Swank 1983); others have shown an inverted relationship between 
poverty levels and adoption of social welfare programmes (Tannenwald 1999, The Lewen 
Group 2004), that is, poor states were less likely to adopt federal welfare programmes. Why 
was that the case if the need for such programmes was bigger in such states? The explanation 
for this negative correlation seems to be related to the fiscal capacity of states, as resource 
constraints in poorer jurisdictions limited their ability to finance services and meet local 
demand for social protection (Jennings 1980), as further discussed below. 
 
3.2.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Policy Resources 
 
Policies provide resources, including funds and other incentives, which can encourage or 
facilitate effective implementation. They also vary in terms of the degree of resources and 
technical expertise required for their implementation.  
 
As targeted and poverty alleviation policies, CCTs concentrate beneficiaries in poor areas.  
As CCTs are very resource intensive, this could potentially create unfeasible resources 
demands in such areas. However, as the bulk of CCTs are funded by either national level 
governments or international donors, poor local areas are, in the majority of cases, net 
recipients of policy resources. This not only alleviate the implementation burden on poor 
areas, but more importantly, generate extra incentives for local policy implementation.  
 
Rich areas, on the other hand, have relative small numbers of beneficiaries and therefore 
receive a small proportion of policy resources. Hence, even though such areas are likely to be 
better able to meet programme’s technical requirements, they may calculate that the burden 
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of the obligations attached to CCT implementation surpass the benefits of the relatively small 
resources it brings to them.  
 
3.2.3 Socio-economic Characteristics and Political Conditions  
 
It has often been argued that targeted social protection programmes, such as Conditional 
Cash Transfers, have such a weak political base that they are often unsustainable. Critics of 
targeted approaches to social protection claim that the economic elite and the middle class 
will invariably oppose targeted social transfers because, apart from not benefiting themselves, 
they fear such programmes will lead to dependency and tax increases (Mkandawire 2005, 
Samson et al. 2006).  
 
CCT programmes, however, have proven to be quite resilient so far. An Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) study of six Latin American CCT programmes showed that most 
countries that started CCT programmes maintained or substantially expanded their 
programmes over the years. The size of the beneficiary population grew in all observed cases 
and so has the value of the transfers, with transfers in Honduras and Mexico tripling and 
doubling in size, respectively (Paes Souza et al. 2013).  
 
Somehow CCT programmes have been successful in mobilising and sustaining political 
support. In fact, CCT programmes have been hailed by some as the “holy grail” of social 
policies for their ability to amass a broad political support while at the same time delivering 
benefits to the poorest (Zucco 2010). Hence there is a growing interest in the social 
protection and cash transfers literatures on issues related to politics and political economy 
focused on understanding the reasons behind this success.  
 
One possible explanation is that CCTs derive their wide political support from programmes’ 
success in achieving impacts, as attested by a multitude of evaluations. However, as Zucco 
(2011:18) noted “good policies have fallen, and will fall, to the imperatives of the 
governments’ budget priorities and electoral incentives”. In this sense, the fact that CCT 
programmes appears to be effective may be a necessary, but not sufficient explanation for its 
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wide political support. Politicians are likely to prioritise programmes which deliver electoral 
returns (Zucco 2011).  
 
Indeed, CCT programmes have benefitted from very high political visibility and there is 
consistent evidence that they promote electoral gains for incumbents both at national and 
local levels. For instance, in Brazil, Zucco (2011) estimated that 4.3 million votes might have 
migrated to Lula (the incumbent president) in the 2006 elections in direct response to the 
Bolsa Família Programme. Evidence from Mexico and Uruguay also indicate that CCT 
programmes can have a positive impact on political support for and the re-election prospects 
of the government that implement them (De La O 2008, Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). A similar 
trend has been observed in Asia. Labonne (2011) analysis of the electoral impact of the 
Philippine CCT programme has shown that local incumbents benefit electorally from CCT 
programmes implemented in their municipality, with incumbent vote share 26 percentage 
points higher in municipalities in which the CCT programme was implemented.  
 
It is also interesting to note that these electoral gains have not been uniform; Zucco (2011) 
found that, in Brazil, non-recipients in high CCT coverage areas voted for the respective 
incumbents at a higher rate than their counterparts with less access to the programme, as they 
benefited indirectly from the programmes economic boost to local economy. This means that, 
given CCT’s poverty targeting, electoral incentives will be more marked in poorer 
jurisdiction than in better off ones.  
 
Interestingly, such electoral gains from direct and indirect beneficiaries do not appear to be 
overshadowed by opposition from non-beneficiaries, as is often the case with redistributive 
policy. Generally, there is no evidence that the more well-off resist redistribution through 
CCTs and there has been no mobilized opposition against CCT programmes (Moore 2009, 
Zucco 2011). In Brazil, for instance, in the 2006 presidential elections candidates from across 
the political spectrum advocated the expansion of the Bolsa Família Programme; similarly in 
the 2010 presidential elections all major candidates vowed to maintain the Programme (Hall 
2006).  
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A possible explanation for the acceptance of this particular type of redistributive policy 
relates to CCT´s design features. CCT programmes deliberately incorporate features such as 
conditionalities to make them more palatable to non-recipients. Greenstein (1991) argued that 
targeted programmes tended to fare better in the political process when they were viewed as 
providing benefits that have been “earned” and when regarded as effective. In this sense, the 
existence of conditionalities has been important politically to convince non-recipients that 
such programmes were not a “hand out” but a contract based on mutual obligations between 
the government and beneficiaries. Hall (2006) noted, for instance, that the Bolsa Família 
Program, which initially had very soft approach to the monitoring of beneficiary adherence to 
conditionalities, had to adopt tighter and more transparent procedures to the monitoring of 
conditionalities’ compliance in response to demands from the public which repeatedly 
demanded a tougher approach.  
 
3.2.4 Socio-economic Characteristics and Agency Capacity  
 
Agency capacity encompasses the competence (ability), the resources (human, technical and 
financial) and structures institutions need to perform their functions and tasks. 
 
Capacity is a key issue for CCTs not only because the implementation of such programmes is 
very complex and resource intensive, but also because, due to their poverty targeting, 
programmes are implemented in areas with high concentration of poverty, with invariably 
very low levels of institutional capacity. Even when CCTs are implemented in middle income 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, they are often concentrated in the poorest areas of the 
countries, which also normally have limited capacity. Moreover, in the majority of cases, 
CCTs are the responsibility of one of the social areas ministries, usually social assistance or 
education, which are often among the least resourced ministries (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013; 
Samson 2009).  
 
Samson (2009) and Holmes and Jackson (2007) review of cash transfer programmes found 
that lack of capacity at implementing agency level is indeed a salient issue in CCTs’ 
implementation.  Few governments, they noted,  have adequate delivery capacity for 
implementing CCTs; the majority face significant capacity constraints both at central and 
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local levels. Governments often operate in an environment with inadequate human resources, 
office facilities, transport, communications and field infrastructure. In Zambia, for instance, a 
district with population ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 people has typically only one or 
two Social Welfare Officers who have limited skills and whose motivation is affected by low 
salaries and the lack of guidance and supervision from their headquarters (Schuber and Slater 
2006).  
 
Another important capacity related issue in the implementation of CCTs refers to the ability 
of governments to provide services related to conditionalities. CCTs directly generate 
additional demand for services, typically health and education,  through conditionalities, 
creating additional pressure on the supply of such services which is often inadequate in poor 
areas in the first place. For instance, Britto and Soares (2007) reported that the 
implementation of Red Solidaria Programme, a CCT in El Salvador, has been severely 
affected by supply-side constraints, as schools struggled to cope with increased enrolment 
produced by the programme, with shortages of classrooms, equipment and teachers. Similar 
shortages have been reported in many countries (Hall 2006; Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). This not 
only impose additional burden on beneficiaries trying to comply with conditionalities, but can 
compromise CCTs’ ability to fulfil its long-term objective to break the intergenerational 
cycle of poverty.  
 
In order to deal with these capacity issues, some countries have been experimenting with 
different strategies aimed at reducing implementation complexities and costs. For instance, in 
order to reduce costs and administrative demands on government institutions, Paraguay and 
El Salvador have used a mix of geographical and community targeting for determining 
eligibility and have also relied on communities for verifying compliance with programme’s 
conditionalities (Briere and Rawlings 2006). Others, such as Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and 
Peru, have reduced the frequency of payments to bi-monthly, in Honduras payments are 
made only 3 times a year (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). Another approach used to dealing with 
limited institutional capacity has been the use of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and private contractors as implementers (Holmes and Jackson 2007; 
Galvani 2011). All these strategies imply trade-offs which may impact on programmes’ 
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ability to achieve its outcomes and hence should not be seen as a substitute to investing in 
building government’s capacity to implement CCTs.  
 
3.2.5 Socio-economic Characteristics and Disposition of Implementers  
 
The “disposition” or “response” of the implementers involves their understanding of the 
policy, the direction of their response to it - neutrality, acceptance, rejection - and the 
intensity of that response (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, 1976). 
 
At the political level, local leaders support for a policy will vary according to their 
assessment of the importance of the policy for their jurisdiction and their assessment of 
potential electoral gains afforded by the policy.  
 
Since conditional cash transfers are targeted at the poor, they are likely to be a high visibility 
and high priority policy for local leaders in poorer jurisdictions thanks to the relative large 
number of direct beneficiaries and the positive spill over effects on the local economy which 
generate indirect beneficiaries. In such cases, electoral gains are likely to be substantial, as 
demonstrated by research empirical research (Zucco 2011). On the other hand, in better off 
jurisdictions, where the number of beneficiaries is smaller and the spill over effect of the 
transfers is less relevant to the local economy, CCTs are likely to be less attractive to local 
politicians, even without an explicit opposition to conditional cash transfers.  
 
The disposition of local bureaucrats is particularly relevant in the case of decentralised 
implementation. Bureaucrats in poorer jurisdictions may look at CCT programmes 
favourably given the local need and the high visibility of the programme; however, the 
complexity of CCT implementation combined with large number of beneficiaries and scarce 
local resources may result in an unmanageable amount of work and significantly impact the 
quality of implementation. In rich jurisdictions, bureaucrats may be less enthusiastic about 
the programme, as they perceive the programme to be less relevant to their community and 
not a priority to local political leaders. However, given the relative small number of 
beneficiaries, the programme may be well implemented with comparative small levels of 
resources and enthusiasm.  
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3.2.6 Socio-Economic Characteristics and Intergovernmental Relations  
 
The flux of information, demands and, above all, resources, between the national and local 
levels can change the dynamics of policy implementation. In general, poor jurisdictions are 
likely to be more dependent on national level resources, and hence more open to the 
implementation of national policies. In the case of CCTs, as resources are disproportionally 
allocated to poorer areas, the programme is likely to be even more welcome in such 
jurisdictions. Wealthy jurisdictions, on the other hand, will, if programme is properly 
targeted, receive less resources than poorer jurisdictions and may calculate that the burden of 
the obligations (financial and others) attached to CCT implementation surpass the relative 
small benefits the programme bring to their community. These general dynamics, however, 
can change depending on the intergovernmental approach adopted for policy implementation.  
 
Mexico and Brazil are both federal states, but offer an interesting contrast in relation to the 
different intergovernmental arrangements they have adopted in the implementation of their 
national CCT programmes (Fizbein and Schady 2009). Mexico opted for a centralised 
(vertical) approach to implementation given concerns with limited local capacity and 
accountability issues; whereas Brazil opted for a decentralised (horizontal) approach, with 
federal resources directed to reinforce and complement local capacity.  
 
Oportunidades, the Mexican programme, is implemented by the Secretariat for Social 
Development (SEDESOL) which coordinates the programmes through an operational 
agency, “The National Coordination of Oportunidades”, which established 32 state 
delegations. The coordinating agency designs and implements all aspects of the programme, 
determining benefits, conditionalities, beneficiary selection, payments and day- to-day 
logistics. Jamaica and Peru also rely on a vertical model (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).  
 
Brazil has opted for a decentralised model, in which the states and particularly municipal 
governments are responsible for the bulk of implementation responsibilities. While the Bolsa 
Família Programme’s ground rules are set at federal level by the National Department of 
Citi en’s Income (Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania –SENARC, in Portuguese) of 
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the Ministry for Social Development (MDS), and the benefit resources come from the federal 
budget, municipalities play a large role in programme implementation, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. Colombia also opted for a decentralized model, formalized by co-responsibility 
agreements between national and local governments that define the responsibilities of each.  
 
Both models present advantages and disadvantages. The vertical model allows for faster and 
more homogeneous programme implementation, and produces more centralised institutional 
memory. It is also less susceptible to the weaknesses in capacity in poorer areas. On the other 
hand, the vertical model may produce administrative conflict between the national/federal 
and sub national governments, competition with overlapping local programmes (especially in 
affluent states and municipalities), and lack of local ownership with consequent lack of 
cooperation from sub-national authorities (Ayala 2006).  
 
The horizontal model capitalises on local knowledge and resources and can result in a more 
context appropriate and responsive implementation if the right incentives are in place to 
guarantee a good partnership between national and sub national governments. On the other 
hand, problems with local capacity can make implementation unviable in some areas, unless 
local capacity is complemented with national resources; decentralised implementation is also 
potentially more open to lack of transparency and rent-seeking issues.  
 
 
Overall, this analysis of the relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and the 
six intervening variable clusters indicate that the implementation of CCTs in poor areas is 
likely to be considerably different from the implementation of CCTs in wealthy areas, as 
illustrated in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance  
Framework adapted to the analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers  
 
CCTs 
Local Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Poor, under-developed areas 
 
Rich, highly developed 
areas 
Policy Objectives: 
CCTs main objective is 
poverty alleviation.  
 
Good Fit: of CCTs’ poverty 
alleviation objectives are more 
relevant to poor areas. 
Poor Fit: CCTs’s objectives  
are less relevant to wealthy 
areas. 
Policy Resources:  
CCTs are targeted at poor 
people. 
Significant Resources: Given its 
targeted nature, CCTs concentrate 
beneficiaries and resources on 
poor areas. 
 
Limited Resources: CCTs 
bring relative small benefits to 
wealthy areas given  
small numbers of 
beneficiaries. 
Political Conditions:  
CCTs are targeted and 
conditional redistributive 
policies. 
Wide Support: Electoral 
incentives are likely to be more 
marked in poor areas, as large 
numbers of direct beneficiaries, 
plus indirect beneficiaries, create a 
powerful lobby for CCTs at the 
local level. CCTs have been 
delivering considerable electoral 
return to incumbents, resulting in 
strong support of local political 
leaders to the policy.  
Narrow Support: The 
relative small number of 
beneficiaries and their 
reduced political clout is 
likely to make CCTs a low 
political priority locally. 
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Agency Capacity:  
CCTs are resource 
intensive and complex to 
implement. 
Inadequate resources: Given the 
high numbers of beneficiaries and 
limited institutional capacity, poor 
areas may struggle to meet 
programme demands and cover 
local implementation costs. 
Adequate Resources: Given 
relative small number of 
beneficiaries and stronger 
institutional capacity, wealthy 
areas are likely to be better 
able to meet the programmes 
technical requirements and 
offer health and education 
services which are crucial for 
the attainment of CCTs’ 
human capital objective. 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
(acceptance, 
neutrality, rejection):  
CCTs are poverty 
alleviation policies with 
high visibility  and 
complex to implement. 
Acceptance: Bureaucrats in poor 
areas are likely to look at CCT 
programmes favourably given the 
local need and the high visibility 
of the programme; however, the 
complexity of CCT 
implementation, the large number 
of beneficiaries and the scarce 
local resources may significantly 
impact their ability to implement 
the programme. 
 
Neutrality or Rejection: 
Bureaucrats may also be less 
enthusiastic about the 
programme, as they perceive 
it to be less relevant to their 
community and not a priority 
to local political leaders. 
However, given the relative 
small number of beneficiaries, 
the programme may be 
adequately implemented with 
comparative small levels of 
resources and enthusiasm. 
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Intergovernmental 
Relations:  
CCTs require strong 
vertical coordination and 
local commitment. It 
concentrate resources in 
poor jurisdictions. 
More susceptible to inducements 
and enforcement: Poor 
jurisdictions are likely to be 
cooperative given the importance 
of CCTs locally and their 
dependency on federal funds.  
Less susceptible to 
inducements and 
enforcement: Wealthy areas 
may calculate that the burden 
of the obligations (financial 
and others) attached to CCT 
implementation, surpass the 
relative small benefits the 
programme bring to their 
community and maybe less 
cooperative. 
 
The implementation of CCTs in poor areas is likely to enjoy strong support from local 
leaders, bureaucrats and the general population, but is likely to be hindered by limited local 
capacity. In rich areas, on the other hand, local support for CCTs may not be as forthcoming, 
but local institutional capacity is less likely to be an obstacle to programme implementation. 
Moreover, each of these scenarios can also be altered by intergovernmental dynamics.  
 
Would these different scenarios result in different implementation performances? If so, which 
scenario would result in better implementation?  
 
These questions will be addressed in the context of the Bra ilian Bolsa Família Program, one 
of the first and currently the largest Conditional Cash Transfer programmes in the world. The 
Bolsa Famíla Program provides an ideal case study to understand how contextual factors 
affect local governments implementation, as its decentralised implementation created a 
“natural laboratory” which allows one to compare the implementation performance of 
Bra il’s 5,565 municipalities (Lindert et al.  2006). The next chapter presents an overview of 
the Bolsa Família Program, with special focus on its implementation arrangements.  
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Chapter IV  Bolsa Família Program 
 
 
Bolsa Família’s decentralised implementation offers an ideal scenario for investigating 
implementation variance at the local level, as it permits the examination of how variation in 
the socio-economic characteristics of the 5,565 municipalities executing the Programme 
affect their implementation performance. This study compared implementation performance 
across poor and wealthy municipalities using  a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques; the details of this comparative analysis are presented and discussed over the next 
three chapters. This chapter contextualises this study by presenting an overview of the Bolsa 
Família Program, its main characteristics, scope and achievements; it also describes the 
Programme’s  institutional arrangement, with a particular focus on its intergovernmental 
framework. Chapter V presents the quantitative analysis of data related to municipal income 
and development indicators and implementation performance and Chapter VI presents a 
qualitative analysis which complements and explains the results of the quantitative analysis. 
These three chapters combined offer a detailed picture of the relationship between municipal  
socio-economic characteristics and performance in the implementation of the Bolsa Família 
Program.  
 
 
1. Poverty and Inequality in Brazil 
 
Brazil has been known for decades as one of the world’s most unequal countries; despite 
being among the world’s wealthiest economies, Bra il has large numbers of its population 
living in poverty. Brazil also experiences extreme regional differences, with wealth 
concentrated in the richer South and Southeast regions, while states in the North and the 
Northeast region have the highest percentage of the population living in poverty.  
 
With Bra il’s democratisation process in the 1980s, following twenty years of military rule, 
debates concerning social inequality gained new momentum. The 1988 Constitution placed 
great emphasis on poverty reduction and the creation of a more just and equitable society  - it 
established access to health, education and social assistance as basic rights and stated the 
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state’s obligation to guarantee access to such services for all citizens. 
 
Since then, successive governments have made considerable strides in tackling poverty and 
inequality through strategies which combined economic growth, redistribution and improving 
access to basic services. Conditional cash transfers, in particular the Bolsa Família Program, 
which is the focus of this study, have been one of Bra il’s main approach to reduce poverty 
and address the country’s historic inequality.  
 
According to Brazil’s Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada – IPEA, in Portuguese), the number of Brazilians living in extreme 
poverty fell by 55 percent between 2001 and 2013, from 25.5 million to 10.5 million people.  
 
Bra il’s Human  evelopment Index has also improved drastically in the past two decades, 
according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Brazil’s Municipal Human 
Development Index (MHDI) jumped from 0.493 (Very Low Human Development) in 1991 to 
0.727 (High Human Development) in 2010, with over two-thirds of Bra ilian cities’ MHDIs 
above the 1991 national average. Progress was mainly driven by the health component of the 
index (MHDI-Longevity of 0.816), reflecting an increase of 9.2 years (or 14.2 per cent) in 
life expectancy at birth, from 1991 (UNDP 2013).  
 
Inequality, as reflected by the Gini coefficient for the Brazil, has fallen from 0.59 in 2001 to 
0.53 in 2009. The incomes of the poorest 10 per cent of Brazilians grew by 91.2 per cent over 
the 2001 to 2009 period, while those of the richest 10 per cent rose by 16.6 per cent (Soares 
et al. 2010). IPEA’s research has established that the most important contributor to the 
reduction of inequality was formal work, which accounted for 58 per cent of the reduction in 
inequality, followed by  social security transfers, which accounted for 19 of this reduction, 
and the Bolsa Família Program, which IPEA estimates was responsible for 16 per cent the 
reduction in inequality in Brazil. 
 
 espite this remarkable progress over the last two decades, Bra il remains one of the world’s 
most unequal societies. Hence, conditional cash transfers are likely to remain at the centre of  
Bra il’s strategies for poverty alleviation.  
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2. Overview of the Bolsa Família Program 
 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Bra il’s marked income inequality was the main motivation behind the development of 
Conditional Cash Transfers (Lavinas 1998).  
 
The concept of CCTs first emerged in policy debates in Brazil in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, in the context of the country’s democratisation process. Bra il’s politicians have 
framed national debates on poverty around inequality and have emphasised the need for 
redistribution, paving the way to the development of non conventional social policies and 
programmes such as CCTs to address poverty and inequality in the country. Lindert et al.  
(2007) pointed out that the use of CCTs as an instrument of social policy reflects the 
widespread belief expressed by 76 per cent of Brazilians that people are poor due to 
exclusion and “an unjust society” and the pressing need to address this “debt to the poor”. 
 
Within this context, the idea of providing a minimum income for the poor segment of the 
population gained momentum in 1991 when Senator Eduardo Suplicy, of the Worker’s Party 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT, in Portuguese), then an opposition party, presented a bill of 
law to introduce a guaranteed minimum income programme for all Brazilians over 25 years 
of age with monthly income below R$240 (US$120). Suplicy’s proposal was to grant a 
monthly cash transfer corresponding to 30 per cent of the difference between his income and 
the R$240 threshold. Although the House of Representatives passed the bill, it never came to 
a vote in the Senate, where the Government majority blocked the debate (Lavinas 1998). 
 
Even though this proposal was never approved,  it inspired some municipalities, particularly 
those most developed and with a larger fiscal base, to experiment with social transfer 
programmes. The first programmes of this kind were implemented in January 1995 in the city 
of Campinas, the Guarantee of Minimum Family Income, and in the Federal District, the 
Bolsa Escola (School Stipend/Grant) (Lavinas 1998; Lindert et al., 2007). These were the 
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very first CCTs to come to life in the world (Sá e Silva). It is interesting to note that such 
programmes were created by mayors from different political parties -  Campinas’s mayor 
belonged to PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party); while the governor of Brasília was a 
member of PT  (Workers’ Party). CCTs as a broad policy category  appealed to politicians 
and policymakers across the political spectrum: politicians on the left supported them as 
reinforcing basic human rights while right-wing politicians saw the conditions as an 
enforceable contract (Lavinas 1998).  
 
Both programmes targeted school-aged children and tied income to compulsory school 
attendance and achieved demonstrable positive impacts on poverty and on drop-out and 
repetition rates. In view these successful experiences, hundreds municipalities all over Brazil 
started to developed similar programmes - by December 1999, more than 500,000 families in 
one-fifth of Brazilian municipalities were receiving some form of school grant. However, due 
to limited financial capacity of most municipalities, the programmes could only meet a small 
part of the local need; hence, the federal government started to provide complementary 
funding in order to support the expansion of these local programmes (Lavinas 2001).  
 
Finally, in 2001, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Bolsa Escola 
became a nation-wide federal programme with four central objectives (Jamvry et al. 2005):  
(i) to increase educational performance, helping to reduce poverty in the long-run;  
(ii) to reduce short-term poverty by providing an income transfer to poor families;  
(iii) to reduce child labor; and  
(iv) to act as a potential safety net.  
 
The programme,  managed by the Ministry of Education, provided poor families, with per 
capita incomes of less than half the minimum wage,  a monthly grant of R$15 (US$7.50) per 
child between 6 and 15 years of age , up to a maximum of three children, conditional upon a 
minimum school attendance of 85 per cent.  
 
With the end of the Cardoso administration and the victory of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and 
his Workers’ Party in the 2002 elections, a period of transition began for CCTs in Brazil. 
Lula had strongly based his campaign on the promise that he would end hunger and guarantee 
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that every Brazilian would have access to at least three meals a day. In order to work towards 
this goal, his government created the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) Program. In order to house 
this programme, a new ministry was created – the Special Ministry of Food Security and 
Fight Against Hunger (Ministério de Segurança Alimentar e Luta Contra a Pobreza – MESA, 
in Portuguese). In 2003 MESA put together a number of sub-programmes that would jointly 
comprise Fome Zero, one of which was  art o  limenta  o (Food Card), a CCT focused on 
improving food security for the poor.  
 
The federal Bolsa Escola was maintained, especially since its greatest advocate, Cristovam 
Buarque was appointed Minister of Education. By 2003, Bolsa Escola had reached 8.2 
million school-aged children. 
 
Hence, in 2003, there were several other ongoing federal cash transfer schemes, which had 
distinct purposes and institutional frameworks, but essentially the same target group – poor 
families (Lindert et al. 2007). These included:  
 
 Bolsa  limenta  o (Health and Nutrition  rant): launched in 2001 and managed by 
the Ministry of Health, the Bolsa Alimenta  o targeted pregnant and lactating women 
and young children from poor families and had a series of health and nutrition related 
conditionalities;  
 Auxilio Gás (Cooking Gas subsidy): launched in 2002 and managed by the Ministry 
of Mines and Energy as a compensatory measure for the phasing out of cooking gas 
subsidies; and  
  rograma do  art o  limenta  o (Food Card): launched in 2003 and managed by 
the Ministry of Food Security the programme provided a monthly benefit payment of 
R$50 to poor families with a per capita income of less than half the minimum wage 
per month.  
  
The existence of several uncoordinated federal cash transfers created overlaps and 
inefficiencies. Despite the initial enthusiasm which accompanied the launch of Fome Zero in 
early 2003, serious problems soon became apparent due to the fact that each of the these 
programmes operated independently with no overall coordination. Each had separate 
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administrative structures, beneficiary selection and payment processes. This made effective 
implementation difficult, leading to high implementation costs and targeting errors of up to 
30 per cent (Hall 2006) Hence, in order to rationalise and improve efficiency of the Brazilian 
social safety net, the decision was taken to merge Bolsa Escola and these other three federal 
cash transfer programmes into a single programme called Bolsa Família Program.  
 
The Bolsa Família Program was formally created by Provisional Measure 41.132 of 20 
October 2003 and soon after turned into Law 10.836 of  9 January 2004. At first the 
programme was housed at the Bolsa Família Department, which was directly under the 
President’s office. In early 2004 it was transferred to the newly created Ministry of Social 
Development and Fight Against Hunger (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à 
Fome – MDS, in Portuguese).  
 
Within MDS, the Programme is managed by the National  epartment of Citi en’s Income 
(Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania - SENARC, in Portuguese), in partnership with 
different line-ministries (particularly the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of  Health), 
states and municipalities. The programme’s institutional framework and intergovernmental 
arrangements will be presented in detail later in this chapter (section 3).  
 
The formal objectives of Bolsa Família as stated in Article 4 of Decree 5.209 of 17 
September 2004, which regulated law 10.836 that established the Bolsa Família Program are 
to:  
(i) promote access to public services, particularly health, education and social assistance;  
(ii) fight hunger and promote food security; 
(iii) support the sustainable emancipation of families living in poverty and extreme poverty; 
(iv) fight poverty; and 
(v) promote coordination and synergy in government’s social action. 
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2.2 Targeting and Coverage 
 
The Bolsa Família Program targets poor families with children up to the age of 15 and all 
extremely poor families regardless of their composition, according to a programme-specific 
poverty line. The original income ceilings for eligibility were set at a fixed monthly per 
capita family income of R$100 (US$48) for poor families and R$50 (US$25) for extremely 
poor families. The Programme aimed to cover the totality of households within this profile, 
which were estimated at 11.2 million based on figures from the 2004 National Household 
Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD, in Portuguese). These 
quantitative targets for coverage were met by June 2006.  
 
Figure 4: Expansion in the Number of Beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família Program 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
 
The eligibility thresholds have been revised upwards in 2006, 2009 and most recently in 
2014
5
  in order to account for increases in the cost of living. In 2014, the income ceilings for 
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eligibility were R$77 (US$ 35) for “extremely” poor households and between R$78 and 
R$154 (US$70) for “poor” households. 
 
Targeting and beneficiary selection in the programme is done through a combination of 
geographic targeting and means testing. Each municipality is allocated a beneficiary quota 
based on poverty levels in the municipality based PNAD’s data. Municipalities have the  
responsibility for identifying and registering potential beneficiaries into a central database 
known as the  adastro  nico (unified registry), but family eligibility is determined centrally 
by MDS. 
 
In 2013, Bolsa Família reached  13.94 million families (about 46 million people),  surpassing  
the number of poor and extremely poor families estimated by the 2010 Census (13.738.415) 
(MDS 2014).  
 
Despite its rapid expansion, the Bolsa Família Program has maintained impressive levels of  
targeting accuracy, with low levels of inclusion and exclusion errors. Several reviews 
(Lindert et al. 2007; Soares et al. 2010) have found the Bolsa Família Program to be among 
the best targeted conditional cash transfer programmes in the world, with about 90 percent of 
programme’s benefits going to families in the poorest two quintiles and 68 per cent going to 
those in the poorest quintile .  
 
 
2.3 Benefits  
 
The Bolsa Família Program provides monthly cash transfers according to family income 
levels and composition. As of June 2014, Bolsa Família’s monthly payment values were as 
follows
6
:  
 
 Extremely poor families (per capita income below R$77) receive: 
- a basic transfer of R$77 (US$38.5);  
                                                        
6 The value of the benefits is defined by the government through presidential decrees and  justified on the basis 
of rises in the official minimum wage and in national inflation indices. 
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- R$35 (US$17.5) per child up to 15 years old (capped at three children); 
- R$35 (US$17.5) per pregnant women or lactating mothers in the 
household; 
- R$42 (US$21) per youth  aged 16 or 17 years old (capped at two people); 
and 
 
- Extreme poverty supplement: paid to families that fall below the R$77 per 
capita income threshold even after other BFP transfers. The value of the 
supplement is calculated on a case by case basis to enable households to 
reach a monthly per capita income of  R$77. 
 
 Poor families (income per capita between R$78 and R$154) are only eligible to 
variable transfers according to demographic composition: 
- R$35 (US$17.5) per child up to 15 years old (capped at three children); 
- R$35 (US$17.5) per pregnant women or lactating mothers in the 
household; and 
- R$42 (US$21) per youth  aged 16 or 17 years old, up to the maximum  
 
Monthly transfers range from R$35- 336
7
 (US$17.5-168) per family. The average value of 
benefits paid in 2013 was about R$150 (US$75), representing 22 per cent of the Brazilian 
minimum wage (MDS 2014). 
 
Payments are made via the banking system, through the Caixa Econ mica Federal, a public 
bank. In order to ensure easy access to the funds, each beneficiary household is issued a 
Bolsa Família card, preferably in the name of the woman head of the household,  to 
withdrawn the benefits in one of the  programme’s 78,000 payment points, which include 
Caixa Econômica agencies, lottery points, ATMs and bank correspondents such as authorised 
shops and supermarkets. In 2013, a total of 32.932.386 payments were made  (MDS 2014). 
 
 
                                                        
7
 Without including the extreme poverty supplement. 
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2.4  Public Spending on Bolsa Família 
 
Bolsa Família’s spending has grown exponentially since the inception of the programme in 
2003, reflecting the rapid expansion in the number of beneficiaries and several increases in 
the value of the benefit. The total cost of the programme amounted to R$24.88 billion 
(US$12.44 billion) in 2013, the equivalent of 0.46 per cent of the Brazilian Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (MDS 2014). Despite its large size, Bolsa Família is not the largest social 
assistance programme in Brazil; the Benefício de Prestaç o Continuada (BPC-LOAS), a cash 
assistance benefit for the poor elderly and disabled, costs about 0.6 of GDP; and a similar 
percentage of the GDP is directed to unemployment insurance benefits (Lindert  et al. 2007; 
MDS 2014).  
 
Figure 5: Benefits paid to beneficiary families 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
 
 
2.5  Conditionalities 
 
Bolsa Família’s cash transfers are conditional on all family members complying with human 
development conditionalities. As discussed in Chapter 3, conditionalities play a pivotal role 
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in all CCT programmes, but their interpretation vary from programme to programme 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The Ministry of Social Development sees the role of 
conditionalities in Bolsa Família as  a two-way commitment between beneficiary families 
and the government to guarantee access to health and education. Indeed, M S’s website and 
publications often stress that conditionalities are not a form of punishment, but an 
encouragement for beneficiaries to take up and exercise their right to free education and free 
health care  (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; MDS 2014) .  
 
Conditionalities under the Bolsa Família Program include:  
 
 Education: 
- school enrolment of all children in the household aged 6-15 years;  
-  minimum school attendance of 85 per cent for all children in the household aged 6-15 
years; and 
- minimum school attendance of 75 per cent for students in the household aged 16 -17 
years.  
 
 Health: 
- up-to-date vaccines for all children in the household aged 0-7 years;  
- Regular health check ups and growth monitoring for all children in the household aged 
0-7 years; 
- pre-natal and post-natal check-ups for pregnant women in the household; and  
- participation in educational health and nutrition seminars offered by local health teams. 
 
Monitoring compliance is a very complex task, as it requires coordination among at least 
three government areas – social assistance, education and health – both at the local and 
national levels. 
 
In the case of Education conditionalities, the responsibility for overseeing the monitoring of 
conditionalities lays with the Ministry of Education (Ministério da Educaç o – MEC in 
Portuguese), but data collection at the local level involves schools, Bolsa Família’s municipal 
manager, and the municipal education secretariat. Once the data on conditionalities is 
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received and consolidated, MEC shares the information with MDS in bi-monthly reports.  In 
2013, 16.1 million children aged 6-17 were monitored, representing 38 per cent of all 
students enrolled in public (government) schools in Brazil. Of these, 96 per cent complied 
with the conditionalities (MDS 2014:76).  
 
Overseeing the monitoring of health conditionalities is  the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health, relying on information provided by community health workers, local health centres 
and hospitals (Lindert et al. 2007). In 2013, 73 per cent of beneficiary  families were 
monitored, the highest percentage achieved by the programme to date (MDS 2014:85). 
Compliance with health conditionalities depends greatly on access to services, which can, in 
some cases, require a higher level of effort on the part of beneficiaries.  
 
As mentioned previously, the Bolsa Família Program takes a soft approach on 
conditionalities, as lack of compliance is seen more as a “red flag” that alerts authorities to 
the existence of some kind of obstacle that impedes the family to access services, than 
unwillingness to comply. In this sense, noncompliance leads to a warning (written notice) and 
the visit of a social worker to see if there is a non cash-related problem to be solved. Only 
after three consecutive occasions of noncompliance the benefit is temporarily “blocked”. In 
2013, 217.957 families received warnings, 71.002 had their benefits blocked, and 60.543 had 
their benefits suspended, but none has been cancelled (MDS 2014:76).  
 
 
2.6  Programme Impacts 
 
Bolsa Família’s impact evaluations published by MDS in 2012 (Avaliaç o de Impacto do 
Bolsa Família – AIBF in Portuguese) and several other independent studies show that the 
Bolsa Família Program has had significant positive impacts, including:  
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 Impact on Poverty and Inequality  
 
Between 2003 and 2009, Bra il’s absolute poverty rate dropped from 26 to 14 per cent8, 
while extreme poverty declined from 10 to 4.8 percent of the population. Estimates indicate 
that the net impact of Bolsa Família explains about 17 per cent of the reduction of poverty 
and 40 per cent of the reduction of extreme poverty between 2003-2005. Bolsa Família’s 
impact on poverty  has diminished in the subsequent years, but still very significant 
accounting for an estimated 13 per cent of the reduction of poverty and 32 per cent of the 
reduction of extreme poverty between 2007-2009 (Soares et al. 2013).  
 
The programme has also contributed to reducing inequality. Bra il’s  ini coefficient fell by 
10 per cent between 2001 and 2009, from 0.592 percent to 0.538. It is estimated that Bolsa 
Família accounted for 16 per cent of this fall in inequality, which is quite an amazing 
contribution given that the  Programme only contributes to 0.8% of household income 
(Soares et al. 2013) 
 
 Impact on Education 
 
Recent studies show that the Bolsa Família Program reduced drop out rates for both primary 
and secondary students and improved school attendance by about 4.5 per cent for children 
aged 7-14 years (MDS 2012; Silveira Neto 2013).  The programme also has been shown to 
have a positive impact on performance, increasing approval rates for beneficiaries by about 8 
percentage points (Brauw et al. 2012).  
 
 Impact on Nutrition and Health 
 
One of the most unequivocal positive impacts of Bolsa Família has been the marked 
reduction in food insecurity and the increase in consumption among poor beneficiary 
families, with positive consequences to beneficiaries’ nutrition. For instance, Bolsa Famíla’s 
impact evaluation (AIBF) found that the incidence of malnutrition among children benefiting 
                                                        
 
8
 According to Bolsa Família administrative poverty line. 
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from the Programme fell from 15 per cent to 10 per cent in 4 years (MDS 2012). The AIBF 
also found positive health impacts including improvements in children’s  anthropometry 
(weight-for-height and body mass), increase in pre-natal care and children vaccination 
schedule. 
 
 
3. Institutional arrangements for programme implementation 
 
Bolsa Família is a federal programme that is implemented in a decentralised way. According 
to Licio (2012), the decision to decentralise the Programme’s implementation was taken by 
the Federal government in response to realisation that the ambitious expansion targets set for 
the programme could only be achieved if the responsibility for its implementation was shared 
with municipalities. This section provides an overview of Bra il’s federalism and presents the 
specific intergovernmental arrangements developed to facilitate the implementation of the 
Bolsa Família Program within Bra il’s federative context.  
 
 
3.1 Overview of Brazil’s Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations 
 
In the early 1980s, Brazil had a very centralised system of decision-making and control of 
public finance, a legacy of the years of military rule. In many instances, federal 
implementation involved state and local agencies in administrative roles, but with quite 
limited discretion. The Constitution of 1988, which is considered a benchmark in Brazilian 
federalism,  instituted a number of decentralisation reforms and established a triune 
federalism in which municipalities have the same status as states and the central government 
(the Union). Brazil is now a highly decentralized federation which includes 5,565 
municipalities, 26 States and the Federal District.  
 
The 1988 Constitution deepened the process of decentralisation of revenue mobilisation and 
expenditure functions, granting greater autonomy to states and municipalities in debt and 
expenditure management and control, with important tax bases devolved to sub-national 
governments and the reform of Bra il’s revenue-sharing system. As a result, the share of sub-
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national government spending in total government expenditures in Brazil is now comparable 
to the OECD’s average and that of other large decentralised federations such as the United 
States and Germany; and far exceed those of most Latin American countries (Afonso and 
Mello 2000).  
 
With the new Constitution, the role of municipal government has changed significantly, not 
only due to their increased revenue mobilisation capacity, but also in terms of their more 
active role in service delivery, particularly in the social area. The Constitution established 
that provision of essential services (education, health, social assistance and public works) 
would be principally the responsibility of municipalities, with secondary roles for state 
governments. Indeed, it has been argued that the decentralisation provisions in the 1988 
Constitution were essentially a process of municipalisation of revenue mobilization and 
service delivery (Afonso and Mello 2000).  
 
Besides the large number of matters falling exclusively under municipal jurisdictions, such as 
transportation and basic sanitation, municipal governments play an increasing role in areas of 
concurrent competence among the three levels of government such as health,  education,  and 
social security and welfare (Neves 2012). 
 
Municipal governments have progressively taken on the expenditure functions assigned to 
them by the Constitution. However, the conditions for fulfilling their responsibilities are 
extremely diverse; environmental and institutional disparities among Brazilian municipalities 
(Neves 2012). 
 
Even though revenue mobilization has been strengthened at the municipal level with the 
assignment of wider tax bases and increases in revenue-sharing transfers after 1988, 
municipal tax revenues are still relatively low as a share of GDP. More importantly, even 
though municipal revenue collection now exceeds the mandated federal transfers to the 
municipal governments allocated to the Municipal Revenue-Sharing Fund (Fundo de 
Participaçao dos Municípios –FPM in Portuguese), revenue mobilisation capacity is unequal 
across municipalities and the number of local governments for which local revenues exceed 
transfers from higher levels of government is small (typically large municipalities and state 
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capitals) (Afonso and Mello 2000). Hence,  municipalities have often required financial 
assistance from the federal government, in addition to the existing mandated revenue-sharing 
arrangements, in order to fulfill their role in service provision. In Education, for instance, the 
Fundo de Manutençao e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental (FUNDEF) was created 
1998 to finance sub-national spending on education. The key objectives of FUNDEF are to 
reduce shortfalls in financing at the sub-national level and to increase the coverage of the 
municipal primary education system.  Similarly, in health care, federal funding for basic and 
preventive health care programmes has increased and minimum per capita transfers have 
been implemented for a number of preventive care programmes, including pre-natal care, oral 
hygiene and immunisation.  
 
However, in contrast with the assignment of revenue sources across different levels of 
government in the 1988 Constitution, expenditure functions were not always devolved in a 
clear and systematic fashion to sub-national governments, particularly in the areas of 
concurrent competence, often generating inefficiencies, irrational definitions of programmes, 
services, and clients, discontinuities and waste of resources (Cunha and Pinto 2008). Any 
federal entity is constitutionally authorised to implement programmes in the areas of health, 
education, welfare, housing and sanitation. Conversely, no federal entity was constitutionally 
obligated to implement programmes in those areas (Arretche 2003). The rules for cooperation 
between government spheres are provided for in complementary laws whose enforcement 
depend on the development of intergovernmental arrangements, with varying structures, 
funding and enforcement methods (Neves 2012).  
 
In the case of Conditional Cash Transfers, programmes originated at the municipal level and 
were later centralised by the federal government under the Bolsa Família Program in order to 
increase coordination  and efficiency. The division of competencies and the rules for 
cooperation among government spheres in the context of Bolsa Família were established by 
the federal law that created the programme, but, given the autonomy of states and 
municipalities, such rules and competencies could not be imposed, they have to be negotiated 
with states and municipalities, as further discussed in the next sections (Cunha and Pinto 
2008).  
  100 
3.2 Overview of key actors and their roles in Bolsa Família’s implementation 
 
The Bolsa Família Program is managed by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), but 
numerous other actors from across government areas and levels are involved in various 
aspects of programme implementation.  
 
3.2.1 Federal level: 
 
The Bolsa Família Program is managed at the federal level by the Ministry of Social 
Development (MDS) in coordination with the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. 
 
 The Ministry of Social Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social - MDS) 
 
The Ministry of Social Development was created in January 2004 in a merger of the (former) 
Ministry of Social Assistance, the (former) Ministry of Food Security, and the Bolsa 
Família’s Executive Secretariat.  MDS comprises four executive Secretariats responsible for 
the implementation of social protection programmes, namely: the National Secretariat of 
Citi en’s Income (Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania - SENARC), the National 
Secretariat for Social Assistance (Secretaria Nacional de Assistência Social - SNAS), the 
National Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança 
Alimentar e Nutricional - SESAN), and the Extraordinary Secretariat for Overcoming 
Extreme Poverty (Secretaria Extraordinária para Superaçao da Extrema Pobreza - SESEP) ; 
and the Secretariat for Information Management and Evaluation (Secretaria de Avalia  o e 
Gest o da Informa  o – SAGI), a transversal Secretariat responsible for developing 
monitoring and evaluation systems. 
 
Within MDS, SENARC has the overall responsibility for coordinating the Bolsa Família 
Program and the national registry database for social programmes -  adastro  nico (Unified 
Registry). It is responsible for beneficiary selection, payments authorization, overseeing 
compliance of conditionalities and administering consequences for non-compliance, 
monitoring of the programme, and supporting municipal managers.  
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 Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health 
 
The Ministries of Education and Health are responsible for establishing technical and 
operational guidelines regarding school attendance and health conditionalities, and also for 
consolidating conditionality compliance information and reporting this information to MDS. 
The law that created Bolsa Família (Law 10.836/2004) defines the roles of Health and 
Education ministries in the programme as follows:  
 
“At the federal level, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and of the Ministry 
of Education to regulate the conditionalities that correspond to them and to verify their 
fulfillment by families; to monitor and solve deficiencies in service supply by federated 
units; to coordinate programme implementation with local government; to participate in 
decisions concerning the centralised functions of programme management (registry, 
payment of benefits, monitoring and evaluation.”  
 
The Ministry of Education has created an intricate national system  for monitoring school 
attendance of Bolsa Família beneficiaries. The system, which is part of  ro eto  resen a 
(Attendance Project), is based on a network of municipal focal points. Each municipal 
Department of Education has designated a focal point who formally agrees to be held 
accountable for the monthly reporting of school attendance records of every Bolsa Família 
student in the municipality. The first task of the municipal focal point is to print attendance 
lists containing the names and information of Bolsa Família students enrolled in each school. 
The lists are then handed in to school personnel, which fill them out by reporting the number 
and reason of individual absences. That procedure is to be carried out by principals and their 
teams, not by teachers, so as to avoid that they may want to protect or punish students by 
incorrectly reporting class attendance. Finally, focal points at the municipal  Department of 
Education gather all school lists and enter data into an online database (Sá e Silva 2011). 
 
The system of school attendance monitoring connects 22 thousand users, who monthly report 
class attendance for 17.49 million students enrolled in 168 thousand public schools. In 2013,  
the system had complete information for 88.2 per cent of Bolsa Família’s beneficiary 
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students (14.42 million students). Among those, 95.9 per cent complied with minimum class 
attendance requirements (MDS 2014). 
 
The monitoring of health conditionalities is even more complex, as compliance with health 
condicionalities depends greatly on access to services. Beneficiary families are monitored 
when they receive assistance from community health teams under the Family Health 
Program, local health centers or hospitals. Health service providers record data on health 
visits, vaccination, nutritional status, growth monitoring and other Bolsa Família 
conditionalities into a special module ( apa Diário de  companhamento) of the national 
health information systems “SISVAN,” a database system designed to monitor the health and 
nutrition situation of the general Brazilian population. The information gathered on Bolsa 
Família beneficiaries is transmitted the municipal health authorities regularly. The municipal 
health authorities are then responsible for consolidating the information at municipal level 
and transmitting it to the Ministry of Health (Minist rio da Sa de) twice a year. 
 
 Caixa Econômica Federal 
 
The Caixa Econ mica Federal, a state bank, has been contracted as Bolsa Família’s operating 
agent. Caixa consolidates and manages the national registry database for social programmes 
(Cadastro Único), assigns registered individuals the unique Social Identification Number 
(NIS), and makes payments directly to beneficiaries, crediting beneficiaries’ electronic 
benefit cards on a monthly basis. Withdrawal of benefits can be done through Caixa’s 
extensive banking network of over 2,000 agencies nationwide, or at other participating 
locations such as lottery points and other banking correspondents (Lindert et al. 2007; MDS 
website). 
 
 Controls agencies  
 
At federal level, Bolsa Família Program is overseen and controlled by three federal control 
agencies – the General Controllers Office (Controladoria Geral da Uni o – CGU, in 
Portuguese), the Federal Audits Court (Tribunal de Contas da Uni o – TCU, in Portuguese), 
and the Office of the Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público –MP, in Portuguese). 
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Cooperation agreements have been signed between the Ministry of Social Development and 
each of these agencies in order to coordinate oversight and control of the programme through 
random-sample operational and financial audits, case investigations, and implementation 
evaluations (Lindert et al. 2007; SENARC 2014). The work of such agencies is 
complemented at the local level by the Social Control Councils.  
 
3.2.2 State level: 
 
States’ governments have a very limited role in the implementation of the Bolsa Família 
Program, despite their importance in the Brazilian federal system. Their responsibility is 
basically limited to  providing technical support and training to municipalities, particularly 
smaller ones. Fenwick (2009) argued that this was a deliberate move from the federal 
government to circumvent the interference of state governors and avoid them claiming 
political credit for the programme.   
 
3.2.3 Local level: 
 
Bra il’s 5,565 municipalities are responsible for the bulk of Bolsa Família’s implementation 
at the local level and are the main interface between the Programme and its beneficiaries. 
Municipalities have a wide range of roles including (MDS 2013:15-17): 
 
- providing a local Bolsa Família manager (Gestor Municipal); 
 
- registering potential beneficiaries in the Unified Registry (Cadastro Único) 
database and keeping beneficiary records updated; 
 
- monitoring health and education conditionalities, consolidating associated 
information and transmitting it to corresponding Ministry; 
 
-  linking Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries to other complementary services such as     
literacy, professional training, and income-generation programmes;  
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- establishing Social Control Councils (SCCs) which are responsible for overseeing 
local implementation and communicating any irregularities detected in the 
management and execution of the Bolsa Família Program at the municipal level.  
SCCs must have civil society and government members from different sectorial 
areas. 
 
 
3.3 Intergovernmental framework  
 
 iven Bra il’s continental dimensions and Bolsa Família’s ambitious beneficiary targets, the 
federal government was unable to implement the Bolsa Família Program by itself; it  did not 
have the necessary information, resources, expertise nor the legal authority to do it. Instead, it 
had to reach out to municipalities.  
 
However, even though the federal law that created the Bolsa Família Programme (ordinary 
law 10.836 of 9 January 2004) set out responsibilities for municipalities in programme 
implementation, such responsibilities could not be imposed on them since municipalities  are 
constitutionally autonomous and hence not obliged to carry out a federal programme (Cunha 
and Pinto 2008). 
 
 In such situations, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) noted, traditional top-down hierarchical 
tools are not effective and alternative programme management models which recognise 
interdependency between government levels should be used instead. Indeed, Licio (2012) 
described how the federal government tried to implement the programme using a more 
centralised/top down approach before 2006 and failed; this lead to the development of a 
series of tools and mechanisms to support programme’s decentralised implementation.  
 
3.3.1 Joint Management Agreements (                ) :  
 
In May 2005, MDS issued an executive order calling on all municipalities to sign joint 
management agreements  (Termos de  des o)  which would formalise municipalities 
commitment to Bolsa Família and establish the overall framework for the programme’s 
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decentralised implementation. These agreements clarified municipalities’ roles and 
responsibilities and established minimum institutional standards for programme operations at 
the municipal level.  
 
Specifically, the agreements required municipalities to assign a local Bolsa Família manager, 
register potential beneficiaries in the Unified Registry (Cadastro  nico  and keep their 
records up-to-date, monitor and consolidate information on compliance with health and 
education conditionalities, and set up Social Control Councils (SCCs) comprised by 
government and civil society representatives to oversee Programme implementation. The 
Joint Management Agreements also specified that municipalities agreed to prioritise Bolsa 
Família beneficiaries for other complementary services and programmes such as literacy, 
professional training, and income-generation programmes (Lindert et al. 2007).  
 
Despite all those requirements, by the end of 2005, MDS had entered into formal Joint 
Management Agreements (Termos de  des o  with 5,558 municipalities (99.7 per cent of 
Brazilian municipalities); the remaining 5 municipalities formally joined the Bolsa Família 
Program in 2009 (Licio 2012).  
 
However, a key limitation of the Joint Management Agreements is that they were all the 
same, despite the great diversity of Brazilian municipalities. The Agreements followed a 
standard template, without taking into consideration the specificities of municipalities and 
their strengths and limitations. So, despite their initial support to the programme,  
municipalities increasingly complained that they were unable to meet their commitments to 
the programme given the lack of resources to cover local costs. It became apparent then that 
the federal government had to provide more support to municipalities for them to be able to 
fulfil their responsibilities under the Joint Management Agreements (Licio 2012). 
 
3.3.2 Financial Support for updating the Unified Registry 
 
Financial support for Bolsa Família local implementation came initially in the form of 
specific support for the process of updating and expanding the Unified Registry (Cadastro 
Único). A key implementation challenge of the programme was to update the registry which 
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had been inherited from previous CCT programmes (particularly the Bolsa Escola Program). 
In order to motivate municipalities to cooperate with this process, MDS devised a 
mechanisms which would permit the transfer of funds to municipalities to support their work. 
Following a fee-for-service approach, municipalities would receive R$6 (US$3) for each 
record updated, completed or added in the Registry. The signing of the Joint Management 
Agreements (Termos de  des o) was a precondition for receiving these funds, which also 
helped to encourage municipalities to sign the agreement (Licio 2012).  
 
3.3.3 Monitoring the Quality of Decentralized Implementation:  
 
Encouraged by the successful experience with the updating of the Unified Registry, MDS 
developed in 2006 a broader framework to support and reward municipalities implementation 
performance. At the centre of this framework was the  ecentrali ed Management Index 
( ndice de  est o  escentrali ada – IGD-M, in Portuguese), an index which measures 
municipalities’ performance on all  key aspects  of Bolsa Família’s implementation under 
their responsibility.   The IGD-M is calculated on a monthly basis for all municipalities as 
follows (SENARC 2012):  
 
IGD-M= Factor 1 x Factor 2 x Factor 3 X Factor 4 
 
Factor 1: This factor is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the scores of four aspects of 
municipal implementation:  
(i) the share of potential beneficiary families registered in the Unified Registry with 
consistent and complete information; 
(ii) the share of families in the Unified Registry with records updated within the past two 
years;  
(iii) the share of Bolsa Família beneficiary children with complete information on compliance 
with education conditionalities; and  
(iv) the share of families with complete information on compliance with health 
conditionalities in the SISVAN system.  
  107 
 
Factor 2: Has the municipality joined the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS)? (yes=1 
no=0) 
 
Factor 3: Has the Municipality presented the accounts related to previous  
IGD-M transfers? (yes=1 no=0) 
 
Factor 4: Have these accounts been approved? 
(yes=1 no=0) 
 
The value of the IGD-M can vary from 0 to 1; the closer to 1, the better the implementation 
performance of the municipality. If the municipality is not in compliance with Factors 2, 3 
and 4, than the IGD-M will be zero. In 2013, only about 2 per cent of municipalities were not 
in compliance with factors 2, 3 and 4 (SENARC 2013:94). 
 
The average IGD-M scores have increased significantly in the time period since IGD 
monitoring began in 2006, as shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Average IGD-M scores 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
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Besides bringing transparency to Bolsa Família’s local management and making municipal 
governments more accountable, the IGD-M is also used as a basis for defining how much 
financial support the federal government should provide to municipal governments to 
compensate them for part of the costs they incur with Bolsa Família. These performance-
based financial incentives provide administrative cost subsidy to municipalities to (partially) 
reimburse them for the costs of implementing the programme and promote quality in 
municipal implementation.  
 
The value of the administrative cost subsidy is calculated by multiplying R$3.25 per valid 
entry in the Unified Registry by the municipalities’ score. A full IGD-M score results in an 
administrative cost subsidy of R$3.25 (US$1.6) per month, per family in the Unified 
Registry. MDS has also established a minimum quality floor of 55 per cent for the IGD-M 
and 20 per cent in each of term of Factor 1, under which municipalities receive no 
administrative cost subsidies.  
 
Also, since 2011, municipalities can receive a bonus of up to 10 per cent of  the original 
amount,  provided they: follow up families in breech of their conditionalities requirements (3 
per cent); respond to M S’s requests regarding irregularities (3 per cent); have 100 per cent 
of their registries up-to-date (2 per cent); and have at least 96 per cent of Bolsa Família cards 
delivered to beneficiaries on time (2 per cent). It is interesting to observe how MDS is 
gradually expanding the role of the IGD-M and how it has become a key instrument to 
fostering municipality cooperation with the programme. 
 
MDS transfers the administrative cost subsidies to municipalities on a block grant basis 
(fundo-a-fundo). In 2013, the MDS has transferred a total of R$ 417 million to municipalities 
and the federal district (SENARC 2013:94). A recent survey by MDS (2013) has pointed out 
that IGD-M funds have been used by municipalities to buy equipment (such as vehicles and 
furniture) and materials to support programme implementation at municipal levels. The 
survey has also found that these funds are often the only resource available for programme 
implementation at the municipal level, as municipalities’ contributions to programme 
implementation are mainly in kind, such as staff and office space.  
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Besides its role as a key intergovernmental tool in programme management, the IGD-M has 
been receiving increasing attention from researchers of public administration and public 
policy as a valuable proxy indicator for implementation performance in quantitative studies. 
For instance, the IGD-M has been used  by Tomazilli et al. (2010) to calculate municipalities’ 
efficiency loss; Silva et al. (2010) used the IGD –M to assess implementation performance in 
Minas Gerais state ; and Van  Stolk and Patil (2013), used IGD-M as a proxy for municipality 
performance. This study too will use the IGD-M as a proxy indicator of implementation 
performance in the quantitative study examining the relationship between municipal socio-
economic characteristics and Bolsa Família implementation performance presented in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter V  Quantitative Analysis 
 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative analysis conducted with the purpose of examining the 
relationship between municipalities’ socio-economic variables and implementation 
performance in the context of the Bolsa Famíla Program. This study used data from all 5,656 
municipalities to test the following research hypotheses: 
 
H1: Municipalities’ socio-economic characteristics affect implementation performance. 
 
H2a: High levels of income and development are associated with good performance, 
while low levels of income and development are associated with weak performance;  
OR 
H2b: High levels of income and development are associated with weak performance, 
while low levels of income and development are associated with good performance. 
 
 
1. Study Variables 
 
The dependent variable, municipal implementation performance, is represented in this study 
by Decentralised Management Index (Índice de Gest o Descentralisada - IGD-M in 
Portuguese) scores. The municipal socio-economic context, the independent variable, is 
defined in terms of income and development levels and operacionalised by two commonly 
used indicators: GDP per capita (income per capita) and the Municipal Human Development 
Index (MHDI). It is important to emphasise that rather than trying to investigate all possible 
variables which could impact municipal performance, this study focuses on one specific 
variable cluster and seeks to understand its relationship with implementation performance 
within a specific policy context9. This approach to implementation studies has been suggested 
by O’Toole  (2001) as a way to rationalise the plethora of variables which have been  
                                                        
9
 For a very interesting study along these lines, refer to van Solk and Patil (2014). The authors have tested the 
influence of 51 variables on municipal implementation performance.  
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identified in the policy implementation literature as affecting policy implementation 
performance.  
 
 
1.1  Dependent variable: Implementation Performance 
 
Implementation performance is represented in this study by the Decentralised Management 
Index – IGD-M of the Bolsa Família Program. The IGD-M is calculated on a monthly basis 
for all municipalities as the sum of scores assigned to four aspects of municipal 
implementation: selection and registration of potential beneficiaries, updating beneficiary 
records, monitoring compliance with education and health conditionalities. Each dimension 
represents 25 per cent of the index value. The value of the IGD-M ranges from 0 to 1; the 
closer to 1, the better the implementation performance of the municipality. 
 
 
1.2  Independent Variable: Socio-Economic Characteristics 
 
In order to gauge socio-economic conditions, this study employs two widely used measures 
of income and development: GDP per capita (income per capita) and the Municipal Human 
Development Index (MHDI). 
 
- GDP per capita is calculated by dividing an area’s Gross Domestic Product  (GDP) by its 
population. Despite its limitations, such as the fact that it masks income distribution among 
the population, GDP per capita is a widely used indicator of socio-economic context for its 
simplicity and comparability. Municipal income per capita was used for municipal level 
analyses and state and regional GDP per capita were used for regional/state level analyses.  
 
- Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) is a composite measure of human 
development calculated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for all 
Brazilian municipalities based on data provided by the decennial censuses conducted by 
IBGE. The MHDI offers a broader assessment of the socio-economic context by 
incorporating three dimensions - health, education and income. The MHDI is calculated as 
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the geometric means of these dimensions, reflecting the idea that all dimensions are equally 
important and non-replaceable (UNDP 2013).  
 
MHDI Education component is calculated using two indicators: 1) the percentage of people 
aged 18 years or older who have completed primary education (which provides information 
on the educational level of the adult population); and 2) the arithmetic mean of the percentage 
of children aged 5 to 6 years attending school, the percentage of young people aged 11 to 13 
years attending the final years of primary school, the percentage of young people aged 15 to 
17 years with primary education completed and the percentage of young people aged 18 to 20 
years with secondary education completed (which provides information on the educational 
level of the young population).  
 
MHDI Income component is estimated by municipal’s income per capita, the average 
monthly income of the residents in a given municipality, in Brazilian Real. 
 
MHDI Longevity component  is calculated by life expectancy at birth - the average number 
of years that people would live from birth while maintaining the same mortality patterns 
observed in the reference year.  
 
Its value ranges between 0 (minimum value) and 1 (maximum value) and municipalities are 
classified according to their MHDI score into five stages of development:  
 
0.800–1.000 Very high human development 
0.700–0.799 High human development 
0.600–0.699 Medium human development 
0.500–0.599 Low human development 
0.000–0.499   Very low human development 
 
UNDP also calculates a MHDI score for the whole country (MHDI Brazil) and also for each 
region and state.  
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1.3 Control variable  
 
Population size: Population size has been shown to be an important factor in performance 
variation in policy the implementation. Van Stolk and Patil (2014) have also shown that the 
size of municipal population can potentially play an important role in the implementation of 
Bolsa Família. Hence municipalities’ population si e has been used as a control variable in 
this study, following IB E’s categorisation which divide Bra ilian municipalities in three 
groups: small municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants (4,957 municipalities); 
medium-sized municipalities with population between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants (475 
municipalities); and large municipalities with over 200,000 inhabitants (133 municipalities).  
  
 
2. Data Sources 
 
Data for this research has been obtained through the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Brazilain Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE). This study utilises  the most recent MHDI available, 
calculated with data from 2010 census and released in 2013. All other variables also refer to 
the year 2010. For the IGD-M, which is calculated monthly,  the data used is the average 
score over a period 12 months (January to December 2010). 
 
 
3. Data analysis 
 
The investigation proceeded in several steps. Firstly, a descriptive and geographical analysis 
of the variables was carried out. This was followed by bivariate analysis of the relationships 
between socio-economic variables – municipal GDP per capita and MHDI - and the 
implementation performance indicator–IGD-M. This analysis was stratified by municipal 
size. Based on the results of the correlation analyses, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
analysis was used to examine the associations between the average IGD-M scores for 2010, 
as the dependent variable, and both municipal socio-economic variables (GDP per capita and 
MHDI) as independent variables, and population size as a control variable. Four separate 
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regression analyses have been performed; one including all municipalities and one for each 
subgroup of municipalities according to population size. 
 
 
3.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
3.1.1 Municipal Decentralised Management Index (IGD-M) 
 
Average IGD-M scores have increased significantly since monitoring began in 2006, while 
variance has decreased, indicating an overall improvement in performance in the 
implementation of Bolsa Família (Table 4). In 2010, the national average was 0.805. Refer to 
Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 for a list of municipalities with the best and worse average IGD-
M scores in 2010. 
 
Table 4: Average IGD-M scores 
 
Year IGD 
 Mean Variance SD Min Max Count 
2006 0.713 0.019 0.138 0.000 1.000 5564 
2007 0.715 0.015 0.124 0.000 1.000 5565 
2008 0.769 0.010 0.101 0.000 1.000 5565 
2009 0.772 0.008 0.091 0.000 0.980 5565 
2010 0.805 0.008 0.084 0.315 0.980 5565 
2011 0.823 0.007 0.083 0.430 0.990 5565 
2012 0.826 0.007 0.082 0.410 0.990 5565 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
 
Regional and state level analyses of the IGD-M shows marked regional differences on IGD-
M average scores, as reflected in table 5. In 2010, municipalities in the Northeast region of 
Brazil had the highest average IGD-M (0.86), followed by municipalities in the North region 
(0.81). Municipalities in Rio Grande do Norte state, in the Northeast region, had the best 
performance in the country with an average IGD-M score of 0.90. Indeed, nearly 80 per cent 
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of the top 10 per cent IGD-M scores in 2010 were from municipalities in the Northeast 
region. The South region had the worse regional performance, with an average IGD-M score 
of 0.75, with all states in the region with average scores below the national average. The 
Southeast and Mid-West regions also had average IGD-M scores below the national average. 
The worst performance at state level was achieved by the Federal District, with an average 
IGD-M of 0.61. 
 
Table 5: Average IGD-M scores by regions and states (2010) 
 
 IGD –M 
Brazil 0.80 
Northeast (NE) 0.86 
Alagoas (AL) 0.84 
Bahia (BA) 0.85 
Ceará (CE) 0.88 
Paraíba (PB) 0.87 
Pernambuco (PE) 0.86 
Piauí (PI) 0.87 
Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 0.90 
Sergipe (SE) 0.86 
North (N) 0.81 
Acre (AC) 0.80 
Amazonas (AM) 0.84 
Amapá (AP) 0.77 
Maranhao (MA) 0.86 
Pará (PA) 0.82 
Rondônia (RO) 0.75 
Roraima (RR) 0.79 
Tocantins (TO) 0.83 
Mid-West (MW) 0.78 
Distrito Federal (DF) 0.61 
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 IGD –M 
Goiás (GO)  0.81 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 0.73 
Mato Grosso (MT) 0.77 
Southeast (SE) 0.78 
Espírito Santo (ES) 0.76 
Minas Gerais (MG) 0.80 
Sao Paulo (SP) 0.75 
Rio de Janeiro (RJ) 0.74 
South (S) 0.75 
Paraná (PR) 0.79 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS) 0.72 
Santa Catarina (SC) 0.74 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
 
Analysis of IGD-M scores according to municipal size reveals that small municipalities had 
on average better IGD-M scores than medium- and large-sized municipalities, which 
presented average scores below the national average. The data also suggests that performance 
in large municipalities is more homogeneous than in the other groups. 
 
Table 6: Average IGD-M scores and municipal size (2010) 
 
 IGD-M  2010 
  Mean Variance SD Min Max Count 
Brazil (all) 0.80 0.0079 0.0888 0.32 0.98 5,565 
Small municipalities 0.81 0.0071 0.0844 0.32 0.98 4,957 
Medium municipalities 0.75 0.0084 0.0920 0.52 0.95 475 
Large municipalities 0.68 0.0061 0.0786 0.47 0.90 133 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S data. 
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3.1.2 GDP per capita 
 
In 2010, Bra il’s average municipal   P per capita was R$12,785 (US$6,392), with 
considerable regional variance, as shown in table 7. People in the South have almost three 
times the income of people living  in the Northeast, Bra il’s poorest region. The data also 
reveals a concentration of wealth in larger municipalities (table 8); small municipalities had 
an average GDP per capita of R$12,100 (US$6,050), roughly half of  that of  large 
municipalities, which stood at R$23,600 (US$11,800). Overall, only 36 per cent of Brazilian 
municipalities had GDP per capita equal or above the national average. 
 
Table 7: GDP per capita by regions and states (in Brazilian real, 2010) 
 
 GDP per capita 
Brazil 12,785 
Northeast (NE) 6,033 
Alagoas (AL) 4,957 
Bahia (BA) 7,078 
Ceará (CE) 5,446 
Paraíba (PB) 5,382 
Pernambuco (PE) 6,631 
 Piauí (PI) 4,476 
Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 7,010 
Sergipe (SE) 9,590 
North (N) 9,316 
Acre (AC) 10,769 
Amazonas (AM) 6,263 
Amapá (AP) 12,070 
Maranhao (MA) 4,813 
Pará (PA) 6,805 
Rondônia (RO) 14,475 
Roraima (RR) 10,440 
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 GDP per capita 
Tocantins (TO) 10,663 
Mid-West (MW) 16,506 
Distrito Federal (DF) 58,325 
Goiás (GO)  14,818 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 16,390 
Mato Grosso (MT) 19,217 
Southeast (SE) 16,453 
Espírito Santo (ES) 16,680 
Minas Gerais (MG) 12,217 
Sao Paulo (SP) 20,831 
Rio de Janeiro (RJ) 24,836 
South (S) 17,685 
Paraná (PR) 14,627 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS) 19,646 
Santa Catarina (SC) 18,530 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IB E  data. 
 
 
Table 8: Municipal GDP per capita (in Brazilian real, 2010) 
 
 GDP per capita  (R$) 
  Mean Variance SD Min Max Count 
All municipalities 12,785 200,033 14,143 2,227 296,785 5,565 
Small municipalities 12,117 8,999 13,789 2,272 296,786
10
 4,957 
Medium municipalities 16,760 234,658 15,380 2,744 112,791 475 
Large municipalities 23,601 259,001 16,093 6,500 115,275 133 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on IBGE data. 
 
  
                                                        
10
 Sao Francisco do Conde, in Bahia state, has the highest GDP per capita in Brazil thanks to one of the 
country’s largest oil refineries.  
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3.1.3 Municipal Human Development Index  (MHDI) 
 
The divide between the more prosperous South and Southeast regions and poorer North and 
Northeast is also very apparent in the MH I’s analysis (Table 9). The states of the North and 
Northeast regions have the lowest MHDI scores, with most municipalities registering low or 
medium human development, while in the South region, more than 65 per cent of 
municipalities have achieved high human development.  
 
Table 9: MHDI in regions and states (2010) 
 
 MHDI 
Brazil 0.69 
Northeast (NE) 0.59 
Alagoas (AL) 0.63 
Bahia (BA) 0.66 
Ceará (CE) 0.68 
Paraíba (PB) 0.65 
Pernambuco (PE) 0.67 
Piauí (PI) 0.65 
Rio Grande do Norte (RN) 0.68 
Sergipe (SE) 0.66 
North (N) 0.61 
Acre (AC) 0.66 
Amazonas (AM) 0.67 
Amapá (AP) 0.71 
Maranhao (MA) 0.64 
Pará (PA) 0.65 
Rondônia (RO) 0.69 
Roraima (RR) 0.70 
Tocantins (TO) 0.69 
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 MHDI 
Mid-West (MW) 0.69 
Distrito Federal (DF) 0.82 
Goiás (GO)  0.74 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 0.73 
Mato Grosso (MT) 0.73 
Southeast (SE) 0.70 
Espírito Santo (ES) 0.74 
Minas Gerais (MG) 0.73 
Sao Paulo (SP) 0.78 
Rio de Janeiro (RJ) 0.76 
South (S) 0.71 
Paraná (PR) 0.75 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS) 0.75 
Santa Catarina (SC) 0.77 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UN P  data. 
 
The analysis of the MHDI scores according to municipal size (table 10) shows a similar 
pattern to the GDP per capita analysis. Small municipalities (with less than 50,000 
inhabitants) had an average MHDI score of 0.652 (Medium Human Development), below the 
national average and considerably below the average MHDI of large municipalities which 
was 0.758 (High Human Development).  
 
Table 10: Municipal Human Development Index (2010) 
 
 MHDI 
 Mean Variance SD Min Max Count 
All Municipalities 0.66 0.0051 0.0719 0.418 0.862 5,565 
Small municipalities 0.65 0.0048 0.0694 0.42 0.85 4,957 
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 MHDI 
 Mean Variance SD Min Max Count 
Medium-size municipalities 0.70 0.0084 0.0920 0.52 0.95 475 
Large-size municipalities 0.76 0.0016 0.41143 0.65 0.85 133 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNDP data. 
 
 
3.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient  r  was calculated to assess the intensity of the 
relationships between socio-economic context variables (municipal GDP per capita and 
MHDI) and municipal implementation performance (IGD-M). Bivariate analyses were 
undertaken at both state and municipal levels. In order to take into consideration municipal 
size, four separate bivariate analyses were carried out at municipal level; one including all 
municipalities, and one for each sub-group of municipalities according to size: small (4,957), 
medium (475) and large-sized municipalities (133). 
 
3.2.1 Implementation Performance and Income (IGD-M and GDP Per capita) 
 
State level analysis 
 
The correlation coefficients between GDP per capita and IGD-M  in states are  displayed in 
table 11 and Figure 5 (scatter plot). The data reveals a strong and significant relationship 
between the variables. The negative direction of the relationship indicates that states with low 
average incomes are associated with better implementation performance.  
 
Table 11. Correlation between IGD-M and GDP per capita (state level analysis) 
 
IGD-M and GDP per capita Correlation coefficient (r) 
States -0.88* 
* significant at 1% 
  122 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between IGD-M and GDP per capita in states 
 
 
 
The scatter plot shows that states with low GDP per capita tended to have IGD-M above the 
national average, while states with high GDP per capita tended to have IGD-M scores below 
the average.  It is interesting to note that all states in the Northeast region, Bra il’s poorest, 
have average implementation performances above national average, while all states from 
South and Southeast regions, Brazil wealthiest ones, have average implementation 
performances below the national average, with the exception of Minas Gerais, which had a 
IGD-M score very close to the national average. 
Municipal level analysis 
 
The correlation coefficients between municipal GDP per capita and IGD-M are  displayed in 
table 12. The data reveals statistically significant relationships, except when large 
municipalities are considered in isolation. The negative  direction of these relationships 
GDP per 
capita Brazil 
 
IGD-M Brazil 
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indicate that municipalities with lower income per capita have better implementation 
performance than wealthier ones.  
 
Table 12. Correlation between IGD-M and GDP per capita (municipal level analysis)  
 
IGD-M and GDP per capita Correlation coefficient (r) 
All municipalities  -0.30* 
Large Municipalities  -0.14 
Medium-sized Municipalities -0.34* 
Small Municipalities -0.28* 
* significant at 1% 
 
 
3.2.2 Implementation Performance and Development levels (IGD-M and MHDI) 
 
State level analysis 
 
The correlation analysis between MHDI and IGD-M reveals a strong and  statistically 
significant negative association between the two variables. Similarly to the GDP per capita 
analysis, states with HDI below the national average have had better implementation 
performance, as reflected in Table 13 and Figure 8.  
 
Table 13. Correlation between IGD-M and MHDI (state level analysis) 
 
IGD-M and MHDI Correlation coefficient (r) 
States  -0.81* 
* significant at 1% 
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Figure 8: Correlation between average IGD-M and MHDI in states 
 
 
 
The scatter plot suggests a negative association between IGD-M and MHDI. States with 
lower levels of development have high IGD-M while states with higher levels of 
development have lower IGD-M scores. All but 3 of the 14 states with IGD-M above the 
national average have MHDI scores below the national average. 
 
Municipal level analysis 
 
The data also shows statistically significant relationships across all municipal sizes, although 
the association is small in the case of large municipalities, as shown in table 14 and Figure 9 
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(scatter plot). Again, the negative direction of these relationships suggest that  high levels of 
IGD-M were associated with low levels of MHDI and vice-versa.  
 
Table 14. Correlation between IGD-M and MHDI (municipal level analysis) 
 
IGD-M and MHDI Correlation coefficient (r) 
All municipalities  -0.56* 
Large Municipalities               -0.15* 
Medium-sized Municipalities -0.60* 
Small Municipalities -0.52* 
* significant at 1% 
 
 
The scatter plot (Figure 9) offers a clear illustration of the correlation between dependent 
(IGD-M) and independent variable (MHDI) across all municipal sizes. Large municipalities 
(green dots) are mostly concentrated on the upper left corner, indicating high IGD-M scores 
and low MHDI. Medium municipalities (orange dots) are mostly spread between quadrants 2 
(upper left) and 4 (lower right) indicating a negative relationship between the two variables in 
this group as well. Small municipalities (yellow dots) are a more heterogeneous group, with 
municipalities in all four quadrants, but municipalities in this group are also particularly 
concentrated in quadrant 4 (high IGD-M scores and low levels of development) and quadrant 
2 (low IGD-M scores and high levels of development), again reflecting a negative correlation 
between IGD-M and MHDI. 
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Figure 9: Correlation between IGD-M and MHDI in municipalities 
 
 
 
3.3 Regression Analysis 
 
To assess the relationship between implementation performance and socio-economic 
characteristics, I estimated two regression models, as follows:  
Model 1: MunPer =  +  + 1 MHDI + 2 GDPpc +   
 
Model 2: MunPer =  +  + 1 MHDI + 2 GDPpc + 3 pop +  
 
MHDI Brazil 
IGD-M Brazil 
Small Municipalities 
Medium-sized Municipalities 
Large Municipalities 
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The dependent variable  “MunPerf” is the average I  -M score  for 2010.  In the model 1, 
municipal performance (MunPer) is modelled as a function of municipal income per capita 
and MHDI.  Model 2 controls for population size. 
 
Tables 15 and 16 below display the outputs of the of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression analyses for Models 1 and 2, respectively. The results confirm that local socio-
economic characteristics affect implementation performance. The negative coefficients are 
consistent with the bivariate analysis, supporting the view that as municipal income and level 
of development increases, the quality of the implementation decreases. Results of Model 2 
also confirm that population size is a factor which influences implementation performance as 
well.  
 
Table 15: Model 1, All municipalities 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.248 0.0097 128.1286 0,000*** 
MHDI -0.667 0.0153 -43.4899 0,000*** 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.0000 -4.6129 0,000*** 
Significance levels: ***0.001   
Multiple R-squared: 0.568  Adjusted R-squared: 0.323 
F-statistic: 1329.66 on 2 and 5562 DF, p-value: 0.0000  
 
 
Table 16: Model 2, All municipalities 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.5021 0.0144 103.7235 0.000*** 
MHDI -0.4511 0.0208 -43.4899 0.000*** 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0659 0.0049 -13.4195 0.000*** 
Population (log) -0.0330 0.0019 -17.6854 0.000*** 
Significance level: ***0.001   
Multiple R-squared: 0.61  Adjusted R-squared: 0.37 
F-statistic: 1101.79 on 3 and 5561 DF, p-value: 0.0000  
  128 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of population size, I have re-run Model 2  
segmenting municipalities by population sizes (tables 17, 18 and 19). Again, the results 
overall indicate that local socio-economic characteristics matter and that higher levels of 
performance are associated with lower levels of income and development. The model was not 
statistically significant for large municipalities, confirming that the relationship between the 
variables are weaker in this group, possibly because this is a more homogeneous group in 
terms of wealth and development, as virtually all large municipalities have income per capita 
and MHDI above the national average.  
 
Table 17: Model 2, Small Size Municipalities (less than 50,000 inhabitants) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.4895 0.0185 80.3321 0.000*** 
MHDI -0.4289 0.0221 -19.3486 0.000*** 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0697 0.0052 -13.3751 0.000*** 
Population (log) -0.0304 0.0027 -11.0206 0.000*** 
Significance levels: ***0.001  
Multiple R-squared: 0.56 Adjusted R-squared: 0.31 
F-statistic: 754.4761 on 3 and 4953 DF, p-value: 0.0000  
 
 
Table 18: Mode 2, Medium-size Municipalities (between 50,000 and 200,000 
inhabitants) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.8188 0.1050 17.3123 0.000*** 
MHDI -0.5823 0.0733 -7.9355 0.000*** 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0369 0.0778 -2.3280             0.0203 
Population (log) -0.1036 0.0220 -4.6977 0.000*** 
Significance levels: ***0.001   
Multiple R-squared: 0.63  Adjusted R-squared: 0.40 
F-statistic: 135.5083413on 2 and 472 DF, p-value: 0.0000  
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Table 19: Model 3, Large Municipalities (over 200,000 inhabitants) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 1.3017 0.1904 6.8367 0.000*** 
MHDI 0.2980 0.2412 1.2354             0.2189 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0182 0.0388 -0.4694             0.6395 
Population (log) -0.1377 0.0257 -5.3435 0.000*** 
Significance levels: ***0.001   
Multiple R-squared: 0.42  Adjusted R-squared: 0.18 
F-statistic: 9.5806 on 3 and 129 DF, p-value: 0.0000  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Overall, the results indicate that socio-economic characteristics  have a significant  impact on 
implementation performance.  Both measures of income and development levels  – GDP per 
capita and Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) – were statistically significant 
associated to the dependent variable, the Municipal Decentralised Management Index (IGD-
M). Hence, this study accepts hypothesis H1  unicipalities’ socio-economic characteristics 
affect implementation performance.  
 
Regarding the direction of these associations, both correlation and regression analyses show a 
negative relationship between the dependent and independent variables; that is, high levels of 
implementation performance were associated to low GDP per capita and low MDHI, while 
low levels of implementation performance were associated to high GDP per capita and high 
MHDI.  Hence, this study rejects the hypothesis H2a High levels of income and development 
are associated with good performance, while low levels of income and development are 
associated weak performance; and accepts the hypothesis H2b High levels of income and 
development are associated with weak performance, while low levels of income and 
development are associated with good performance. 
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Regional and state levels analyses reflected the wide disparities in income and development 
levels and revealed that the poorer North and Northeast regions were generally associated 
with high implementation performance, while the more prosperous South and Southeast 
regions had weaker performances. Municipal level analysis confirmed this trend, with poorer, 
less developed municipalities outperforming wealthier ones in the implementation of Bolsa 
Família.  
 
The study also showed that population size is an important factor influencing implementation 
performance, as reflected in the statistically significant relationship between population size 
and implementation performance. The negative direction of the relationship indicates that 
larger municipalities tended to have weaker implementation performances; indeed, large 
municipalities have been found to have the lowest average IGD-M scores. This result reflects 
the added difficulties associated with implementing a targeted programme such as Bolsa 
Família within large areas; additionally, as large municipalities are also virtually all wealthy, 
this result is in line with the finding that wealthier municipalities have weaker 
implementation performances.  
 
Overall, the findings from the quantitative analysis show that municipalities’ socio-economic 
characteristics – particularly their levels of wealth and development – are relevant factors in 
determining municipal  implementation performance. The fact that municipalities with lower 
levels of income, which inherently have limited resources and institutional capacity, are more  
successful at implementing the Bolsa Família Program is somehow counterintuitive and calls 
for further investigation. Hence, the next chapter presents a qualitative analysis which looks 
into the processes underlying these results with the aim of establishing why levels of income 
and development are inversely correlated performance in the implementation of Bolsa 
Família. 
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Chapter VI   Qualitative Analysis  
 
 
This Chapter investigates the dynamics underlying the results of the quantitative analyses 
which revealed a negative relationship between implementation performance and municipal 
wealth and development levels. It examines and compares the implementation of Bolsa 
Família in both poor and wealthy municipalities to uncover the reasons why poor, less 
developed municipalities outperform wealthy, more developed ones in the implementation of 
the programme.  
 
This qualitative analysis was guided by the “Socio-Economic Characteristics and 
Implementation Performance” theoretical framework developed in chapters 2 and 3, and 
based on information provided by Bolsa Família municipal managers (gestor municipal) from 
42 municipalities, combined with a thorough review of programme documents and literature.  
 
 
1. Data Sources 
 
This research used a combination of primary and secondary data.  
 
1.1 Primary data: Qualitative Survey  
 
A questionnaire with 14 open-ended questions was sent  by email to a sample of Bolsa  
Família municipal  managers in June 2014. It is important to highlight that the aim of this 
“qualitative survey” was not to establish frequencies, means or other parameters, but to 
define and investigate variation in the implementation process of the Bolsa Família across 
poor and wealthy municipalities (Jensen 2010). The questionnaire (Appendix 3) was 
elaborated based on this study’s theoretical framework and covered four areas: 1) political 
conditions: the importance of the programme at the local level and support from local mayor;  
2) institutional capacity: resources for Programme implementation at the local level;  3) 
disposition of implementers: their views and attitudes towards the Programme’s objectives 
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and execution; 4) intergovernmental relations: relationship with state and federal 
governments (communications, resources, IGD-M). 
 
The questionnaire was sent out to a sample of municipal Program managers (gestor 
municipal) drawn from a contact database from the Ministry of Social Development available 
on line (http://www.mds.gov.br/adesao/gestor/Gestorsrch.asp). In order to ensure the 
representativeness of both poor and wealthy municipalities, a non-probabilistic purposive 
sampling design was used and the questionnaire was sent to 100 municipalities with MHDI 
and GDP per capita above the national average and 100 municipalities with MHDI and GDP 
per capita below the national average  (Cooper and Emory 1995).  
 
The email was used as a means of communication for pragmatic reasons, enabling the 
research to cover a range of respondents in a wide geographical area at low cost (Cooper and 
Emory 1995:287). Some of the key disadvantages of using email include the low rate of 
response of this type of method and the loss of tacit information that would be conveyed in a 
conventional interview situation (Kelley et al 2003). One unexpected problem was that the 
M S’s database was surprisingly inaccurate; circa 20 per cent of emails were returned due to 
fatal errors in the email address; and circa 10 per cent no longer involved in programme 
implementation (the majority of contacts had personal rather than institutional email 
addresses).  
 
The final sample consisted of 42 completed questionnaires;  21 (3 of which were large ones) 
from municipalities with MHDI and GDP per capita above the national average and  21 from 
municipalities with MHDI and GDP per capita below the national average. Table 20 shows 
the profile of municipalities in the sample.  
 
It is also important to underline that the questionnaire and responses were in Portuguese, thus 
their content had to be translated before being incorporated into the research. Despite the 
author’s aim to conduct the translation in the most accurate form, some minor inexactitudes 
may have remained. 
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Table 20 : Profile of  Municipalities in the sample 
 
Respondents 
Average 
IGD-M 
Average 
MHDI 
Average 
GDP per 
capita 
Population 
Number 
Beneficiary 
Families 
All (42) 0.79 0.67 14,017 46,224 2,480 
Below 
Average 
(21) 
0.87 0.61 6,109 13,530 1,883 
Above 
Average 
(21) 
0.71 0.72 20,278 72,106 2,954 
Above 
Average 
excluding 
large (18) 
0.73 0.72 18,391 23,635 1,464 
Large only 
(3) 
0.63 0.75 29,710 314,467 10,406 
 
 
1.2 Secondary data  
 
Secondary data sources were chosen with great care and followed a criteria of relevance to 
the topic and validity. The main sources of secondary data used in this study were Bolsa 
Família documents and the extensive academic and professional literature dedicated to Bolsa 
Família.   
 
Programme documents reviewed included laws and decrees, guidelines on several aspects of 
programme implementation issued by MDS, training material used by MDS, and several 
programme evaluations.  
 
I have also referred extensively to the large academic and professional literature which covers 
a variety of aspects of Bolsa Família, but is particularly focused on programme’s impacts. 
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There was, however, a significant gap in the literature regarding studies related to 
programme’s local implementation, which I addressed by resorting to primary. 
 
 
2. Data Analysis 
 
Primary and secondary data were used complementarily. Firstly, local managers’ 
questionnaires were classified in two groups: group 1 with respondents from municipalities 
with MHDI and income per capita below the national average, with 21 complete 
questionnaires; and group 2 with respondents from municipalities with MHDI and income 
per capita below the national average, also with 21 complete questionnaires. Responses from 
both groups were analysed separately and  trends, commonalities and divergences were 
identified within which group; the results were then brought together and compared, as 
presented in the results matrix below.  
 
Similarly, content analysis of secondary data was carried out with reference to this study’s 
theoretical framework and taking into account municipalities’ different socio-economic 
contexts. Both strands of information were brought together to triangulate and complement 
each other with reference to this study’s theoretical framework. 
 
The matrix below summarises and compares the content of municipal managers responses. 
The analysis of the questionnaires showed a remarkable level of consistency and 
commonality within groups. It was possible to identify trends and similarities in the 
responses of managers from municipalities with similar socio-economic characteristics, both 
in terms of the practical issues they face in the implementation of the programme and also in 
their perceptions and beliefs.  
 
When comparing the two groups, it was possible to detect important differences between 
them, mainly in relation to the importance of the programme to municipalities, their 
interpretation regarding conditionalities compliance and the degree of concern regarding 
welfare dependency. However, the comparison also showed similarities between the two 
groups, particularly in relation to their reliance on IGD-M funds to support implementation at 
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the local level and their overall concern with possible inclusion errors due to the use of 
unverified, self-reported income information in the selection of potential beneficiaries. 
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Table 21: Analysis of municipal managers responses 
 
Variable Cluster Questions Poor Municipalities Rich Municipalities 
Capacity Profile Municipal 
Manager  
(questions 1, 2 and 3) 
Majority have university degree. 
Majority are permanent  municipal 
employees. 
All have received programme related 
training. 
Majority have university degree. 
Majority are permanent municipal 
employees. 
All have received programme related 
training. 
 
Capacity Human 
Resources/facilities & 
Equipment available 
for BFP  
implementation  
(questions 4,  10, 11 
and 13) 
There are between 2-10 people 
working directly with BFP (average 4-
5). Some mentioned the use of 
contractual staff for one-off tasks 
(using IGD-M resources). 
 
Overall good resources: computers, 
internet, furniture, vehicle – better than  
other programmes in the municipality. 
  
There are between 1-8 people working 
directly with BFP (average 3). 
 
All have computers, internet – 
infrastructure/resources similar to other 
social programmes in the municipality. 
 
Large municipalities: lack resources 
(particularly human resources) to keep 
existing beneficiaries info up-to –date  
and actively register new ones.  
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Capacity IGD-M (use of 
resources) 
(questions 10,13) 
Virtually the only source of resources 
available to support local 
implementation. 
 
Mainly used to maintain facilities, buy 
furniture and equipment (particularly 
IT), vehicle/transport costs , running 
costs. 
 
The use of IGD-M resources is 
normally decided by BFP manager 
and/or municipal social assistance 
secretary. 
Virtually the only source of resources 
available to support local 
implementation.  
 
Mainly used to maintain facilities, buy 
furniture and equipment (particularly 
IT), vehicle/transport costs , running 
costs. 
 
The use of IGD-M resources is 
normally decided by BFP manager 
and/or municipal social assistance 
secretary. 
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Capacity 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
IGD-M (main 
difficulties to achieve 
a good score) 
(question 12) 
Coordinating with education and 
particularly health sectors (aggregating 
information).  
 
Families keeping information up to 
date. 
 
Locating families, particularly in rural 
areas. 
Over half of respondents said main 
issue is that beneficiaries do not 
comply with their obligations to keep 
records up-to-date and fulfil 
conditionalities commitments   
(particularly health conditionalities). 
 
Coordinating with education and 
particularly health sectors (aggregating 
information).  
 
Policy objectives 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
Perception of BFP 
(questions 5,14) 
All rate BFP as Excellent/Good.  Majority rate BFP as a Good 
programme (but needs to have exit 
doors). 
 
Policy objectives 
Political 
conditions 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
Perception regarding 
importance of BFP to 
municipality  
(questions 5,14) 
All respondents said BFP is the most 
important social programme in their 
municipalities: in same cases the 
“only” programme / others, see BFP as 
a  platform for other programmes. 
Large number of beneficiaries 
Only one-third said BFP is the most 
important social programme; two-
thirds mentioned other programmes are 
equally important or more important.  
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Political 
conditions 
Mayor involvement 
(questions 6,13) 
About half reported an active role 
(participate in meetings, ask questions); 
the other half  said mayor was 
supportive but not directly involved. 
 
About 10 per cent raised concerns 
regarding politicisation of the 
programme – as mayor is responsible 
for appointing municipal manager. 
 
About one-third reported an active role 
and two-thirds said mayor was not 
directly involved or not involved at all. 
Intergovernmenta
l relations 
Relationship with 
MDS and state level 
coordination 
(questions 8,9) 
 
MDS: none or very little contact – 
mainly to “unblock” benefits. 
State level: a lot of contact - training, 
clarifying procedures, information 
sharing. 
 
MDS: very little – IT systems and to 
“unblock” benefits 
State level: also very little contact. 
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All Key Problems 
(questions 7, 12,14) 
 
Targeting/selection:  Unverified self-
declared information on income 
leading to inclusion errors. 
 
Welfare dependency/ Lack of exit 
doors (about 25%). 
Targeting/selection:  Unverified self-
declared information on income 
leading to inclusion errors. 
 
Welfare dependency/ Lack of exit 
doors (over 60%). 
All Proposed 
improvement/changes 
(questions 14) 
 
Proof of income, more oversight and 
control to curb inclusion errors/  fraud 
such as audits. 
 
About 25% suggested the inclusion of 
time limits to decrease dependency and 
linking beneficiaries to training and 
work schemes. 
 
Proof of income, more oversight and 
control to curb inclusion errors/  fraud 
such as audits.  
 
Over 60% suggested the inclusion of 
time limits to decrease dependency and 
linking beneficiaries to training and 
work schemes. 
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3. Results 
 
 
The analysis of the municipal managers questionnaire has been complemented and 
triangulated with a wealth of quantitative and qualitative information from Bolsa Família’s 
studies, reports, evaluations and data from MDS/SAGI’s database. The result, presented 
below, offers a rich description of the processes underlying implementation performance and 
offers an explanation , with reference to this study’s theoretical framework, of why poor 
municipalities outperform rich ones in the implementation of the Bolsa Família Program. 
 
 
3.1 Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Policy Objectives and Resources 
 
The Bolsa Família Program was established with the objectives of fighting hunger and 
poverty, and empowering families to access public services, particularly health, education 
and social assistance (Brasil 2004). Accordingly, the selection of beneficiaries for the 
programme follows a poverty targeting approach based on the estimated incidence of poverty 
at the municipal level. Municipalities with higher incidence of poverty receive higher 
quotas
11
.  
 
As a result, Bolsa Família concentrates beneficiaries and resources in the country’s poorest 
regions, as shown in table 22. The Northeast region, Bra il’s poorest, accounted for more 
than 50 per cent of Bolsa Família beneficiaries in 2010, with 44 per cent of families in the 
region benefiting from the programme. The proportion of beneficiary families is also very 
high in the North region, Bra il’s second poorest, where 1 in 3 families benefited from the 
programme in 2010. By contrast, only a relatively small proportion of  families benefit from 
the programme in the South and Southeast, Bra il’s wealthiest regions. 
 
                                                        
 
11
Municipal quotas are defined according to estimates of poverty at the municipality generated by the National 
Household Survey (PANAD) (Lindert et al. 2006).  
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Table 22: Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries by regions and states (2010) 
 
State 
Number of 
Beneficiary Families 
Proportion of beneficiary 
families in the population 
Total Benefits Paid to 
Beneficiaries (in Real) 
North region 1,348,329 33% 1/3 1,694,796,865 
RO 114,112 26% 1/4 134,018,952 
AC 59,779 32% 1/3 77,746,624 
AM 278,893 33% 1/3 363,029,883 
RR 42,213 41% 2/5 54,983,920 
PA 680,804 35% 1/3 860,577,255 
AP 44,096 26% 1/4 60,244,984 
TO 128,432 35% 1/3 144,195,247 
Northeast 
region 6,454,764 44% 1/2.5 7,582,457,798 
MA 871,297 51% 1/2 1,089,091,298 
PI 420,392 49% 1/2 494,678,237 
CE 1,022,259 44% 4/9 1,174,401,644 
RN 338,424 38% 3/8 383,736,583 
PB 450,525 43% 3/7 529,979,555 
PE 1,045,268 42% 3/7 1,216,004,851 
AL 414,112 49% 1/2 482,955,041 
SE 230,418 40% 2/5 272,641,222 
BA 1,662,069 43% 3/7 1,938,969,367 
Centre-West 
region 725,216 18% 1/6 721,913,936 
MS 132,887 19% 1/5 137,463,646 
MT 167,693 20% 1/5 176,342,099 
GO 326,084 19% 1/5 333,388,973 
DF 98,552 14% 1/7 74,719,218 
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State 
Number of 
Beneficiary Families 
Proportion of beneficiary 
families in the population 
Total Benefits Paid to 
Beneficiaries (in Real) 
Southeast 
region 3,185,843 14% 1/7 3,276,739,142 
MG 1,135,715 20% 1/5 1,189,570,569 
ES 189,983 18% 1/6 198,301,764 
RJ 685,301 14% 1/7 743,584,718 
SP 1,174,844 10% 1/10 1,145,282,091 
South 1,064,068 13% 1/8 1,096,795,124 
PR 466,607 15% 1/7 466,013,885 
SC 143,700 8% 0 146,604,158 
RS 453,761 14% 1/7 484,177,081 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S/SA I data. 
 
 
Given the high concentration of beneficiaries in poor municipalities, Bolsa Família resources 
are also naturally concentrated in such municipalities. In 2010, over R$7 billions were 
received by beneficiaries from municipalities with Municipal Human Development Index 
(MHDI) below the national average, the equivalent of  R$165 per capita
12
. Considering that 
such municipalities have small economies and are generally highly dependent on federal 
funds, the impact of the such funds can not be underestimated. 
 
Studies to gauge the importance of the Bolsa Família to Brazilian municipalities have shown 
that programme transfers dwarf local tax revenues and make up a significant proportion of 
federal transfers in municipalities with large number of beneficiaries (MDS 2007:169, 
MDS/SAGI 2013). A recent study in the state of Ceará, in the Northeast, calculated that, 
between 2009 and 2012, Bolsa Família transfers were on average equivalent to 56 per cent of 
federal constitutional transfers to municipal budgets
13
; and that in poorer municipalities, 
Bolsa Família’s resources were at the same level, or in some cases, above those of federal 
constitutional transfers (IPECE 2013).  
                                                        
 
12
 Author’s calculation based on MDS/SAGI data 
13
 Fundo de Participação dos Municípios , FPM (Municipal Revenue-Sharing Fund) 
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Indeed, a study by the Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa (INSER) published in 2009 showed that 
Bolsa Família transfers have increased the local GDP of poor municipalities and have had a 
significant impact on the fiscal situation such municipalities. The study calculated that a 10 
per cent expansion in the number of Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries increased municipalities’  
 
revenues in more than one percent; while a 10 percent increase in the amount of the monthly 
transfer increased local revenue by 1.36 percent (Landim 2009). 
 
In fact, municipalities where a significant proportion of the population benefit from the 
Programme have had their economies transformed. The case of  Junco do Maranhão, a 
municipality with 4,000 inhabitants in Maranhão state,  in the North region of Brazil, 
illustrates this transformation. Junco do Maranhão’s economy is based on small-scale 
farming (banana, cashew nuts and coconut) and the majority of its population rely on small 
and irregular incomes. Bolsa Família benefited 882 families in 2010, who received  a total of  
about R$ 95,000 per month; amounting to over R$1 million a year –the equivalent of about 
one-third of total federal transfers to the municipality. This large injection of resources has 
had a considerable impact on the small economy of the municipality. Local shop keepers 
reported that Bolsa Família has increased their customer base considerably and they have 
experienced  a marked increase in sales of food, cleaning/hygiene products  and school 
materials (MDS 2010). Indeed, The Brazilian Supermarket Association (Associa  o 
Brasileira de Supermercados – ABRAS, in Portuguese) has stated that the Bolsa Família 
program has helped to create a local market in small municipalities in the North and 
Northeast regions and has been an important source of growth for the sector (MDS 2010). 
 
The benefits generated by Bolsa Família to the local economy are key for mobilising the 
support of local business and political elites to the programme, facilitating its implementation 
locally. 
 
Given the broad impact of the Program in poor municipalities, it is not surprising that all 
local programme managers from poor municipalities agreed that Bolsa Família was the most 
important social programme in their municipality (municipal managers survey). 
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This situation contrasts with the much more limited impact the programme has had on  
municipal finances and the local economy of wealthy municipalities, given the low 
concentration of beneficiaries and their more developed economies. Bolsa Família transfers 
to municipalities with MHDI above the national amounted to R$49 per capita in 2010, less 
than one-third of the resources directed to poor municipalities.  
Indeed, the limited importance of the Program to wealthy municipalities came across clearly 
in the municipal managers survey; only about one third of managers form wealthy 
municipalities agreed that Bolsa Família was the main social programme in their 
municipality. Also, some local managers, while recognising the importance of the 
Programme nationally, questioned the relevance of the programme to their context. 
 
Overall, Bolsa Família’s objectives and resources are more relevant to poor municipalities 
than to wealthy ones. The good fit between the local socio-economic context and policy 
objectives, combined with the considerable amount of resources the programme brings to 
such municipalities, result in a positive local response towards the programme and facilitate 
its implementation.   
 
 
3.2  Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Political Conditions 
 
As discussed previously, the high concentration of beneficiaries of Bolsa Família in poor 
municipalities generate positive economic externalities, attracting the support of local 
economic elite and creating a wider support base for the programme at the local level.  
 
This wide support base has generated considerable electoral impacts. Political economy 
studies have found that Bolsa Família produces significant electoral returns to incumbents 
across the board, but that this effect appears to be more marked on poor municipalities, 
thanks to the indirect economic benefits brought about by the programme (Zucco 2010). It is 
also interesting to notice that support for Bolsa Família comes from across the political 
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spectrum; there appears to be no association between mayor political party and 
implementation performance (Van Stoke and Patil 2014). 
 
Also, there seems to be a link between quality of implementation and votes in poor 
municipalities. Fried (2012) found that voters seem to award incumbent mayors if the 
programme is run well. Similarly, Janvry et al. (2005 and 2011) showed that, in 
municipalities in the Northeast region, quality of the programme performance is rewarded by 
a higher likelihood of local mayor being re-elected.  
 
Such electoral returns tend strengthens the support of local political leaders to the Programme 
and create an extra incentive for them to support local implementation. Moreover, the link 
between performance and electoral returns provides extra incentives for mayors to ensure that 
the programme is implemented well. Indeed, the majority of municipal managers from poor 
municipalities, which also have above average implementation performances,  reported an 
active support of mayors for Programme implementation (municipal managers survey).  
 
This high visibility and political importance of the programme could raise concerns regarding 
political interference and clientelism in poor municipalities, such as local politicians 
registering friends, relatives, party members as potential beneficiaries to gain political 
support in return for programme benefits. Indeed, this is usually a key concern regarding the 
decentralisation of cash transfer programmes. Bolsa Família has in place several mechanisms 
designed to curb manipulation and rent-seeking behaviour by local politicians  - for instance, 
the centralised determination of eligibility according to automatic objective criteria, a series 
of internal and external cross-checks and formal control mechanisms, social control councils 
(SCC), and specific “pre-election” measures such as a quarantine period on new beneficiaries 
in order to avoid “vote buying”. Such mechanisms seems to be working, as in 2013 there 
were 1,760 reported irregularities (MDS 2014), a relative small number given the scope of 
the programme. Also, this issue was mentioned by only a small minority of survey 
respondents from poor municipalities, also indicating that political manipulation  is not a 
widespread concern at the local level. These respondents were mainly concerned about the 
fact that the local Bolsa Família manager is appointed by the local mayor opening the  
possibility of  some kind of pressure or manipulation in programme implementation. Survey 
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respondents were more concerned about intentional fraud by beneficiaries, such as providing 
false information regarding income or household composition.   
 
The political scenario is different in wealthy municipalities, where support for the Bolsa 
Família Program is generally narrow. Beneficiaries form a small proportion of the population 
and lack political clout. Moreover, the relative small amount of resources the programme 
brings to wealthy municipalities fail to create significant externalities in the local economy in 
order to generate significant numbers of indirect beneficiaries. As a result, the political 
returns generated by Bolsa Família to local political leaders are also relatively small. In this 
sense, it is not surprising that the interest of local mayors in the implementation of the 
programme is small in such municipalities, according to the municipal managers survey.  
 
One consequence of the low political profile of Bolsa Família in wealthy municipalities 
seems to be the failure to mobilise local resources to support programme implementation in 
such municipalities, as discussed in the next section.    
 
In sum, the Bolsa Família Program enjoys wide political support in poor municipalities and a 
narrow and fragile one in wealthy municipalities. This difference in support seems to be 
reflected in the level of commitment of local political leaders to the programme and the 
consequent level of support that the programme’s implementation receive at the local level, 
which is ultimately reflected in implementation performance.  
 
 
3.3 Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Agency Capacity  
 
The high concentration of beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries in poor municipalities 
means that the amount of work involved in programme implementation and the costs related 
to it are particularly high in such municipalities, generating unprecedented pressure on their 
already fragile administrative and financial capacities. 
 
Indeed, studies carried out in the start of the programme highlighted that poor municipalities 
had particularly weak infrastructure and capacity. For instance, a survey of municipal social 
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assistance structures in 2005 highlighted the overall lack of resources and general poor state 
of social assistance in municipalities; for instance, about 10 per cent of them not even had 
access to a phone line (IBGE 2006). A study carried out by  the National Confederation of 
Municipalities (Confederação Nacional de Municípios – CNM, in Portuguese)  also 
highlighted the great challenges that the implementation of the Bolsa Família posed to 
municipalities, particularly poor ones; key issues included lack of human resources, 
inadequate facilities, lack of IT equipment and reliable internet connexion, and lack means of 
transportation to reach all municipal areas (CNM 2009). 
 
More recent studies, however, found that basic infrastructure for Bolsa Família’s 
implementation is now in place in most municipalities, both rich and poor. For instance, 
SENARC surveyed in 2011 39 municipalities to assess the situation of Bolsa Família 
implementation and found overall good facilities, adequate IT equipment , access to internet 
(MDS 2012). Another recent survey carried out in 278 municipalities to assess the 
management of the single registry database found  that 99 per cent of municipalities had 
computers which are used  exclusively by the programme (majority of municipalities have 2-
3 computers); that all have access to internet, and that the majority had received systems 
related training in the last 12 months (M S 2013:65). This study’s survey of Bolsa Família’s 
municipal managers corroborates this assessment - the vast majority of municipal managers 
said that they had adequate facilities and resources to carry out their work and municipal 
managers from poor municipalities generally thought that Bolsa Família’s local 
resources/facilities were better than those of other programmes in the municipality. 
 
What caused this marked change in the municipalities’ administrative and financial capacities 
to implement the programme?  
 
It seems that the key for this change has been the targeted support from the federal 
government (MDS) to develop local implementation capacity.  
 
According to Licio (2012), the lack of institutional capacity at the local level has been a key 
concern of the federal government from the start of the programme, even prompting MDS to 
consider a centralised implementation approach. However, as centralised implementation 
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would severely constraint the speed of programme’s expansion and increase implementation 
costs considerably, the MDS opted for a decentralised approach, with municipalities 
responsible for the bulk of Bolsa Família’s implementation at the local level. As the success 
of the programme was then dependent on municipalities’ capacity to implement it, the M S 
had to develop a series of strategies to deal with differences in capacity at the local level and 
ensure a somehow uniform implementation of the programme. To this effect, MDS 
developed detailed procedures and guidelines, invested heavily in IT systems and  signed 
management agreements with municipalities to clarify roles and responsibilities. One of the 
most relevant and effective strategy was undoubtedly the creation of the Decentralised 
Management Index (IGD-M) and the financial incentives linked to it. 
 
Since it was created in 2006, the amount of IGD-M funds transferred to municipalities has 
grown considerably, as shown in Table 23. This is both a result of improvement in 
implementation performance (higher IGD-M scores) and also an increase in the amount of  
resources paid per valid entry in the Single Registry database (Cadastro Único). IGD-M 
funds are used mostly to buy equipment (computers, cars), improve facilities, cover running 
costs and hire temporary staff (MDS 2007, municipal manager survey). 
 
Table 23: IGD-M funding (in millions of real) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
161,3 230,6 256,6 252,9 287,6 299,4 488,7 417 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S/SA I data. 
 
 
As IGD-M funding takes into account the number of  registered beneficiaries and potential 
beneficiaries, as well as performance, the bulk of IGD-M resources is received by 
municipalities in the Northeast region, as shown in table 24. Taking into account the number 
of municipalities per region, it is even more evident the concentration of IGD-M resources in 
the municipalities of Bra il’s poorest regions. 
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Table 24: IGD-M funding by region (in millions of real, 2012) 
 
Region Total Funding 
Average funding per 
municipality 
North 49.2 0.12 
Northeast 230.3 0.14 
Southeast 131.2 0.07 
South 47.6 0.04 
Mid-west 30.2 0.07 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on M S/SA I data. 
 
 
Hence, poor municipalities with large number of beneficiaries have particularly benefited 
from IGD-M resources. As a consequence, despite their weak starting point, poor 
municipalities in general were able to bridge the capacity gap and build a structure which, 
albeit not perfect, enables them to implement the programme well, as reflected by the high 
IGD -M scores achieved by this group of municipalities. High IGD-M scores, in turn, result 
in more resources, creating a virtuous cycle for implementation performance.  
 
A key concern, however, relates to the fact that the IGD-M do not reflect the quality of health 
and education services in the municipality (supply side). The fact that this aspect of Bolsa 
Família implementation is not captured by the IGD-M, and is hence outside the programme’s 
incentives framework,  could be sending the wrong message to municipalities that this is a 
lesser important aspect of programme implementation. Indeed, municipalities with high 
average IGD-M scores are the ones with low MHDI, which signals low quality of health and 
education. This is also evident when looking at two other national indexes IDEB14  and 
                                                        
14
 Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica, IDEB (Basic Education Development Index) is an  indicator 
of educational performance based on exam results and pass rates. 
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IDSUS15 which measure quality of education and health respectively: municipalities with 
high IGD-M scores had lower IDEB and IDSUS scores, as illustrated in table 25. 
 
Table 25: Comparison of health and educational performance indexes (2010) 
 
 
Municipalities with High 
IGD-M
16
 
Municipalities with low 
IGD-M
17
 
Average of IDH 0.62 0.70 
Average of IDSUS 5.6 5.8 
Average of IDEB (year 1 to 5) 4.3 4.8 
Average of IDEB (year 6-9) 3.6 4.1 
 
 
This not only hinders beneficiaries’ abilities to comply with programme’s conditionalities, 
but also undermines the achievement of Bolsa Família’s long term objective of breaking the 
intergenerational poverty cycle through  human capital investments. A possible solution 
would be to broaden the scope of capacity development at the local level by incorporating 
aspects of quality of health and education provision in IGD-M’s calculation and channeling 
resources to improve the quality of these services through the programme’s performance –
based incentives framework. 
 
Even though the provision of health and education is not as much of a concern to wealthy 
municipalities given their overall stronger institutional capacity, such municipalities have 
been struggling to carry out key programme tasks such as beneficiary registration and 
monitoring of conditionalities, as reflected in their relatively low IGD-M scores.  
 
Wealthy municipalities have, in most cases, failed to mobilise substantial local resources to 
support programme implementation mainly given the relative small relevance of Bolsa 
                                                        
15
 Índice de Desempenho do SUS na Atenção Básica, IDSUS (Health System Performance Index)is a synthetic 
score measures the performance of each municipality in relation to access and effectiveness of the health 
system.  
16
 Municipalities with IGD-M above the National average. 
17
 Municipalities with IGD-M below the National average. 
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Família locally. Even though IGD-M funds were devised as a cost-sharing incentive, it 
became apparent from municipal managers survey that local contribution to programme 
implementation, in both rich and poor municipalities, is virtually totally in kind (municipal 
civil servants and facilities) and that the bulk of financial resources available to Bolsa Família 
implementation at the local level come from the federal government via IGD-M. Silva and 
Silva’s (2011) study of Bolsa Família implementation in Maranh o state confirms this; the 
authors found that municipalities and states provided no financial resources to support Bolsa 
Família’s local implementation; their support was limited to in-kind contributions.  
 
Hence, wealthy municiaplities also basically rely on IGD-M transfers to fund local 
implementation (municipal manager survey and MDS 2013). As their share of IGD-M 
transfers is considerably smaller and there are few institutional or informal pressures for 
effective management, such municipalities tend to devote insufficient resources towards the 
implementation process. As a result, the quality of implementation suffers. Within this group, 
large municipalities face a particularly challenging situation, as the size of population makes 
the tasks involved in locating potential beneficiaries and monitoring existing ones much more 
complex; hence, it is not surprising that this subgroup of municipalities has the worst IGD-M 
scores. 
 
Low IGD-M scores further reduce municipalities’ I  -M funding, generating a negative 
cycle for implementation performance. This in turn can further compromise the political 
sustainability of the programme since, as argued by Sá e Silva (2011) and Lindert and 
Vicentine (2013), the fragile support of local elites to the programme in wealthy 
municipalities is linked to their perception that the programme is well implemented, 
particularly in relation to targeting accuracy (especially inclusion errors) and to monitoring 
and enforcement of conditionalities. This situation can also affect the disposition of local 
implementers, as discussed in the next section.  
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3.4  Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Disposition of Implementers 
 
In an intergovernmental context, disposition of implementers can be discussed at two levels: 
firstly the disposition of local political leaders; and, secondly, the disposition of public 
servants directly involved in program implementation. As the motivation of political leaders 
was discussed previously in this chapter (3.2 Political Conditions), this section focuses on the 
disposition of local public employees. 
 
Bolsa Família implementation is, in the majority of cases, housed in the municipal social 
assistance department. Each municipality is required to appoint a Bolsa Família municipal 
manager (gestor municipal) who is the programme focal local point in the municipality. The 
opinions and attitudes of local managers and other staff involved in the implementation of 
Bolsa Família matters greatly because they are the interface between the programme and its 
beneficiaries and their actions can have a direct impact on implementation performance.  
 
According to a  survey carried out by MDS, the majority of Bolsa Família municipal 
managers are public employees (70 per cent) and  have high levels of education (the majority 
hold a university degree or higher) (MDS 2010). Municipal managers interviewed for this 
study had a similar profile.  
 
The survey of municipal managers revealed interesting differences in attitude and disposition 
among managers from municipalities with different levels of wealth and development. 
Municipal managers from poor municipalities were unanimous in recognising that Bolsa 
Família addresses a clear local need and is of extreme importance to their municipalities. All 
programme managers from poor municipalities rated  the Bolsa Família Program as “good” 
or “excellent” and are notably proud of being part of a programme that is so important to 
their municipality.  
 
The unprecedented scale of the Bolsa Família resulted  in a complete transformation of social 
services in poor municipalities; the large proportion of beneficiaries and potential 
beneficiaries in these municipalities generate considerable amount of work, but Bolsa Família 
municipal staff were overall satisfied with the resources available at the local level to carry 
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out their work; the majority thinks that Bolsa Família’s local infrastructure and resources are 
better than those of other municipal programmes thanks to IGD-M resources. In this sense, 
issues of capacity and resources for implementation seems to have been largely addressed by 
federal transfers linked to IGD-M. 
 
Bolsa Família implementers in wealthy municipalities, on the other hand, were generally less 
enthusiastic about the programme; the majority of municipal managers considered Bolsa 
Família to be a good programme, however about one third of them found that the programme 
does not fit the reality of their municipalities well, and a few of them  expressed their outright 
rejection towards it. The changes brought about by the programme to social services have 
been less marked in wealthy municipalities and most managers reported Bolsa Família had an 
infrastructure similar to other social programmes in their municipalities.   
 
Managers in general voiced concerns about certain design aspects of the programme. But, 
here again, differences of opinions between managers from poor and wealthy municipalities 
were noticeable. Managers from wealthy municipalities were particularly concerned with the 
lack of “exit doors” in the programme, which they see as generating welfare dependency - 
about 60 per cent of them voiced their concern related to this issue and suggested the 
inclusion of time limits and work-related incentives in programme design. This concern was 
only voiced by about 25 per cent of managers from poor municipalities. One point where 
there was widespread agreement among managers relates to Bolsa Família’s use of unverified 
self-declared approach to means testing (information for potential beneficiary registration 
regarding household income is self-declared and is unverified); managers in general find this 
approach leaves the programme open to inclusion errors and fraud; suggestions for 
improvement include change of approach to verified means testing and more frequent 
external audits.  
 
In relation to the difficulties in achieving or maintaining a good IGD-M score,  most 
managers identified problems in coordinating the monitoring of conditionalities with other 
areas (health and education); others, particularly from wealthy municipalities, blame the lack 
of commitment from beneficiaries in relation to conditionalities as a key difficulty in 
achieving the IGD-M score.  
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Overall municipal managers are positive about Bolsa Família and committed to its 
implementation. But it is noticeable that municipal managers from poor municipalities are 
aware of the extreme importance of this programme to their municipalities and the political 
importance attached to it; while managers from wealthy municipalities have more questions 
in relation to the suitability of the programme to their local needs.  
 
 
3.5 Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Intergovernmental Relations  
 
Under Bra il’s federalist structure, municipalities are constitutionally autonomous and hence 
are not obliged to implement the Bolsa Família Program and least according to federal 
standards.  
 
All Brazilian municipalities have formally and voluntarily agreed to implement Bolsa Família 
by signing  Joint Management Agreements (Termo de Adesão), which formalised the 
partnership between federal and municipal levels for the implementation of the Programme 
and outlined the responsibilities of each level and established minimum standards for 
programme implementation at municipal level (Lindert et al. 2006).  
 
As a voluntary mechanism, the Joint Management Agreement offers no means to ensure local 
government compliance with its terms. In this sense, local commitment to the programme is 
critical to guarantee compliance. As discussed previously, such commitment is stronger in 
poor municipalities where support for the programme is much wider. Licio (2012) argued 
that rich municipalities have joined Bolsa Família mainly because of the political costs 
associated with not joining such a high profile programme, despite small local demand for it. 
Fenwick (2009) suggested that some municipalities, particularly large ones, adopted the 
programme for fiscal reasons
18
. In such cases, where consonance between local interests and 
                                                        
18
 According to Fenwick (2009) municipalities have been counting on Bolsa Família funds to meet their legally 
required expenditure on social assistance. 
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federal programme goals is low, the risk of slippage is high and in some cases the programme 
may be adopted only symbolically (Berman 1978).  
 
The “ ecentralised Management Index” (IGDM) was created in order to address the slippage 
issues and better align interests between federal and local levels by monitoring 
implementation quality and awarding performance-based incentives. As discussed in the 
previous sections, the IGD-M has become the key instrument in the programme’s 
intergovernmental framework – it  has had a significant impact on local implementing 
capacity and has been crucial in enabling poor municipalities to fulfil their implementing role 
in the programme. Without the IGD-M monthly transfers, which are in most cases the only 
funding available to the costs related to implementation, local implementation would be 
unviable in most municipalities.  
 
Overall, it seems that the intergovernmental framework built for the programme has worked 
well for poor municipalities, but less so for wealthy ones. Poor municipalities were, from the 
start, more likely to be willing to implement the programme and comply with federal 
guidance given the good match between programme and local need and their high 
dependency on federal resources; the intergovernmental framework reinforced their 
willingness by providing resources to enable them build their institutional capacity for 
programme implementation.   
 
On the other hand, the programme’s intergovernmental framework has failed to significantly 
influence priorities at the local level in wealthy municipalities. The IGD-M, which was 
created to deal with the “principal-agent” issues and align programme and local interests, 
works less well for wealthy municipalities because the amount of resources it offers as 
incentive (“carrot”) is generally too small to have an impact on such municipalities’ finances 
and their economies; and its coercive power (“stick”) is basically non-existent given the 
voluntary nature of the relationship and the smaller dependency of  the majority of these 
municipalities on federal funds.    
 
Outside this framework, the relationship between the federal and local levels in the context of 
the programme is very limited; due to SENARC’s limited capacity and human resources, 
  157 
contact between municipal and federal levels are sporadic and mainly indirect (via call 
centre, email and website), and largely relate to information dissemination in the case of 
SENARC and issues related to the databases controlled at the federal level 
(blocking/unblocking benefits) in the case of municipalities (municipal managers survey).  
 
It is interesting to note that, despite the limited “official” role played by the states in the 
Bolsa Família Program, their support to municipalities came across quite strongly in the 
municipal managers survey; managers from some states (particularly in the Northeast region) 
reported a close relationship with the state coordination and an active role in training and 
day- to-day support.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The scenarios suggested by the analysis of the implementation of the Bolsa Família in poor 
and wealthy municipalities  largely correspond to the ones proposed by the Local Socio-
economic Context and Implementation Performance Theoretical Framework developed in 
this study. The main difference relates to agency capacity: poor municipalities have been able 
to equip and resources the agency responsible for the implementation of the Bolsa Família at 
the local level, despite overall lack of institutional capacity in the municipality, thanks to 
IGD-M funds; wealthy municipalities, on the other hand, have largely failed to allocated 
existing local resources to Programme implementation.  
 
  
  158 
Table 26: Local Socio-Economic Characteristics and Implementation Performance of 
Bolsa Família Program 
 
 
Theoretical Framework Bolsa Família  
Poor  
Areas 
Wealthy 
Areas 
Poor 
Municipalities 
Wealthy 
Municipalities 
Policy 
Objectives 
Good Fit Poor Fit Good Fit Poor Fit 
Policy Resources 
Significant 
Resources 
Limited 
Resources 
Significant 
Resources 
Limited 
Resources 
Political 
Conditions 
Wide Support 
Narrow 
Support 
Wide Support 
Narrow 
Support 
Agency 
Capacity 
Inadequate 
Resources 
Adequate 
Resources 
Adequate 
Resources 
Adequate/ 
Inadequate*  
Resources 
Disposition of 
Implementers 
Support 
Neutral-
Rejection 
Support 
Neutral-
Rejection 
Intergovernmen
tal Relations 
More 
dependent 
Less 
dependent 
More 
dependent 
Less  
dependent 
Performance ? ? High Low 
* Particularly in the case of large municipalities 
 
 
These results suggest that where there is a will, there is a way. It seems that poor, less 
developed municipalities outperform wealthy ones in the implementation of the Bolsa 
Família Program because they combine both willingness and capacity to implement the 
federal programme.  
 
Their positive disposition towards the programme is underpinned by Bolsa Família’s positive 
economic impact and the substantial electoral returns resulting from the large number of 
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direct and indirect beneficiaries in these municipalities. This positive disposition is 
complemented by an adequate implementation capacity which was created  and is maintained 
by targeted intergovernmental resources linked to the Decentralised Management Index – 
IGD-M. Without such intergovernmental transfers, the quality of programme implementation 
would certainly suffer  and, in some cases, implementation would be unviable.   
 
Wealthy municipalities, on the other hand,  lack the economic and electoral incentives to 
invest in programme’s implementation, given the weak demand for the Programme at the 
local level and its consequent limited relevance.  The fact that institutional capacity exist in 
such municipalities does not mean that it will be employed in the implementation of the 
programme; its allocation depend on political will, which is limited in such municipalities.  
 
Based on the combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis it is possible to group 
municipalities into four categories in relation to their level of development and 
implementation performance: i) poor municipalities with good implementation; ii) poor 
municipalities with weak implementation; iii) rich municipalities with weak implementation; 
and iv) rich municipalities with good implementation (figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Municipalities’ development and performance levels 
 
 
 
  
MHDI Brazil 
IGD-M Brazil 
Rich municipalities 
with weak 
implementation 
Poor municipalities 
with good 
implementation 
Rich municipalities 
with good 
implementation 
Poor municipalities 
with weak 
implementation 
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Poor municipalities with good implementation: this is the group with the largest number of 
municipalities, which means that the bulk of Programme beneficiaries and resources are 
administered by municipalities that have the right incentives to engage in Programme 
implementation; in such cases, the federal government should continue to focus on 
complementing local resources and capacities to support Programme implementation. One 
key concern in relation to this group relates to the provision of quality health and education 
services.  These municipalities’ relatively low Human Development Index, IDEB and IDSUS 
scores suggest that  the quality of health and education provision in such areas is low; this not 
only hinders beneficiaries’  abilities to comply with Programme’s conditionalities, but also 
undermines the achievement of the Programme’s long term objective of breaking the 
intergenerational poverty cycle through  human capital investments. This aspect of Bolsa 
Família implementation is not capture by the IGD-M, and hence is outside the Programme’s 
incentives framework, sending the wrong message to municipalities that this is a lesser 
important aspect of Programme implementation. A possible solution would be to incorporate 
aspects of quality of health and education provision in IGD-M’s calculation and channel 
resources to improve the quality of these services through the Programme’s performance –
based incentives framework. 
 
Poor municipalities with weak implementation: this is a relatively small group of 
municipalities, but a very important one since these municipalities are likely to have high 
numbers of beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries. Municipalities in this group are likely to 
have a positive attitude towards the programme hence low implementation performance is 
probably related to lack of local capacity. As the programme’s costs subsidies are linked to 
IGD-M scores, municipalities in this group may be in a  resource trap where they do not have 
enough resources to implement the programme to a minimum standard and hence do not 
receive performance-related subsidies. In such cases, the federal government should consider 
complementing municipal resources and focus on capacity building in spite of municipalities 
IGD-M scores. 
  
Rich municipalities with weak implementation: this is a sizeable group of municipalities and 
include the majority of large municipalities. The main issue with large municipalities is that, 
despite their wealth, they are likely to have large numbers of beneficiaries (and potential 
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beneficiaries) given the size of the population and high levels of inequality. In such case, the 
federal government should consider engaging with municipalities at the political level to 
negotiate a new intergovernmental framework which could make the Bolsa Família more 
attractive to such municipalities; also, at the practical level, the federal government could 
discuss adjustments to the programme to make its implementation more manageable in such 
contexts.  
 
Rich municipalities with good implementation: this is the group with the smallest number of 
municipalities, with mainly small municipalities. Given the reduced number of beneficiaries 
in such municipalities, the programme can be adequately implemented with comparative low 
levels of resources and enthusiasm. Such municipalities are likely to have higher quality of 
health and education services, and hence Bolsa Família should be better placed to achieve its 
human capital development objective in these municipalities. 
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VII Conclusion 
 
 
This study aimed at building a better understanding of how local socio-economic 
characteristics impact policy implementation. It looked at how local levels of income and 
development impact implementation performance, an issue that is particularly relevant to the 
targeted poverty alleviation polices. Does it really matter for implementation performance 
whether the implementing jurisdiction is rich or poor?  
 
This research suggests it does.  The analysis of implementation performance data from 
Bra il’s 5,565 municipalities found a clear association between municipal socio-economic 
characteristics and implementation performance; what was surprising was the negative 
direction of the relationship - counterintuitively, poor municipalities were found to 
outperform richer, more developed municipalities in the implementation of Bolsa Família. 
Why was that the case? 
 
Investigation using qualitative techniques suggested that this was the case because poor 
municipalities had both the willingness and the capacity to implement the programme, while  
wealthy municipalities had neither.  
 
Bolsa Família’s poverty targeting concentrated the bulk of beneficiaries and resources in poor 
municipalities, making  the programme extremely relevant to such areas, not only to the large 
number of direct beneficiaries, but also to the local economic and political elites who 
benefited indirectly from the programme. Additionally, performance-related federal funds to 
support local implementation helped to bridge the capacity/resource gap in such areas, 
enabling them to carry out programme activities under their responsibility.  
 
In wealthy municipalities, on the other hand,  Bolsa Família had a more limited relevance, 
since only a relative small proportion of the population benefited directly from it and the 
resources it brought to such areas were insufficient to generate substantial numbers of 
indirect beneficiaries. Hence, support for the programme in such areas was narrow, and 
  163 
mostly limited to the poorest, who lack political clout. As a result, Bolsa Família has 
generally failed to mobilise existing local resources, relying on limited federal funds to 
support local implementation – this was a particularly important issue to large municipalities 
which, despite their wealth, have large absolute numbers of beneficiaries.  
 
The good news for the Bra ilian federal government is that the bulk of Bolsa Família’s 
beneficiaries and resources are directed to poor municipalities and hence administered by 
local governments that have the right incentives to engage in programme implementation; in 
such cases, the federal government should continue with its strategy of complementing local 
resources and capacities for programme implementation, as this seems to be working well  
given this group’s strong implementation performance.  
 
The main issue in relation to this group though is the low quality of health and education 
services in such municipalities, reflected in their low Municipal Human Development Index 
and also their below average IDUS and IDEB scores. These municipalities are doing a good 
job in identifying poor people and linking them to health and education services - hence their 
high IGD-M scores - however, it is likely that the quality of services beneficiaries are 
receiving is deficient. This can significantly undermine the achievement of Bolsa Família’s 
outcomes, particularly its long-term objective of breaking the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty.  
 
Even though improving the quality of such services is beyond the scope of the programme, 
given the importance of good health and educational services for the attainment of 
programme’s goals, the federal government, particularly the Ministries of Health and 
Education, could leverage on Bolsa Família’s importance in poor municipalities and use the 
programmes’ intergovernmental mechanisms and institutional capacity/infrastructure to 
improve the quality of such services in these areas. One possibility would be the 
incorporation of indicators of the quality of municipal health and education services in the 
IGD-M, as to align incentives in these areas as well, and possibly link funds for the 
improvement of municipal health and education supply through this mechanism. 
 
  164 
The federal government also needs to rethink its relationship with large and better-off 
municipalities in the wealthier regions of Brazil, as the coercive and remunerative 
mechanisms which are in place at the moment do not seem to work in such areas, particularly 
in the case of large municipalities.  
 
Despite their wealth, large municipalities have large number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries 
and potential beneficiaries, and yet this is the sub-group of municipalities with the weakest 
implementation performance. Given their large population and territorial extension, 
programme implementation in such municipalities is more complex and requires substantial 
resources, which, at the moment, are not available in most cases. Improving implementation 
performance in such areas would require increasing mobilisation of existing local resources. 
For that, it is important to foster local ownership of the programme, by bringing it more in 
line with local needs and expectations. This, I believe,  could lead not only to short-term 
improvements in programme implementation, but also to increasing Bolsa Família’s long-
term sustainability in this important group of municipalities.  
 
This study of the Bolsa Família Program also provided insights which could be applied to 
other conditional cash transfers programmes, particularly in relation to the feasibility of 
conditional cash transfers in poor countries. Academics and practitioners alike have 
expressed their concerns regarding the implementation of such costly and complex policies in 
poor countries.  At the centre of these concerns are two interrelated types of capacity issues; 
one refers to financial sustainability of such schemes and the other to institutional capacity to 
implement them.  
 
It is well known that even the richest countries in the world struggle to maintain their social 
security systems. This is a particularly difficult challenge to poor countries where the number 
of potential beneficiaries - the very poor- is very large. A key concern regarding the financial 
sustainability of CCTs in poor countries is that such schemes have to be large enough to be 
relevant, without starving other areas of investment and constraining local economic 
development. Bolsa Família’s experience highlights how CCTs’ can create significant 
multiplying effects in the local economy of small municipalities, supporting the argument 
that well designed and implemented cash transfer programmes have the potential to integrate 
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poor households into the economy and support local economic development. This in turn 
aligns the interests of the poorest and of the local economic and political elites at the local 
level, generating a broad support base for the policy – a rare phenomenon in redistributive 
policies which often face considerable opposition from local elites – increasing the 
sustainability prospects of such schemes.  
 
However, in order to realise this potential, programmes have to be well implemented. Hence, 
another key issue is how to implement such complex programmes in these difficult 
environments. This is where the second level of capacity -institutional capacity and resources 
- comes in. The experience of poor municipalities implementing the Bolsa Família Program 
can also provide useful lessons here, as Bolsa Família’s intergovernmental arrangements 
have a similar dynamic to the  donor-recipient relationship between poor countries and the 
bilateral and multilateral donors who are financing the majority of CCT schemes in poor 
countries at the moment. 
 
Bolsa Família’s experience suggests that broader institutional capacity issues seem to be less 
relevant to performance than agency level capacity and shows that targeted capacity support 
can work well, particularly if linked to clear and comprehensive performance objectives. This 
invites us to rethink the traditional capacity building strategies which focus on filing gaps in 
capacity and instead think about capacity building in terms of motivation, within a dynamic 
framework incorporating incentives and sanctions. Indeed, measuring and monitoring 
implementation performance and linking it to financial incentives has been a critical element 
of Bolsa Família intergovernmental framework, as it has enabled the federal government to 
align interests and improve capacity at the same time. These insights on incentive structures 
for capacity building of local-level actors are relevant not only to the implementation of 
CCTs, but also to the wider literature on decentralisation and development which focus on 
how to deal with the heterogeneity of local government capacities in decentralisation. 
 
As a contribution to policy implementation theory, this study offers a better understanding of 
one key variable in the study of implementation: local socio-economic characteristics. It 
challenges the widely accepted assumption of a positive relationship between wealth and 
implementation performance; that is, that richer, more developed areas are better at 
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implementing policies than poor ones - and proposes a broader theoretical framework to 
analyse the relationship between local socio-economic characteristics and implementation 
performance. The theoretical framework suggests that local socio-economic characteristics: 
 
- are a key criteria in the assessment how well policy objectives address local 
problems/needs; 
- render the resources made available by a policy more or less relevant to an area;  
- have an impact on how policy resources are distributed locally and the array of 
interests affected by it; 
- have a direct effect in determining the level of tangible and intangible resources 
available for the implementing agency;  
- are one of the lenses through which bureaucrats judge the meaningfulness of a 
policy;  
- render jurisdictions more or less susceptible to intergovernmental inducements and 
enforcements. 
 
When applied to the analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers, the theoretical framework 
suggested two very different scenarios for the implementation of CCTs in poor and wealthy 
areas. The implementation of CCTs in poor areas was likely to enjoy strong support from 
local leaders, bureaucrats and the general population, but was likely to be hindered by limited 
local capacity. In better-off areas, on the other hand, local support for CCTs was unlikely to 
be as forthcoming, but local institutional capacity were less likely to be an obstacle to 
programme implementation. Moreover, each of these scenarios could be significantly altered 
by intergovernmental dynamics.  
 
The analysis of the Bolsa Família Program largely confirmed these scenarios, validating the 
usefulness of the theoretical framework in describing and understanding how the local socio-
economic characteristics impact policy implementation. Bolsa Família enjoyed strong local 
support from local leaders, bureaucrats and the general population in poor municipalities, 
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while support for the programme was limited in wealthy municipalities. Intergovernmental 
relations in the form of targeted federal funds and training was responsible for altering the 
scenarios by bridging the capacity gap in poor municipalities. 
 
This framework is certainly not all-encompassing or complete. There are literally hundreds of 
variables in the literature thought to impact implementation. Further studies could incorporate 
other intervening variable clusters and analyse how they are affected by local socio-economic 
characteristics in the implementation process. There is also scope to investigate the 
interaction between such variables and the local socio-economic characteristics in the 
implementation of different types of policies.  
 
In methodological terms, this study reiterates the value of analysing policy implementation 
from an intergovernmental perspective, in which variables form the “top” and from the 
“bottom” of the implementation systems, as well as the interaction between these two levels, 
represented by intergovernmental relations related variables, are equally relevant to 
understanding the implementation process. This perspective offers researchers the tools to 
explore some  of the central dilemmas in policy implementation within new governance 
arrangements such as the balance between control and autonomy, accountability and 
responsiveness.  
  
The systematic study of policy implementation started in the 1970s as a response the 
frustration with government’s inability to implement social policies in the USA. Bardach 
(1977:3), one of pioneers in the field, said then that designing public policies and 
programmes was hard, but implementing  them was “excruciatingly hard”. Since then 
governments have become more horizontal and fragmented and the policy implementation 
process has become even more complex amidst these wider changes in governance. This 
study, I hope, represents a small but relevant contribution towards highlighting the current 
importance of implementation studies in supporting governments’ in the excruciatingly hard 
task of converting policy into action. 
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Appendix 2: Municipal Human Development Index (MDHI) 2010 
 
 
 
0.800-1.00 Very high human development 
0.700-0.799 High human development 
0.60-0.699 Medium human development 
0.500-0.599 Low human development 
0.00-0.499 Very low human development 
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Appendix 3: Bolsa Família’s Municipal Managers Questionnaire 
 
 
1) How long have you been  programme manager in your municipality? 
 
2) What is your level of education? 
 
3) Have you received any training as Bolsa Família’s municipal manager? Which ones? 
 
4) How many people work with you in the implementation of the Bolsa Família Program in 
your municipality? 
 
5) Is Bolsa Família the most important social programme in your municipality? Why? 
 
6 ) Is the mayor involved in the implementation of the programme? How? 
 
7) What is, in your opinion, the most difficult task in the implementation of the Bolsa Família 
Program? 
 
8) Do you have much contact with the Programme’s national coordination at  M S in 
Brasília? With which purpose? 
 
9) Do you have much contact with the Programme’s state level coordination? With which 
purpose? 
 
10) Have you had any help/assistance from the federal and/or state governments  to set up 
Bolsa Família’s infra-structure in your municipality (office space, furniture, computers, 
internet,vehicle)? 
 
11) Is Bolsa Família’s infra-structure better or worse than the infra-structure of the other 
social programme in your municipality? 
 
12) What is, in your opinion, the main difficulties in achieving and maintaining a good 
Decentralised Management Index (IGD) score? 
 
13) Who decides in your municipality how the IGD-M resources will be used? What has it 
been used for? 
 
14) Do you think that the Bolsa Família is a good programme? What changes would you 
make to improve it? 
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Appendix 4: Qualitative survey – Municipalities’ profile 
 
 
Municipality State IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita  
Number of 
beneficiary 
families 
Total BFP 
benefit  
Population 
1 SC 0.60 0.81 6.54 6.2 5.2 35,851.78 5,376 5,160,143.00 515,288 
2 RS 0.73 0.78 6.27 0.0 5.3 20,782.35 36 28,898.00 3,184 
3 SC 0.72 0.78 7.04 6.0 5.0 19,337.24 693 590,272.00 29,018 
4 SC 0.80 0.77 7.51 5.0 5.0 31,065.52 149 137,777.00 6,426 
5 SC 0.74 0.76 6.56 5.7 4.9 20,453.48 496 428,202.00 17,260 
6 RS 0.55 0.75 4.17 5.8 4.9 24,415.84 402 342,154.00 27,126 
7 RS 0.49 0.75 6.27 4.8 3.6 51,101.25 7,299 7,300,025.00 323,827 
8 SC 0.77 0.75 5.77 6.9 5.1 18,078.71 102 90,722.00 4,142 
9 MG 0.58 0.74 4.70 5.6 4.4 17,779.53 4,249 4,330,847.00 84,718 
10 SC 0.64 0.74 7.04 5.7 4.4 19,589.94 1,526 1,347,230.00 58,833 
11 RS 0.65 0.74 5.70 4.9 3.7 19,270.55 9,123 9,928,260.00 214,087 
12 RS 0.78 0.72 5.88 6.2 4.3 15,374.03 652 840,216.00 10,221 
13 RS 0.63 0.71 5.17 4.5 3.5 22,247.07 3,212 3,770,923.00 38,159 
14 BA 0.78 0.71 5.31 4.3 3.3 12,818.00 19,827 23,976,550.00 204,667 
15 RS 0.83 0.71 6.05 0.0 4.3 12,792.79 305 298,751.00 3,494 
16 SC 0.68 0.71 6.64 5.5 4.5 14,201.90 145 142,316.00 3,373 
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Municipality State IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita  
Number of 
beneficiary 
families 
Total BFP 
benefit  
Population 
17 RS 0.70 0.70 6.62 5.1 3.6 12,816.03 403 384,116.00 6,227 
18 SC 0.74 0.70 6.05 5.5 4.2 31,236.68 98 71,929.00 2,890 
19 SC 0.80 0.69 7.07 5.9 4.7 17,693.37 159 173,905.00 3,532 
20 BA 0.73 0.68 5.38 3.8 0.0 31,259.27 10,796 10,881,658.00 118,047 
21 MG 0.77 0.66 6.43 5.6 4.6 13,210.15 229 214,350.00 3,055 
22 ES 0.82 0.65 5.99 5.6 4.2 7,853.85 3,803 4,342,587.00 31,091 
23 MT 0.71 0.65 5.86 4.4 3.5 8,818.21 276 275,145.00 3,592 
24 MG 0.92 0.65 6.63 5.3 3.1 11,362.03 245 249,575.00 3,403 
25 CE 0.96 0.65 6.19 5.4 4.7 4,807.96 1,126 1,337,949.00 7,316 
26 MT 0.77 0.64 4.52 4.8 3.9 8,898.38 2,537 2,964,461.00 30,812 
27 RN 0.85 0.64 5.72 3.3 2.7 7,096.09 907 986,769.00 11,385 
28 RS 0.70 0.64 5.78 4.1 3.4 10,964.24 420 504,028.00 5,285 
29 BA 0.88 0.64 5.37 3.7 3.6 6,363.72 2,610 3,028,823.00 20,216 
30 BA 0.91 0.64 6.51 4.1 2.8 5,192.78 1,832 2,228,664.00 12,055 
31 CE 0.94 0.63 6.47 5.3 3.9 3,894.46 3,352 3,899,455.00 19,007 
32 RN 0.90 0.62 5.47 3.9 3.8 4,571.31 1,087 1,247,737.00 8,218 
33 CE 0.83 0.61 5.65 7.5 5.0 3,800.67 2,004 2,322,119.00 14,102 
34 BA 0.97 0.61 6.47 4.4 0.0 4,489.96 3,980 4,894,331.00 24,294 
35 MT 0.88 0.60 6.23 4.0 0.0 10,315.95 180 243,874.00 3,029 
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Municipality State IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita  
Number of 
beneficiary 
families 
Total BFP 
benefit  
Population 
36 PE 0.82 0.59 4.87 3.5 2.6 4,940.37 6,575 7,789,182.00 40,732 
37 PI 0.86 0.58 5.20 3.6 3.2 9,267.41 611 731,561.00 3,863 
38 BA 0.86 0.58 5.82 3.7 2.2 3,594.04 2,554 3,271,530.00 17,327 
30 PI 0.89 0.57 5.53 4.5 4.2 4,415.60 853 1,055,063.00 4,757 
40 PI 0.86 0.56 4.33 3.8 3.5 5,087.12 790 1,024,078.00 4,993 
41 AL 0.96 0.53 5.86 4.5 2.8 4,170.55 2,202 2,608,521.00 12,325 
42 MA 0.87 0.51 4.90 2.9 2.6 2,833.09 1,904 2,584,106.00 13,954 
 
 
Rich Municipalities with MHDI and GDP per Capita above national average 
Poor Municipalities with MHDI and GDP per Capita below national average 
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Appendix 5: 100 Top Performances - Municipalities with the best IGD-M scores in 2010 
 
 
State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
PR Jussara 0.9783 0.718 6.20 6.0 3.6 22,764.15 292 335,551.00 6,610 
CE Orós 0.9758 0.636 5.86 4.6 3.9 4,969.56 3,519 4,092,777.00 21,389 
BA Nordestina 0.9758 0.560 5.97 4.2 3.0 3,498.99 1,960 2,467,248.00 12,371 
CE São Gonçalo do Amarante 0.9750 0.665 6.02 5.1 4.4 25,463.91 6,371 7,669,374.00 43,890 
BA Ipupiara 0.9742 0.590 5.35 3.6 3.6 3,981.37 1,310 1,527,992.00 9,285 
RN Tenente Laurentino Cruz 0.9733 0.623 5.64 3.7 3.9 5,155.01 880 1,020,036.00 5,406 
AM Fonte Boa 0.9725 0.530 4.81 3.2 3.2 5,407.99 2,920 4,218,284.00 22,817 
BA Uauá 0.9717 0.605 6.47 4.4 0.0 4,489.96 3,980 4,894,331.00 24,294 
PE Pedra 0.9692 0.567 5.70 3.3 3.6 6,506.54 3,006 3,835,110.00 20,944 
RN Portalegre 0.9692 0.621 5.30 3.9 3.5 4,630.19 1,142 1,296,597.00 7,320 
GO Diorama 0.9692 0.729 5.04 5.5 3.8 11,356.60 278 325,352.00 2,479 
AM Itamarati 0.9675 0.477 3.95 5.1 4.9 6,427.97 1,184 1,630,925.00 8,038 
BA Abaíra 0.9658 0.603 5.24 3.9 3.7 4,248.20 1,217 1,347,610.00 8,316 
CE Pereiro 0.9658 0.601 5.52 4.4 4.3 3,963.13 2,401 2,937,772.00 15,757 
RN Major Sales 0.9650 0.617 4.95 4.4 2.9 4,995.76 493 590,807.00 3,536 
BA Floresta Azul 0.9642 0.557 5.75 3.3 3.3 4,231.71 1,489 1,766,320.00 10,660 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
PI Jurema 0.9642 0.555 5.59 0.0 0.0 3,794.55 862 1,016,068.00 4,517 
PI Wall Ferraz 0.9633 0.544 5.97 3.9 3.6 3,866.82 833 997,740.00 4,280 
SP Marinópolis 0.9633 0.731 7.72 6.6 5.4 16,139.61 107 88,014.00 2,113 
BA Itaeté 0.9633 0.572 5.75 4.4 3.4 4,405.99 2,303 2,973,621.00 14,924 
RN São Fernando 0.9633 0.608 6.08 3.6 3.4 10,024.11 495 554,578.00 3,401 
RN Antônio Martins 0.9625 0.578 5.61 3.5 2.7 4,605.33 1,154 1,341,978.00 6,907 
RN Serrinha dos Pintos 0.9625 0.598 5.63 4.1 3.3 4,506.17 740 854,941.00 4,540 
CE Itaiçaba 0.9617 0.656 6.19 5.4 4.7 4,807.96 1,126 1,337,949.00 7,316 
PB Caldas Brandão 0.9617 0.568 5.27 3.3 2.8 4,939.33 930 1,094,014.00 5,637 
BA Malhada 0.9608 0.562 5.20 4.1 3.0 4,593.29 2,509 3,130,475.00 16,014 
CE Jucás 0.9608 0.598 5.25 5.1 4.2 4,241.82 3,872 4,643,385.00 23,807 
RN Pedra Preta 0.9600 0.558 6.20 3.0 2.3 5,567.95 443 552,272.00 2,590 
MG Alvorada de Minas 0.9600 0.572 7.67 5.5 4.3 7,199.94 421 555,734.00 3,546 
GO Nova Veneza 0.9600 0.718 4.84 5.4 4.7 10,555.17 638 801,358.00 8,129 
PE Frei Miguelinho 0.9592 0.576 5.34 3.9 3.8 4,211.85 2,365 2,756,913.00 14,293 
RN Areia Branca 0.9592 0.682 5.50 3.7 3.0 18,011.42 2,774 3,256,104.00 25,315 
PB Casserengue 0.9583 0.514 5.29 4.3 3.2 4,484.27 997 1,218,654.00 7,058 
CE Araripe 0.9583 0.564 5.99 4.5 4.1 4,313.42 3,662 4,648,382.00 20,685 
PI Passagem Franca do Piauí 0.9575 0.561 5.59 3.9 2.9 3,620.11 709 915,620.00 4,546 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
PI São Braz do Piauí 0.9575 0.596 5.43 0.0 0.0 3,333.64 821 1,003,179.00 4,313 
PB Matinhas 0.9567 0.541 6.13 4.1 3.5 5,379.31 562 707,510.00 4,321 
CE Pacujá 0.9567 0.621 6.41 4.6 3.5 4,368.69 879 1,037,070.00 5,986 
PB Belém 0.9567 0.592 5.40 4.1 2.8 4,885.98 2,546 3,022,653.00 17,093 
RN Água Nova 0.9567 0.616 5.23 4.4 3.8 5,108.72 461 523,135.00 2,980 
AL Flexeiras 0.9567 0.527 5.86 4.5 2.8 4,170.55 2,202 2,608,521.00 12,325 
CE Brejo Santo 0.9558 0.647 5.39 5.9 4.2 5,300.95 6,420 7,621,081.00 45,193 
CE Mulungu 0.9558 0.607 5.77 4.5 3.7 4,598.26 1,730 2,158,324.00 11,485 
PI Capitão de Campos 0.9558 0.583 5.81 4.0 3.8 3,233.91 1,850 2,259,483.00 10,953 
PB Pirpirituba 0.9558 0.595 5.25 3.6 3.2 4,376.53 1,346 1,618,058.00 10,326 
PI Joca Marques 0.9558 0.504 4.61 4.0 2.7 3,207.45 956 1,170,606.00 5,100 
RN Riacho de Santana 0.9558 0.591 5.30 3.4 2.9 5,436.00 697 832,468.00 4,156 
BA Jiquiriçá 0.9550 0.553 4.76 3.8 3.4 4,033.43 2,067 2,479,503.00 14,118 
PE Floresta 0.9542 0.626 4.87 4.0 3.8 9,773.23 3,804 4,791,361.00 29,285 
RN Viçosa 0.9533 0.592 5.61 4.7 3.1 5,562.42 295 305,616.00 1,618 
CE Porteiras 0.9525 0.622 5.90 4.5 4.0 3,943.89 2,416 2,924,656.00 15,061 
SC Presidente Nereu 0.9517 0.737 6.63 0.0 4.3 15,137.04 124 146,499.00 2,284 
GO Ipiranga de Goiás 0.9517 0.696 4.27 5.2 4.6 8,699.37 207 243,139.00 2,844 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
MA Tufilândia 0.9508 0.555 5.21 0.0 3.6 4,597.75 914 1,208,869.00 5,596 
AL Olho d'Água Grande 0.9508 0.503 5.25 3.4 2.8 3,941.50 898 1,107,671.00 4,957 
RN José da Penha 0.9500 0.608 5.68 3.8 3.2 5,236.37 914 1,081,179.00 5,868 
GO Uruana 0.9500 0.703 5.38 5.4 3.5 12,756.62 1,151 1,217,242.00 13,826 
BA Santa Bárbara 0.9492 0.583 4.89 3.5 2.7 4,566.62 2,940 3,608,196.00 19,064 
GO Itaguaru 0.9492 0.718 4.69 5.0 5.0 12,249.59 452 491,567.00 5,437 
RN Rio do Fogo 0.9492 0.569 6.00 2.7 2.3 5,476.89 1,510 1,934,096.00 10,059 
MA Tutóia 0.9483 0.561 5.03 3.9 3.3 2,774.59 7,356 9,666,545.00 52,788 
RN Lagoa de Velhos 0.9483 0.589 6.02 3.2 2.3 6,248.88 397 471,972.00 2,668 
BA Rodelas 0.9483 0.632 5.71 3.4 3.8 4,689.90 1,036 1,261,171.00 7,775 
CE Deputado Irapuan Pinheiro 0.9475 0.609 5.07 4.7 4.5 4,049.04 1,678 1,857,053.00 9,095 
PI Barra D'Alcântara 0.9475 0.577 6.54 3.4 3.1 4,149.27 781 902,721.00 3,852 
PB Bernardino Batista 0.9475 0.558 5.19 4.5 3.2 4,306.67 538 658,261.00 3,075 
RN Coronel João Pessoa 0.9475 0.578 5.75 0.0 3.1 4,821.88 759 942,057.00 4,772 
CE Palhano 0.9475 0.638 5.82 4.9 4.0 5,288.74 1,393 1,607,087.00 8,866 
CE Graça 0.9467 0.570 5.75 5.4 4.0 3,711.21 2,358 2,835,196.00 15,049 
PB Pedra Branca 0.9467 0.599 5.01 5.0 2.9 4,615.69 544 649,259.00 3,721 
BA Malhada de Pedras 0.9458 0.578 5.05 4.1 3.9 3,784.36 1,247 1,438,407.00 8,468 
CE General Sampaio 0.9458 0.568 5.69 0.0 0.0 4,638.47 825 1,086,380.00 6,218 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
CE Quixeramobim 0.9458 0.642 5.63 5.2 4.0 5,638.22 10,637 12,610,449.00 71,887 
GO Guarinos 0.9458 0.652 5.05 5.9 3.9 9,115.70 301 341,902.00 2,299 
MA Araguanã 0.9450 0.533 4.69 3.6 3.0 3,242.61 1,695 2,112,193.00 13,973 
MA Anapurus 0.9450 0.581 4.96 3.3 3.3 5,129.13 1,827 2,356,311.00 13,939 
PB Pilões 0.9450 0.560 5.72 3.7 3.2 4,881.91 952 1,203,738.00 6,978 
PE Santa Cruz da Baixa Verde 0.9450 0.612 6.00 4.8 4.3 3,578.94 1,792 2,200,629.00 11,768 
PA Viseu 0.9442 0.515 4.05 3.6 3.4 3,284.95 7,292 10,583,663.00 56,716 
AM Manaquiri 0.9442 0.596 3.39 4.0 3.4 5,360.86 2,335 3,065,385.00 22,801 
BA Tabocas do Brejo Velho 0.9442 0.584 6.46 3.8 3.4 4,495.93 1,987 2,415,166.00 11,431 
CE Jaguaribara 0.9442 0.618 5.38 4.2 2.9 5,577.65 1,674 1,931,478.00 10,399 
PE Santa Maria do Cambucá 0.9442 0.548 5.63 4.3 2.8 5,582.67 1,994 2,447,651.00 13,021 
PI Massapê do Piauí 0.9442 0.525 5.27 3.2 3.2 3,187.46 1,249 1,466,790.00 6,220 
AM Uarini 0.9433 0.527 4.42 3.3 2.6 8,643.01 1,155 1,524,420.00 11,891 
RN Bento Fernandes 0.9433 0.582 5.77 3.2 2.5 5,526.50 811 1,001,134.00 5,113 
SE Amparo de São Francisco 0.9433 0.611 5.66 3.6 3.8 6,535.82 367 401,466.00 2,275 
PE Petrolândia 0.9433 0.623 5.42 4.5 3.9 21,710.45 4,155 5,243,077.00 32,492 
PB Santarém 0.9425 0.622 5.00 3.2 3.2 4,756.02 443 464,155.00 2,615 
CE Ocara 0.9425 0.594 5.72 4.6 4.0 3,532.39 3,442 4,125,669.00 24,007 
PI Boqueirão do Piauí 0.9425 0.560 6.29 3.5 3.4 3,332.47 1,178 1,399,377.00 6,193 
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State Municipality IGD-M MDHI IDSUS IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita  
Beneficiary 
Families 
Benefits Population 
RN Santana do Seridó 0.9425 0.642 6.71 4.0 3.7 6,846.00 347 391,717.00 2,526 
RN Riacho da Cruz 0.9425 0.584 5.42 3.8 2.4 4,743.76 458 548,335.00 3,165 
PI Patos do Piauí 0.9417 0.563 5.16 3.8 3.4 3,893.04 1,196 1,393,345.00 6,105 
PA Peixe-Boi 0.9417 0.581 4.73 3.8 3.9 3,365.04 1,059 1,378,125.00 7,854 
CE Campos Sales 0.9417 0.630 4.94 5.1 3.5 4,369.01 4,193 5,073,804.00 26,506 
MA Mata Roma 0.9417 0.570 5.48 3.0 2.8 4,087.00 2,122 2,814,644.00 15,150 
MG Rio do Prado 0.9417 0.605 6.42 6.0 3.9 5,866.01 646 733,355.00 5,217 
AM Amaturá 0.9417 0.560 4.68 3.9 3.8 4,538.50 1,009 1,504,617.00 9,467 
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Appendix 6: 100 Worse Performances- Municipalities with the lowest IGD-M scores in 2010 
  
 
State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families 
Benefits Population 
SP Elisiário 0.5900 0.747 6.52 6.0 5.1 15,066.99 79 69,881.00 3,120 
SC Ibirama 0.5892 0.737 5.79 5.2 4.6 14,550.61 189 169,975.00 17,330 
SP Ribeirão Pires 0.5892 0.784 3.77 5.9 4.7 16,706.15 3,882 4,294,288.00 113,068 
RJ Guapimirim 0.5883 0.698 3.55 4.3 3.3 9,425.81 3,485 3,945,559.00 51,483 
SP Santo Antônio de Posse 0.5883 0.702 6.11 4.9 4.6 18,776.66 772 787,325.00 20,650 
RS Poço das Antas 0.5867 0.744 6.13 0.0 0.0 15,052.55 30 20,196.00 2,017 
SC Blumenau 0.5858 0.806 6.37 6.1 4.9 28,963.83 2,714 2,997,194.00 309,011 
SP Salto 0.5858 0.780 5.13 5.7 5.1 23,030.88 1,527 1,514,007.00 105,516 
RS Bom Retiro do Sul 0.5858 0.739 4.94 5.9 4.6 14,991.46 209 177,226.00 11,472 
SP Santa Cruz das Palmeiras 0.5850 0.728 4.66 4.9 4.4 10,312.94 764 714,986.00 29,932 
RS Guaíba 0.5842 0.730 4.69 5.1 4.1 25,904.84 3,483 3,627,902.00 95,204 
RJ Parati 0.5833 0.693 5.15 4.8 3.5 16,859.88 1,413 1,367,925.00 37,533 
RS Mato Queimado 0.5825 0.717 6.46 0.0 0.0 16,741.52 85 73,187.00 1,799 
RS Paraí 0.5800 0.773 6.05 7.5 5.3 22,375.07 39 31,359.00 6,812 
RS Westfalia 0.5800 0.752 6.83 0.0 4.5 33,075.90 7 4,967.00 2,793 
RJ Belford Roxo 0.5800 0.684 3.69 3.8 3.1 9,518.97 35,747 44,789,035.00 469,332 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
MG Paracatu 0.5792 0.744 4.70 5.6 4.4 17,779.53 4,249 4,330,847.00 84,718 
RS Pouso Novo 0.5792 0.715 6.52 0.0 0.0 19,288.53 125 153,135.00 1,875 
SC Guaramirim 0.5792 0.751 5.74 5.9 4.7 41,455.16 312 258,052.00 35,172 
SP Sorocaba 0.5767 0.798 5.86 5.9 4.6 27,491.56 13,076 12,750,587.00 586,625 
RS Barão 0.5742 0.748 4.89 5.6 4.4 18,013.59 57 58,684.00 5,741 
RS Tramandaí 0.5742 0.719 6.00 4.9 3.9 11,223.54 1,438 1,467,922.00 41,585 
SC Aurora 0.5742 0.733 6.62 5.4 5.1 17,962.16 96 104,691.00 5,549 
SC Rio dos Cedros 0.5742 0.729 5.50 6.1 4.8 16,684.27 87 95,191.00 10,284 
RS Igrejinha 0.5733 0.721 5.10 5.9 4.8 27,706.57 696 673,824.00 31,660 
SC Ascurra 0.5733 0.742 5.59 5.7 5.0 14,397.73 46 37,249.00 7,412 
SP Holambra 0.5733 0.793 6.72 7.0 5.3 45,614.39 166 137,587.00 11,299 
MG Cambuí 0.5725 0.751 5.20 6.6 5.0 16,308.63 580 570,152.00 26,488 
SP Nova Europa 0.5717 0.765 5.28 4.8 4.6 16,543.44 193 171,359.00 9,300 
MG São José da Lapa 0.5708 0.729 6.21 5.0 3.9 16,063.74 878 982,419.00 19,799 
SC Forquilhinha 0.5692 0.753 7.10 6.2 4.3 27,022.00 480 509,252.00 22,548 
RS São Vendelino 0.5683 0.754 6.52 0.0 4.3 16,700.62 3 880.00 1,944 
MS Figueirão 0.5683 0.660 4.85 4.7 2.7 19,636.27 93 72,728.00 2,928 
RJ Nova Iguaçu 0.5675 0.713 4.42 4.1 3.1 11,926.63 48,997 54,666,262.00 796,257 
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State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS 
IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families Benefits Population 
RS Vale Real 0.5675 0.737 6.56 5.6 4.4 11,284.29 29 20,253.00 5,118 
SC Balneário Camboriú 0.5667 0.845 5.31 5.7 4.6 18,573.37 856 880,053.00 108,089 
RO Presidente Médici 0.5667 0.664 5.12 5.1 3.8 12,068.42 1,906 2,424,217.00 22,319 
SC São José 0.5667 0.809 5.95 5.1 4.3 22,805.85 2,516 2,464,325.00 209,804 
RS Veranópolis 0.5658 0.773 5.62 5.5 5.1 31,709.21 225 201,472.00 22,810 
SP Salto de Pirapora 0.5650 0.729 5.66 5.8 4.8 13,809.25 1,040 1,204,875.00 40,132 
PA São Félix do Xingu 0.5617 0.594 3.14 4.1 3.7 5,780.83 4,333 5,058,402.00 91,340 
RJ São Gonçalo 0.5608 0.739 4.19 4.1 2.9 10,343.57 45,170 44,946,393.00 999,728 
SP Morungaba 0.5600 0.715 5.64 5.2 4.2 27,957.09 148 115,797.00 11,769 
SP Araçariguama 0.5592 0.704 5.46 4.4 4.0 87,931.50 588 549,025.00 17,080 
RS Erechim 0.5592 0.776 6.30 5.9 4.8 25,756.12 2,081 1,922,882.00 96,087 
SC Santo Amaro da Imperatriz 0.5592 0.781 7.69 5.9 5.1 12,299.75 281 268,165.00 19,823 
RS Nova Hartz 0.5575 0.689 6.14 5.6 4.3 23,729.42 549 591,139.00 18,346 
RS Riozinho 0.5567 0.661 6.85 5.9 4.7 15,212.47 126 120,596.00 4,330 
RS São Pedro da Serra 0.5558 0.739 6.96 5.6 4.8 10,724.89 24 16,194.00 3,315 
SC Brusque 0.5558 0.795 4.85 6.0 4.9 27,910.08 795 680,066.00 105,503 
RS Alvorada 0.5550 0.699 6.35 4.4 3.3 7,529.94 6,866 7,716,266.00 195,673 
RS Flores da Cunha 0.5533 0.754 4.17 5.8 4.9 24,415.84 402 342,154.00 27,126 
RS Presidente Lucena 0.5533 0.757 7.32 0.0 4.7 17,627.21 11 7,411.00 2,484 
  201 
State Municipality IGD-M MHDI IDSUS IDEB 
(years 1-5) 
IDEB 
(years 6-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
Beneficiary 
Families 
Benefits Population 
SC Siderópolis 0.5533 0.774 5.95 5.2 4.2 19,658.26 196 184,116.00 12,998 
SP Pedreira 0.5525 0.769 5.61 6.1 5.0 16,705.71 398 422,077.00 41,558 
RS Cidreira 0.5517 0.729 6.42 4.6 3.1 11,253.95 678 850,668.00 12,668 
MT Sinop 0.5508 0.754 4.79 5.0 4.5 17,784.45 2,582 1,767,773.00 113,099 
RS Boa Vista do Sul 0.5508 0.728 5.46 0.0 0.0 22,040.35 17 14,948.00 2,776 
RS Caxias do Sul 0.5483 0.782 5.72 5.7 4.5 36,027.68 7,503 7,315,230.00 435,564 
RS Taquari 0.5483 0.733 4.41 5.3 4.3 16,217.23 835 837,826.00 26,092 
SC Schroeder 0.5483 0.769 6.74 5.5 4.8 15,755.22 183 160,047.00 15,316 
SP Tietê 0.5483 0.778 5.36 5.6 4.4 26,530.91 699 671,296.00 36,835 
RJ São João de Meriti 0.5458 0.719 4.04 4.1 3.1 10,522.12 22,107 22,483,486.00 458,673 
SP Louveira 0.5442 0.777 4.82 6.3 4.8 240,131.74 642 620,393.00 37,125 
MS Água Clara 0.5442 0.670 5.32 5.3 3.8 25,750.55 464 466,606.00 14,424 
RS Feliz 0.5442 0.750 6.22 6.1 4.9 19,274.54 52 40,405.00 12,359 
RS Salvador do Sul 0.5433 0.740 6.69 6.3 4.5 25,674.67 39 38,675.00 6,747 
RS Três Arroios 0.5433 0.791 5.98 0.0 6.0 14,817.16 9 12,898.00 2,855 
SP Itupeva 0.5367 0.762 5.46 5.6 5.0 48,938.14 696 787,483.00 44,859 
PR Almirante Tamandaré 0.5367 0.699 5.68 4.3 3.3 7,014.47 5,041 5,003,651.00 103,204 
RS Garibaldi 0.5358 0.786 5.17 5.8 4.8 33,741.99 223 219,811.00 30,689 
SP Atibaia 0.5342 0.765 4.82 6.3 4.8 24,191.21 2,751 2,659,201.00 126,603 
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SP Areiópolis 0.5333 0.695 7.17 5.7 4.1 9,176.39 156 179,896.00 10,579 
ES Vila Velha 0.5325 0.800 5.52 4.9 3.8 16,832.91 9,195 10,661,417.00 414,586 
RS Nova Candelária 0.5292 0.759 6.62 0.0 5.1 24,036.71 43 37,119.00 2,751 
RS Gramado 0.5208 0.764 6.19 5.7 4.5 19,658.97 550 569,780.00 32,273 
SC Palhoça 0.5175 0.757 6.68 5.3 4.2 14,699.54 2,680 2,943,334.00 137,334 
SP Araçoiaba da Serra 0.5092 0.776 5.48 5.8 4.6 11,121.95 462 535,829.00 27,299 
RS Jaquirana 0.5025 0.614 5.95 3.9 2.8 11,413.45 452 481,119.00 4,177 
RS Teutônia 0.5025 0.747 5.70 5.7 4.6 28,778.27 130 130,616.00 27,272 
SC Presidente Getúlio 0.5017 0.759 6.06 5.7 4.5 20,134.35 137 124,200.00 14,887 
RS Coronel Pilar 0.5017 0.727 5.66 0.0 0.0 17,564.64 18 14,573.00 1,725 
RS Nova Pádua 0.4975 0.761 4.32 0.0 4.6 21,930.61 26 16,064.00 2,450 
RS Herveiras 0.4950 0.616 6.42 0.0 3.8 13,007.45 137 166,870.00 2,954 
RS Protásio Alves 0.4933 0.733 6.64 0.0 4.8 16,414.50 47 36,615.00 2,000 
RS Canoas 0.4917 0.750 6.27 4.8 3.6 51,101.25 7,299 7,300,025.00 323,827 
SP Bariri 0.4833 0.750 6.45 6.0 4.8 18,631.25 439 432,965.00 31,593 
SC Arabutã 0.4792 0.733 6.43 6.8 5.2 10,774.86 48 41,526.00 4,193 
SP São Paulo 0.4733 0.805 6.21 5.1 4.2 39,418.85 166,137 130,772,676.00 11,253,503 
RS Nova Roma do Sul 0.4625 0.741 5.48 0.0 4.4 29,183.37 41 38,023.00 3,343 
RS Toropi 0.4617 0.683 6.90 0.0 4.5 12,856.03 143 137,872.00 2,952 
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RS Dois Lajeados 0.4617 0.757 6.90 0.0 5.5 21,252.59 27 25,807.00 3,278 
PE Fernando de Noronha 0.4583 0.788 0.00 5.2 4.6 12,787.83 10 6,946.00 2,630 
SP Guatapará 0.4517 0.743 6.42 5.3 4.0 16,464.69 188 204,144.00 6,966 
RS Linha Nova 0.4492 0.749 6.56 0.0 0.0 13,681.65 10 8,636.00 1,624 
RS Jari 0.4483 0.631 6.97 0.0 3.7 21,247.55 174 164,273.00 3,575 
RS Vista Alegre do Prata 0.4367 0.780 6.38 8.2 0.0 23,621.41 10 7,442.00 1,569 
RS Monte Belo do Sul 0.4092 0.752 6.15 0.0 5.2 25,756.18 1 660.00 2,670 
RS Santa Cecília do Sul 0.3908 0.725 6.59 5.3 0.0 22,891.84 23 21,521.00 1,655 
RS Santa Tereza 0.3550 0.746 6.70 0.0 4.7 15,713.95 9 8,998.00 1,720 
PI Nazária 0.3150 0.602 0.00 4.5 0.0 3,714.06 378 169,839.00 8,068 
 
 
 
